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The thesis I am putting forward is that Locke, when he talked about
identity, was in reality discussing two quite different notions. One of
them is the concept of identity; the other is that of "genetic identity,"
the relation which holds between temporal, parts that axe distinct from
each other, but which belong to a single, temporally extended whole.
Locke never possessed a clear grasp of this distinction; consequently he
assimilated both of these relations to that of identity. But some of his
views about the nature of identity can be more sensibly interpreted if we
take him to be talking about genetic identity than is possible if we re-
gard him as laying down a teaching concerning identity simply. Thus
Locke held that all significant assertions of identity must compare an
object as it exists at one time with itself it exists at another. As
stated, this is a false teaching. It is sufficient to make an identity
statement significant that the objects being identified are picked out by
means of predicates expressing ’distinct properties; it is not necessary
that these predicates contain references to times which are different.
But if, when speaking of significant identity statements, Locke really
intended to talk about the relation holding between different temporal
parts of a whole which persists through time, then it is obvious that the
singular terms picking out these parts will have to include references
vi
to different times. Similarly, Locke was apparently committed tc the
doctrine that statements having the form "A is the same F as E, A and 3
are both G's, but A is not the same G as E' 5 may be true. This proble-
matic teaching makes far better sense when interpreted as the weaker
claim that A and B may be temporal parts of a single individual of kind
F, but fail to be parts of a single individual of kind. G, even although
A and B both do belong to some individual of kind G„
Many of Locke’s so-called "criteria of identity" for entities of
particular sorts are best understood as criteria of genetic identity.
They are persistence criteria that stipulate the essential properties
which an individual of a certain sort must retain if it. is to continue to
exist. A reinterpretation along these lines is especially important in
the case of Locke’s "criterion of personal identity." Although Locke
officially subscribed to the doctrine ox the soul as an immaterial sub-
stance, he did not identify the person or the self with that soul. His
denial that the self is a substan.ce led him to identify the self with
thought or experience or with states of consciousness. What unifies a
series of states of consciousness existing at different mimes and makes
one person out of them? Because of his failure to distinguish between
identity and genetic identity, Locke - mistakenly answers this question by
saying that a person
,
Pot existing at a later time is identical with a
person, P,
,
existing at an earlier time if and only if P-, is capable of
remembering experiences of . This principle leads to contradictions.
Biit it may be reinterpreted as a theory that a temporal series of states
of consciousness constitutes a person just in case the last state in the
vii
series is such that it can remember experiences included in the earlier
states* Given certain modifications and clarifications, this is a logi-
cally coherent theory* However, it does entail many consequences re-
garding the nature of persons that are counter-intuitive.
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IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE THROUGH Tlx®
The purpose of this essay is to examine Locke's general theory of
identity together with the particular criteria which he puts forward for
the identity of entities of various sorts. I shall be particularly con-
cerned with his conception of the person and the account he gives of
personal identity. Locke's views on all of these topics are to some de-
gree obscure. Particularly where the subject of personal identity is
concerned, many commentators from the eighteenth century to the present
day have accused him of maintaining an inconsistent and incoherent doc-
trine. These criticisms may well be sound when directed against the
theory as it was explicitly formulated by Locke. It will be my conten-
tion, however, that his views are reconstructible in such a way as to
free them from contradictions.
1. The Nature of Identity
Locke appears to maintain two very general theses regarding the
nature of identity, both of which are highly controversial. First, he
makes the claim that all non-trivial assertions of identity are state-
ments concerning the sameness of an object considered as existing at one
time with itself considered as existing at another time. Second, he
seems to hold a theory concerning the relativity of identity which is
remarkably similar to that recently put forward by certain contemporary
T „ ,1
writsi's, of whom the best known representative may be Peter Geacru
Locke holds in effect that statements asserting the identity of A with B
2must be understood as abbreviations or incomplete versions of statements
having the form "A is the same F as 3" where "F" is regarded as replace-
able by an expression designating a kind or sort. His comments in this
connection have been interpreted, and not without good reason, as com-
mitting him to the much debated view that identity, like the relation
"better than," is fundamentally a "relative" relation.” The textual
evidence strongly suggests that Locke believed, where "F" and "G" are
replaced by expressions designating different sorts, it is possible that
A and B may be the same F and yet fail to be the same G, Let us examine
these crucial claims in more detail.
a.,. Identity as a temporal relation . Xu the opening statement of hi
chapter on identity and diversity Locke puts forward the contention that
identity is to be understood primarily as a relation holding between an
object as existing at one time and that same object existing at another
time.
Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the very
being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any
determined time end place
,
we compare it with itself existing
at another_time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and
diversity.-
Locke does not deny that an object considered at a single instant
of time may intelligibly be declared to be the same as itself.
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time,
we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and
not another which at that same time exists in another place, how
like and undiptinguishable soever it may be in all other
respects
Indeed, he seems to conceive of this sameness with itself, which is so
certainly manifested by every object in a given place at a given instant
5of time, as a kind of paradigm of the identity relation. But appar-
ently he does not regard the question as to the self-identity of such
an object as being of any conceivable interest to us. Non-trivial
questions regarding identity are raised only when we ask if an object
existing at one time is the same as an object existing at another time,
. ... and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is
attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment
wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we
compare the present. ... When therefore we demand whether
anything be the same or not, it refers always to something
that existed such a time in such a place, which it was cer-
tain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no
other.
^
That is to say, when we ask whether something is the same, we are
asking whether it is the same as an object previously existing in a
given place at a given time, about whose self-identity there was no
doubt.
Clearly these ideas of Locke’s concerning the relation of identity
differ significantly from those of the contemporary logician. Yet it is
not difficult to understand the considerations that underlie his
thinking. 'To many philosophers it has appeared as though statements of
identity must be either trivial or false ,
0
Locke is certainly not alone
in his attempt to find a way between the horns of this apparent dilemma.
The question "Is the person now standing before me identical with the
person now standing before me?" appeared to him, as indeed it does to
us all, an example of an utterly trivial query. But it neither seems,
nor is it trivial for someone to inquire if the person now standing be-
fore him is identical with some individual with whom at a previous
point in his life he was acquainted. Such a question may have immense
practical significance, a fact attested to by the existence in 'litera-
ture of many famous "recognition" scenes
„
The notion that questions of identity become interesting, and at
the same time problematic, when and only when they involve the compari-
son of an object as it exists at one time with itself existing at
another time makes its appearance in the writings of Hobbes. The
latter clearly exercised an important influence on Locke's ideas con-
cerning identity, and through Locke upon the ideas of his successors in
the Empiricist tradition. Hobbes divides his essay on "Identity and
Difference" into an earlier section which discusses the comparison of
one body with another, and a later one which is devoted to the compari-
son of the same body at different times with itself. In the earlier
section he says,
it is manifest that no tv/o bodies are the same ; for seeing
they are two, they are in tv/o places at the same time; as that,
which is the same, is at the same rime in one and the same place.
/
Clearly this comment is the genesis of the passage already quoted
from Locke in which he asserts that any object seen to be in a given
place at a given time can be known with absolute certainty to be identi'
cal with itself and to be non- identical with any merely qualitatively
similar object existing in another place.
The second section of Hobbes' discussion begins with a statement
that is apparently the source of Locke's conception of a non-trivial
question of identity.
But the same body may at different times be compared with
itself. And from hence springs a great controversy among
philosophers about the beginning of xnd3.vidv.atj.ont namely
,
5in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one
time the same, at another time not the same it was
formerly „ Fcr example, whether a man grown old be the
same man he was whilst he was young, or another man; or
whether a city in different ages the same, or another
city.0
Hobbes equates the more interesting question about identity with
that of individuation. At the same time he points out that it is pre-
cisely when an object changes, that is, manifests at a later time a
property or properties different from those it displayed at an earlier
date, that the question of whether it has remained the same object
throughout the change tends to be one of special significance and
interest. Although Locke does not stress this point in the opening
paragraphs of his chapter on identity, it becomes apparent from his
discussion as a whole that he does not disagree with Hobbes on this
issiie. And this brings us to see how misleading is his initial state-
ment in the paragraph recently quoted, namely:
.... and in this consists identity
,
when the ideas it is
attributed to vary not at all from what they were that
moment wherein we consider their former existence, and
to which we compare the present.
This is one of many passages in the Essay where Locke does not do
justice to his real views. In the first place, he surely means to say
that identity is attributed, not to cur juleas of the object, of which
there are typically a plurality and which clearly may differ from each
other in many significant ways, but rather to the object itself which
the ideas represent. And it is just when the ideas do vary from each
other- that the question of whether they represent one thing or many
things becomes ox greatest interest. What we are really concerned to
know is whether that which is depicted by varying ideas varies irom
6itself "not at all." Although identity questions may be of special
interest when the object under investigation has shown marked qualita-
tive change over a period of time, they remain significant even in the
absence of such change whenever an interval of time has elapsed between
the obtaining of the first idea of the object and that of the second
idea. For no matter how qualitatively similar these ideas may be,
there will always be the possibility that they are not ideas of one and
the same object. With these considerations in mind we can understand
why Locke believes that all non-trivial identity statements are of the
form, "B at tp = A at where "t^" and "tp" are tc be understood as
referring to distinct times.
It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, or to Hobbes either for
that matter, that it might also be of interest to inquire whether
different properties or qualities are uniquely and simultaneously
instantiated by a single object. Locke simply has not considered the
possibility of identity statements having a form such as "the capital
of Japan is (identical with) the largest city in the Far East." When we
make assertions such as these we clearly are net comparing an object
existing at a determined time and place with itself existing at another
time. What we are doing, described in Lockian terminology , is consider-
ing two simultaneously presented ideas which vary greatly from each
other, and asking if nevertheless they both apply (at the present time)
to the same object.
The position of Locke and the British Empiricists in general with
regard to the problem of identity may be described as follows. They had
a partial
,
a very partial and limited glimpse oi the tregean insight
7that if an identity statement is to be both true and significant, it
must equate expressions having different senses but only one denota-
tion or reference. What they perceived instead of this general rule is
in fact a special case of the Fregean principle, namely the case in
which the expressions to be equated are descriptions with times or
dates attached to them such that the times are different. This differ-
ence in the time or date suffices, of course, to guarantee that the
descriptions will have different senses. The property of being the
President of the United States on August 9 % 197^ » is not the same as the
property of being the President on August 10, 197^ • Thus Locke,
following in the footsteps of Hobbes, came to think of the significant
identity statement as one which compared an object as existing at one
time with itself as existing at another time. Needless to say, this had
a profound effect both upon his treatment of identity in general and
upon his criteria of identity for entities of various sorts.
b. The relativity of identity. Let us turn to a consideration of
Locke's views concerning the relativity of identity. Once again, we can
see the genesis of Locke's thinking in the writings of Hobbes. Hobbes'
key utterance on this subject follows:
But we must consider by what name anything is called, when
we inquire concerning the identity of it. For it is one
thing to ask concerning Socrates, whether he be the same
man, and another to ask whether he be the same body; for
his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when
he was an infant, by reason of the difference of magnitude;
for one body has always one and the same magnitude; yet,
nevertheless, he may be the same man. "9
Here is Locke's version of the doctrine:
It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all
sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but
to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what
idea the word it is applied to stands for; it being one
thing to be the same substance
, another the same man
,
and
a third the same person , if person , man , and substance
,
are three names standing for three different ideas; — for
such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be
the identity
Locke clearly wants to deliver to his readers a message of the
following nature. When you inquire whether A is identical with B,
don't imagine that you are necessarily asking whether A and B consti-
tute a single substantial whole. There are other kinds of unity
besides substantial unity. For example, a person is a whole, an indi-
vidual, but he is not a substantial whole in the way that a mass of
matter is. Therefore the requirements that must be met by an A and a B
before they are allowed to count as a single parson are not the same as
must be met by an A and a B that are candidates for being reckoned as a
single mass of matter. If A and B are to count as the same mass of
matter they must be made up of exactly the same material particles; but




a man) without meeting this requirement, providing they displayed
an appropriate relationship of another kind. A person is unified and
individuated by principles other than those that unify and individuate
substantial wholes. It seems reasonably clear that Hobbes, using the
example of a body (mass of matter) and a man (living human organism)
,
was making a similar point.
The interesting question is whether Hobbes and Locke intend to
make an even stronger claim. Bo they wish to uphold the thesis that
the terms "identical” and "numerically the same" are not employed uni-
9vocally? Does Locke wish to say that "is the same" denotes different
ideas cr has different meanings in expressions of the form "A is the
same substance as B," "A is the same man (i.e., human body) as B," and
"A is the same person as B"? If so, then the terms "being the same
substance," "being the same man," and "being the same person" refer to
three distinct relations of sameness. Nov/ it seems that Locke does in~
deed hold this view, for he contends that it is possible for A and B to
be the same nan or bodily organism and yet not be the same person. It
would be impossible for this contention to be true unless "being the
same man" and "being the same person" denoted distinct relations; for if
they denoted the same relation, the relation of identity simply, then A
and B would at the same time both stand in that relation and not stand
in it. Similarly, Locke says it may be that A and E are the same
organism while failing to be the same mass of matter and, of course, the
same considerations apply here.
Locke then, subscribes to the view that it is entirely possible for
A to be the same F as B while failing to be the same G as B, where "F"
and "G" are replaceable by expressions designating sorts or kinds, such
as person, organism and substance. Now there is a sense in which Locke's
claim can be regarded as a trivial truth. If "A" and "B" name one and
the same individual
,
than it will be true that A is the same F as B
just in case that individual, does have the property named by "F." So if
the individual referred to by "A" and by "B" is an F, but is not a. G,
then "A is the same F as B" will be true and "A rs the same G as 3
will be false. (Miss Ambrose is the same female as Mrs. Lazerowitz, but
she is not the seme male.) Locke, however, clearly intends to advance
10
a thesis much stronger and far more dubious than this. He wishes to
maintain that where A and 3 are the same F, and A is a G and B is a G,
it is yet possible for A and B not to be the same G.11 Thus, he says,
a small plant and a mature tree may be one and the same oak, but
although both the plant and the tree are masses of matter (collections
of material particles), they are not the same mass of matter.
In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not
on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For
in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not
the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree,
and then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt grown up
to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while
the same horse? though in both these cases., there may be a
manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not
either of them the same masses of matter, though they be
truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse.
The reason whereof is, that, in these two cases — a mass of
matter and a living body — identity is not applied to the
same thing.12
Similarly, Hobbes maintains that Old Socrates is the same man as Infant
Socrates, but not the same body, although, being a materialist, he
believes that both Old Socrates and Infant Socrates are bodies.
This contention on the part of Hobbes and Locke seems at first
sight extremely puzzling. One would think it impossible for A and B to
be the same F without being the same simply, i Te., without having all
their properties in common. Can Black Beauty and Dark Sweetheart be
one and the same horse except on condition that every property of the
one is also a property of the other? But if A is a G and B is a G,
and. A and B are not the same G, then there must be some property that /
the one has and the other lacks. At the very leant it must be the
case that B has, and A lacks, the property of being the same G as B„
If this is so, it appears to contradict the claim that A and B are the
11
same F. In defense, the relative identity theorist would no doubt pro-
test that it is precisely his view that an entity, A, may lack the prop-
erty of being the same G as B and yet possess that of being the same F
as B, But we may ask, if A lacks the property of being the same G as B,
must not this lack be the consequence of some other property that A and
B fail to have in common? Surely it cannot be the case that A and B
have all their properties in common except the property of being the
same G as B and that of being the same G as A. Such a claim would seem
to violate the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, at least in
spirit. Eut if, in addition to "being the same G as B," A fails to
possess still other properties belonging to B, is it reasonable to
suppose that A and B may be reckoned as one identical F? At the outset,
then, there is some question as to whether the theory of identity which
Locke is putting forward is a coherent one. Shortly we shall consider a
reinterpretation of his statements which renders what seem to be his
views concerning the relativity of identity far less px'oclematxe
.
Identity over Time and Temporal Parts
a. Comparing an obj ect with itself . Locke's thesis that a signifi-
cant judgment of identity involves a comparison of an ooject as it
exists at one time with itself existing at another time has been chal-
lenged on grounds of unintelligibility . In a recent article criticizing
Locke and Strawson, Michael Durrant says, '’it makes no sense to i-al-k of
comparing anything with itself ..." and goes on to assert: "The logic of
comparison here demands that X's which are to be compared are indeed two
12
It follows from this, he seems to think, that the claim that "we
can genuinely talk about- something ’being the same with itself" is
deficient; presumably he means to refer to a logical deficiency.
Similarly, he denies that we can talk of any individual "being the thing
14
it is and not another." Starting from these views, he then goes on to
attempt to discredit the notion of numerical, identity altogether.
A statement that am object is "the same with itself" appears to be
the Lockian equivalent of an assertion that it is self-identical. When
Locke speaks of a thing "being the thing it is and not another," in
addition to attributing self-identity to the object he is presumably
saying that it is identical with itself alone . Now even if it is true
that it is not logically possible to compare a thing with itself, the
deficiency of a claim that an object is self-identical follows only if
this claim cannot be posited without making such a comparison. It is
not immediately obvious that this is true. It is not even certain that
Locke intends to assert it as true. For although Locke thinks that in
malting the interesting statements of identity we are comparing, or need
to compare, an object with itself, he does not say that we do this or
need to do this when we are sure, concerning an object which we see "to
be in any place in any instant of time," that "it is that very thing,
and not another ..." or, in an alternative formulation, when we are cer-
tain that it is "the same with itself and no other." This certainty,
according to Locke, is not based on a comparison of the object with
itself, and a subsequent finding that it is identical with itself. It
is founded instead on the following reasoning.
13
For we never finding nor conceiving it possible that two
things of the same kind should exist in the same place
at the same time, we rightly conclude that whatever exists
anywhere at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and
is there itself alone. ^-5
So even if Locke is wrong about the possibility of comparing an object
as it exists at one time with itself as it exists at another, this
would not vitiate the intelligibility or the truth of the assertion that
an object existing in a given place at a given time is identical with
itself and with itself alone. Nor would this error on Locke's part ad-
versely affect his account of the way we come to know that such an
object is self-identical.
Nevertheless, if Currant is right in maintaining that the logic of
comparison excludes the possibility of comparing a thing with itself,
Locke's theory of significant identity judgments would seem at first
sight to be undermined. It is difficult to judge whether Durrant's claim
is correct. The notion of comparison does not seem to be sufficiently
precise to permit a clear answer to this question. But one point does
seem clear. No object can be found to differ from itself or to be in
any way dissimilar to itself. If A differs from B, then A possesses
some property that B lacks, and vice versa. But under these circum-
stances it is impossible for A to be identical with B , for nothing can
possess a property that it lacks. This holds true, not only at a given
time, but for the entire time span of the object's existence. Strictly
speaking, nothing that endures through time can gain or lose a property.
For let us assume that at b, an object is F and that at t^ it has ceased
to be F. Then the thing that exists at t. and the thing that exists at.
fail to have all their properties in common. Consequently they can-
14
not be one and the same thing. So if change entails the acquisition or
loss of some property, v/e are left with the shocking conclusion that it
is impossible for anything to change and yet to continue in existence.
Motion, of course, will be one of the interdicted forms of change. The
shock engendered by this remark will be considerably softened as soon as
we recognize that any entity may possess different dated properties, the
descriptions of which have the form respectively "F at t^" and fi-F at
t.,V To say of an object that it possesses such properties is tanta-
mount to an assertion that it has changed or that it will change. But
the key point is that it will have both these properties all through its
existence, so that at no point during that existence will it differ from
"I 6itself." When physical objects that persist through time are viewed in
this way, they turn out to be changeless four-dimensional entities, each
of them occupying a certain chunk of space time. Thus the planet Venus
17
may be regarded as a four-dimensional spiral segment of space time.
b. Comparing temporal parts . We now see that we must provide a re=
interpretation for statements which apparently assert that an object
existing, as Locke would say, at one time differs from itself as it
existed at another time. Such statements seem to be making the claim
that there is some one object which has lost a property it formerly
possessed and which has acquired a new property in its place. But we
have seen that this is impossible. V/e may reinterpret this claim along
the lines already sketched. Then we shall say that the object never
differs from itself but that at all times it possesses two properties,
one of which is desc-ritable by a term having the lorra "F at t^
1
' and the
other by a term of the form !'-F at But it is possible to give
15
another kind of reinterpretation, perhaps under these circumstances a
more natural one, which preserves the notion of difference between the
thing that exists at an earlier time and the thing that exists at a
later time. We may attribute F~ness and not F-ness, not to the indi-
vidual which persists through time and which is said to undergo change,
but to its temporal parts. Thus a statement that an object has
changed would be paraphrased by saying a later part of it lias a property
that some earlier part lacks. No contradiction is entailed by the
latter claim, since the parts of the object are distinct. Temporal
parts, just like spatial parts, may differ from each other in a
variety of ways and hence the comparison of any two (or more) of them
is wholly unproblematic. Thus the early temporal parts of a person in-
variably possess the property of youthfulness; the last parts, in most
cases, lack that property. Let us consider the lamentable case of a
devotee of Greta Garbo who meets her in person sometime after, let us
say, 1970. He will no doubt make the sad observation that she has lost
her beauty. We may say, if we wish, that he is considering a change-
less four-dimensional chunk of space time and attributing to that chunk
the property of being beautiful from 3-925 until. 19^5 and also the prop-
erty of being non-beautiful after 1970. But he may also say "The Greta
of today bears l.ittle resemblance to the Greta of former years." I-
the point of this assertion is that the object now being presented to
him is truly different from the object of bis previous acquaintance,
then indeed ha must be sjjeaking of two objects, not cne. He must be
contrasting distinct temporal segments of a more inclusive bodily v/noj.e.
16
Now it is a fact that, except in the case of very short-lived enti-
ties, we normally perceive in any single act of perception, only a por-
tion of an object that persists through time. When Greta's devotee
meets her at a cocktail party in 1971, clearly he does not perceive
Greta from her birth until her death. He is able to perceive only that
temporal segment of Greta which is contemporaneous with the party. It
is his unfortunate lot to compare this presently perceptible temporal
part of her with the earlier parts which he had so much admired, hut
which (except on celluloid) are no longer directly accessible to the
senses. The relationship which holds between the part which is
presently perceptible and the formerly perceptible, presently remembered
part is the ground, not only for the contrast between them, but for the
ascription of them both to a single entity. Such ascriptions of
distinct temporal parts to one inclusive temporal whole are sometimes
18
referred to as judgments of genetic identity or genidentity. A less
dramatic form of the situation confronting Garbo’s fan is one that
typically prevails whenever we re-encounter a physical object of which
we have had previous perceptual experience. At the time of the new
encounter we perceive only a temporal segment of the enduring four-
dimensional object. We compare this segment, as given in present per-
ception, with earlier segments, as given in memory. It is this compar-
ison of the most recent segment with earlier ones that provides the
basis both for judgments of identity and genidentity. Statements which
declare that distinct temporal parts belong to the same temporal whole
and statements which assert the existence of a single object having
properties describable by terms of the form "F at t^" and
1 G at t^" are
17
no doubt intertransiatable. But in cases involving the recognition of
objects given in perception, both kinds of judgment appear to be epi-
stemically dependent on a comparison of temporal segments.
c. Dated and undated properties
. Temporal parts may be conceived
of as "time-slices," that is, as momentary states without duration.
Then they are comparable to spatial points that lack magnitude „ Or
they may be thought of as "time-stretches" which last for some finite
19period. In the latter case they may be of any duration which is less
than the lifespan of the object of which the segment is a part. Conse-
quently temporal segments may overlap and may include other temporal
segments as their own proper parts. The properties to which we attach a
date when we think of them as belonging to a temporally persistent whole
with a lifespan including that date as a proper part of itself, we
attribute, 'without the date, to the appropriate temporal segments. Let
us consider the case of Jones, who was born on January 1, 1900, was
married on January 1, 1925, and who conveniently died on January 1, 1950.
Let us further assume, although somewhat unrealistically, that the period
in which a person is a new-born baby coincides exactly with the date of
his birth, the period in which he is a bridegroom with the day of his
•wedding, etc. Then that temporal segment of Jones which coincides with
the date of his birth has the property cf being a new-born baby and so
does every segment which is entirely included as a proper part of the
birthday segment. The temporal part which coincides with his v/edaing
day, and every proper part thereof, possesses the property of being a
bridegroom. While lacking the properties of being a new-born baby oi a.
bridegroom simply., Jones, the person who is the sum of these and other
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temporal parts, has the corresponding dated properties of being a new-
born baby on (or during) January 1, 1900, and of being a bridegroom on
January 1, 1925. These properties attach to Jones throughout his life,
while the property of being a new-born baby simply belongs only to
those temporal segments which coincide with January 1, 1900 (or parts
thereof)
,
and the property of being a bridegroom simply to those which
coincide with January 1, 192.5, and its parts. For if on January 1, 1900,
Jones had possessed the property of being a new-born baby simply, he
would subsequently have lost that property. The consequence would be
that after January 1, 1900, Jones would lack a property he had
possessed on that date. From this it would follow that Jones on January
1, 1901, let us say, could not be the same person as Jones on January 1,
1900. What is true of the person as a whole will also be true of tempo-
ral segments which contain either the day of Jones' birth or a portion
of that day as a proper temporal, part. They will possess the dated prop-
erty of being a new-born baby on January 1, 1900. For it is true of
every temporal, segment which persists over a period of time that it can-
not gain ox' lose a property and yet remain identical with itself.
However, to the person as a whole we may attribute certain undated
properties® It would be tempting to say that he possesses all and only
those undated properties which belong to each of his temporal segments.
For example, we might say he possesses the property of being human
simply, if and only if each of his temporal parts possesses it. The
difficulty is that there are certain undated properties which belong to
all temporally persistent wholes, not themselves proper parts oi a more
inclusive whole, no matter what kind of entity they may happen to be,
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and which do not belong to any temporal parts, no matter what sort of whole
they belong to. An obvious example of such a property is that of not
being a temporal part. Similarly all temporal segments possess certain
properties, such as being a proper temporal part of a more persistent whole,
which belong to them in virtue of their nature as tempoi’al segments. These
properties do not belong to any wholes which are not themselves temporal
segments. But if we leave out of consideration these properties that flow
from the nature of temporal wholes and parts as such, then it seems we may
safely say that a temporal, whole has an undated property, P, if and only
if that property belongs to each of its temporal parts. In the case of
Jones, such properties would undoubtedly include being human and being male
(assuming Jones does not visit Denmark). They might or might not include a
characteristic such as being an American citizen. If an undated property,
such as American citizenship, belongs to some temporal part or parts, but
not to others, the corresponding dated property will belong to the whole
composed of these parts. Thus if Jones is born an American citizen, but
in 1925 formally shifts his allegiance to the Soviet Union, then he will
have the dated property of being a United States citizen from his birth
date in 1900 until the relevant day in 1925* No one can be identical with
Jones tinless at every point in his existence he possesses all of the dated
and undated properties possessed by Jones at every point in his.
d,y Expressions of the form "A at t." It now becomes evident that
expressions such as !!A. at t" are subject to at least two different inter-
pretations. They may be taken as definite descriptions which make refer-
ence, not to entities whose existence is confined to the time mentioned in
the description, but to entities with lifespans of which the time men-
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tioned in the description is merely a segment. Thus "B at may be
interpreted as "the person having the property of dying on January 1,
1950," while for "A at t " we may substitute "the person having the
property of being married on January 1, 1925." Both of these descrip-
tions apply to Jones, the individual who came into existence on January
1, 1900, who continued to exist until January 1, 1950 s and who had the
dated property of being married on January 1, 1925, and the dated proper-
ty of dying on January 1, 1950, all his life long. Thus "B at t^" and
"A at t^" can be regarded as expressions which specify their temporally
persistent referents through the mention of some dated property which
the object being denoted possesses during the entire span of its exis-
tence. Let "P^_" be a dummy dated property name,, "P^" will be replace-
able by expressions such as "the property of being born on January 1,
1900," or "the property of dying on January 1, 1950." "A at t," as we
are now understanding it, is an abbreviation for "the A which has
It is a name for an entity, A, which exists, not merely at t, but at a
number of different times. The reference to a time that appears in the
name is a .reference to the time at which there exists a temporal part of
A that possesses the undated property which we are using with a date
attached as a means to pick out A. Let us replace "A at t" with "the
man who resigned the Presidency of the United States on August 9, 1974."
The whole expression refers to the temporally persistent individual,
Richard Nixon. A temporal part of Nixon, coinciding with August 9,
1974, had the undated property of resigning the Presidency. We men-
tioned that prope.rty and the date coinciding with the temporal part ol
Nixon that possessed that property in order to pick out Nixon, the whole
21
person, who includes that temporal segment as one of his proper parts.
When interpreted in this way, expressions such as "A at t" may properly
flank an identity sign. An example of a well-formed statement having
the form "B at t
2 =
A at t^' is the assertion that the man who has the
property of resigning the Presidency on August 9, 1974, is identical
with the man who has the property of being re-elected as President on
the second Tuesday of November, 1972.
But there is another interpretation that may be given to the ex-
pressions "A at t^" and "B at t^." They may be taken as dummy names for
temporal segments of persons or objects. Thus "A at t" may be inter-
preted as a name for a temporal segment of A which coincides with t and
only with t. But on the latter interpretation it is clear that state-
ments of the form "B at t^ = A at t^ " are not genuine statements of iden-
tity. For if t and t^ are different times, and if A at t^ and B at t p
are both temporal segments of some object (whether the same or different)
such that A's existence coincides only with t^ and B's existence only
with t.
s ,
then A at t^ can never be identical with B at t^. Under this
interpretation of these expressions, the claim that B at t^ is identical
with A at t,
,
if it is to make sense at all, must be reformulated as the
contention that B at t and A at t., are both parts, although distinct
parts, of the same temporally persistent whole.
e« Critic isms of the doctrine of temporal parts . Before we pro-
ceed to reinterpret Locke’s assertions about identity as statements con-
cerning the relation holding between temporal stages, we must recognize
that the view that objects which persist through time are composed of
temporal parts or temporal segments has been subjected to attack. In
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particular, it has been maintained that an object constituted out of
such parts cannot be a real unity. The genesis of this attack has sorae-
20times been attributed to Bishop Butler. But this seems to be a mis-
take. Butler made a distinction between "a strict and philosophical"
sense of identity and "a loose and popular" sense. He did not contend,
however
,
that an object composed of distinct temporal parts could not be
identical with itself in a strict and philosophical sense. He maintained
merely that strict identity entails sameness of substance . material or
spiritual. More accurately, where "A" and "B" are names of a material
object, Butler in effect stipulated that A is strictly or philosophically
identical with B if and only if there exists a substance such that A has
a spatial part of it and B lias a spatial part of it. Or we may say more
simply that the strict identity of A and B requires that there be some
substance which A and B have in common. And this teaching, in turn,
seems to be founded on the notion that "the same property cannot be
transferred from one substance to another." So if there is no substance
or part of a substance common to A and B, then "no one of their proper-
ties is the same." Thus if a tree existing today and a tree existing in
the same place fifty years ago "have not one common particle of matter,"
"they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the
word same|" they can be identical, only in a loose and popular sense.
Strangely enough, Butler seems to leave open the possibility that A and B
might be strictly identical even if they had only a part of their sub-
stance in common and consequently shared only part of their properties.
Whatever the confusions in Butler's thinking, and there are plainly
a number cf them, it does not seem reasonable to attribute to him tne
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belief that nothing which is composed of temporal parts can constitute a
genuine unity through time. His concerns lie elsewhere. Such a view,
however, has been espoused by Roderick Chisholm, most notably in his
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essay on "Problems of Identity." Chisholm argues, first, that the doc-
trine that persons possess or are composed of temporal parts "is not ade-
quate to the experience we have of ourselves" when we are aware of differ-
ent experiences occurring over an interval of time. He analyzes the ex-
perience of someone who hears the birdcall "Bob White" in the following
terms.
We will say, then, "There exists an x such that x hears 'Bob'
and then x hears 'White'." Jonathan Edwards and our meta-
physician would say that the experience could be adequately
described by using two variables: "There exists a y and a z
such that y hears 'Bob' and z hears 'White'." But the latter
sentence is not adequate to the experience in question. The
man who has the experience knows not only (1) that there is
someone who hears 'Bob' and someone who hears 'White'. He
also knows (2) that the one who hear-s 'Bob' is identical with
the one who hears 'White 1 . And, what is crucial to the
present problem, he knows (3) that his experience of hearing
•Bob' and his experience of hearing 'White 5 were not also had
by two other things, each distinct from himself and from each
other .22
We may certainly agree with Chisholm that the statement "there exists a
^ and a z such that ^ hears 'Bob' and z hears 'White'" is not an ade-
quate analysis of the phenomenon in question. That statement needs to
be supplemented by the further assertion that ^ and z axe temporal
parts of one and the sane person, so that the experience of hearing
"Bob” at one time and the experience of hearing "White" at a later time
are both experiences had by one individual. Furthermore, if the bird-
call is to be experienced as a unity, then the part z which hears
"White" must remember the "Bob" heard by jr. But it seems that even
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when thus supplemented, the temporal part analysis of the "Bob White"
experience would not be acceptable to Chisholm. For he not only wants
to say that the person who hears "Bob" is identical with the person who
hears "White;" he wishes to deny that, in addition to the person who
hears these two sounds, there are "two other things, each distinct from
himself and from each other" such that one of them hears "Bob" and the
other hears "White." To make such a claim, he apparently believes,
would be to multiply entities beyond necessity. Let us consider a
board, the right-hand half of which is painted red and the left-hand
half of which is painted blue. Then there is a board which is painted
red and there is a board which is painted blue. Furthermore it is true
that the board which is painted red is identical with the board which is
painted blue. Shall we now affirm or deny the assertion that there are
also two other things, namely the right-hand half of the hoard and the
left-hand half of the board, each distinct from the board and from each
other, such that the one is painted red and the other is painted blue?
Well, if for "thing" we may substitute only names that apply to whole
boards, so that the statement is thought to imply that in addition to the
board, half of which is painted red and haif of which is painted blue,
there are also two other whole boards, one of them red and the other
blue, then surely it will mislead us as to the facts. There is only
one board, not three. But if for "thing" we may substitute not only
names which are applicable to whole boards, but also to parts of boards,
then the statement seems unexceptionable. The board clearly has
spatial parts and these parts are distinct from each other as well as
from the whole of which they are parts. If we interpret "thing" in
this way, and if we also make the assumption that every spatial magni-
tude is infinitely divisible, it would not be incorrect to say that
v/herever there exists a single spatially extended thing, there also
exists an infinite number of such objects. Let us assume that the
thing in question is a fi litely extended line. Then each of its infi-
nite number of parts is also a line, so it is correct to say that in
addition to there being one line, there is also an infinite number of
them. But there is something that differentiates each of the infinite
number of parts of the line from the line of which they are parts.
Only the latter line has the property of not being a proper part of a
line. 'There is just one line that has that property. The situation
appears to be analogous with objects that are temporally extended. Let
us consider the hearer of the birdcall. There is just one temporally
extended person who has the property of not being a proper temporal
part of a person. But he has an indefinite number of temporal segments
each of which does have the property of being a proper part of a person
and perhaps of being a person simply. When we say that in addition to
the person that hears ,iBob White” there is an earlier person-part that
hears "Bob” arid a later person-part that hears "White," it is important
to remember that we are not affirming that there are three persons, all
of them with the property of not being a proper part of a person. And
if we do keep this point in mind, the accusation that we are multi-
plying entities appears less formidable.
Chisholm gees on to criticize -what he considers to be the case for
the doctrine of temporal parts, that is, "the doctrine according to
which, for every period of time during which an individual thing
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exists, there is a temporal part of that thing which is unique to that
23period of time."
What is this case? It is based, presumably, upon the
assumption that whatever may be said about spatial continuity
and identity may also be said, mutatis mutandis
,
about tempo-
ral continuity and identity. If this assumption is correct,
then the doctrine of temporal parts would seem to be true.
We may say, as our metaphysician did: "Just as an object
that is extended through space at a given time has, for each
portion of space that it occupies, a spatial part that is
unique to that portion of space at that time, so, too, any
object that persists through a period of time has, for each
subpez*iod of time during which it exists, a temporal pert
that is unique to that subperiod of time." But is it correct
to assume that whatever may be said about spatial continuity
and identity may also be said, mutatis mutandis
,
about tempo-
ral continuity and identity? I would say that there is a
fundamental disanalogy between space and time.
The disanalogy may be suggested by saying simply: "One
and the same thing cannot be in two different places at one
and the same time. But one and the same thing can be at two
different times in one and the same place." Let us put the
point of disanalogy, however
,
somewhat more precisely.
When we say "a thing cannot be in two different places
at one and the same time," we mean that it is not possible for
all the parts of the thing to be in one of the places at that
one time and also to be in the other of the places at that
same time. It is, possible, of course, for some part of the
thing to be in place at a certain time and another part of
the thing to be in another place at that time. And to remove
a possible ambiguity in the expression "all the parts of a
thing," let us spell it out to "all the parts that the thing
ever will have had."
Instead of saying simply "a thing cannot be in two dif-
ferent places at one and the same time,” let us say this:
"It is not possible for there to be a thing which is such
that all the parts it ever will have had are in cne place at
one time and also in another place at that same time." And
instead of saying "a thing can be at two different times in
one and the same place," let us say this: "It ius possible
for there to be a thing which is such that all the parts it
ever will have had are in one place at one time and also in
that same place at another time."
It seems to me to be clear that each of these two
theses is true and therefore that there is a fundamental dis-
analogy between space and time.. And so if the case for the
doctrine of temporal parts presupposes that there is no such
disanalogy, then the case is inadequate . (We may, oi course
,
appeal to the doctrine of temporal parts in order to defena
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the view that there is no such disanalogy. We may use
it, in particular, to criticize the second of the two
theses I set forth above, the thesis according to which
it is possible for there to be a thing which is such
that all the parts it ever will have had are in one
place at one time and also in that same place at another
time. But what, then, is the case for the doctrine of
temporal parts? )^ +
In this section Chisholm apparently is trying to establish two claims.
The weaker one asserts that a certain analogy between spatial conti-
nuity and identity, on the one hand, and temporal continuity and identi-
ty, on the other, cannot be established as a fact without assuming the
doctrine of temporal, parts as true. The analogy in question is between
the impossibility that all the spatial parts of a thing should be in
one place at one time and also in another place at that same time and
the like impossibility that all the temporal parts of a thing should be
in one place at one time and also in that same place at another time.
This analogy, of course, depends on the assumption that there are tempo-
ral parts. Hence, if the statement of the analogy is utilised as a
premise in the argument for the conclusion that "whatever may be said
about spatial continuity and identity may also be said, mutatis mutandis,
about temporal continuity and identity," the latter principle cannot be
employed to support the doctrine of temporal parts except on pain of
circularity. This seems to be a sound claim.
Chisholm’s second and stronger assertion is that there is a funda-
mental disanalogy between space and time. Hence the teaching that what-
ever may be said about spatial continuity may also be said aoout temporal
continuity is false. But, as Chisholm himself implicitly admits, the
proof of the existence of this disanalogy is dependent on the assumption
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that the doctrine of temporal parts is false. Anyone who thinks the doc-
trine true will want to substitute for "parts" in the first thesis the
term "spatial parts," and for "parts" in the second thesis the term
"temporal parts." Then the first thesis remains true, but the second
thesis becomes false. It follows that if this disanalogy is employed to
discredit the doctrine of the parallelism between space and time, the
falsity of that doctrine cannot then be utilized to disprove the teach-
ing about temporal parts except on pain of circularity. Consequently
Chisholm's contention about the disanalogy between space and time does
not appear to advance the argument.
In any case, even if some disanalogies between space and time can be
established, it would not follow that spatial continuity and temporal con-
tinuity are aisanalogous in all respects. In particular', it would not
follow that there is a disanalogy between the existence of spatial parts
and of temporal parts. The doctrine of spat ial parts, as enunciated by
Chisholm's metaphysician, seems to follow from the unquestionably true
premise that every spatial magnitude and every object possessing spatial
magnitude is, at least conceptually, divisible. The doctrine of temporal
parts is similarly founded on the assumption that every temporal magnitude
and every object possessing temporal magnitude or extension is divisible.
Does it seem reasonable to question the truth of the latter assumption?
Is it possible to conceive of an extent of time that is not, at least in
principle, subject to division? And fox' every extent of time that faxls
within the lifespan of a temporally extended object, no matter how short,
that extent may be, is there not some portion of that object which coin-
29
cides with that extent? If that is so, the doctrine of temporal parts
would seem to be as much of a necessary truth as its companion teaching
regarding spatially extended entities.
Chisholm goes on to maintain that there are at least some things
which "persist intactly" through time.
"... a thing 'persists intactly' if it has continued, uninterrupted
existence through a period of time and if, at any moment of its exist-
ence, it has precisely the same parts it has at any other moment of its
existence.
There is an ambiguity, however, in the expression "precisely the
same parts." It is indeed possible for an object to possess at one
moment precisely the same spatial parts as it possessed at an earlier
moment. The spatial parts of an extended object, like the object itself,
may be regarded as four-dimensional chunks of space time. They are the
subjects of dated properties which they possess during the entire span of
their existences, and as such, they are things which may remain self-
identical over a period of time. Thus an object made up of two atoms, A
and B, v/ill be thought of as retaining precisely the same spatial parts
so long as it consists of those two atoms and no others. But is it
possible for an object to possess at a later moment of its existence the
same temporal parts it possessed at some earlier moment? Once again, the
question needs clarification. An object which persists through time, as
we have seen, at every point in its existence has all the properties it
ever had and ever will have, although some of these, properties have dates
attached to them. So there is a sense in which at every point in its
existence the object possesses all the temporal parts it ever had or ever
will have, and a sense in which it is true that "at any moment of its
existence, it has precisely the seme temporal parts it has at any other
moment of its existence." In. this sense all objects which persist at
all, persist intactly. But not all of the temporal parts of an object
coincide with that moment of its existence which is the present moment.
And if Chisholm means to require, as it seems he does, that all the tem-
poral parts of an object which persists intactly over a period of time
should coincide exactly with each sub-period of that time, then he is
asking the impossible, and nothing can persist intactly. Let us con-
sider an object which exists from t^ and t^. Then a part of its exist-
ence will coincide with the period from t^ until t^, another part with
the pex'iod from until t^, and still another with the period from t_
until t.^. That is the same thing as saying it will have a temporal part
that lasts from t, until t_, another lasting from t_ until t^ and a third
from tj until t,, . In addition it will have mere inclusive proper tempo-
ral parts that extend from t n until t^ and from t until t,, . But surely1 y 2 H-
it is exceedingly strange to suggest that each of these temporal segments
must coincide with, let us say, the period from t, until t^. By defini-
tion, the segment which exists from t^ until t
^
cannot be the same seg-
ment as that existing from t until t^*
3o Reinterpreting Locke's Views on Identity
V/e have already observed that some of Locke's statements concerning
identity indicate that he conceived of that relation (or relations) in a
’way that differs significantly from the way of the contemporary logician.
We must now consider whether his more puzzling and deviant views about
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identity make becter sense if* we take him to be talking, not about iden-
tity, but about temporal segments and the relation, so-called, of genet-
ic identity that obtains between such segments when they belong to a
single temporal whole. We suggested that, in putting forward the thesis
that all significant identity statements involve the comparison of an
object "as existing at one time" with itself "at another time," Locke
may have been motivated by a realisation, however partial, that if an
assertion of identity is to escape triviality, the expressions flanking
the identity sign must have different senses, that is, they must express
different properties. Stipulating that these expressions must contain
references to times that are distinct was a way, although an unnecessar-
ily stringent one, to see that this requirement would be met. Even if
this suggestion about hi.s philosophical, motivation is correct, however, it
would certainly be a vast exaggeration to claim that Locke had a clear
understanding of the reasons for his stipulation. Indeed, if he had
possessed such an understanding it seems obvious that he would not have
framed his requirements for significant identity statements as he did.
Locke was not S’rege. But a person who glimpses that an assertion of
identity can be freed from triviality if its singular terms contain refer-
ences to different times without fully understanding why this is the ease-
ls very prone to shift from one interpretation of those terms to the
other and not be aware of what he is doing. In our terminology, he is
liable to confuse an expression whose form should be analyzed as "the A
which has P ’* with one having the form "the temporal, segment of A which
coincides exactly with t." In fact, the only way to steer crear of such
a confusion in dealing with terms of the form "A at t" is to have a
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grasp of the distinction between the very different relations of iden-
tity and genidentity. It seems doubtful that any of the philosophers
in the tradition of British Empiricism understood this distinction.
That Locke was oblivious of it will become particularly obvious when we
undertake a discussion of his treatment of personal identity. It is
easy to see, then, how Locke may have started out with the idea that sig-
nificant identity statements should have the form "the B which has P =
t
2
the A which has P " and then have passed over to the notion that the
l
l
correct form for such assertions should be "the temporal segment of 3
which coincides exactly with t^ = the temporal segment of A which coin-
cides exactly with t^." The first idea suffers merely from the defect of
being excessively restrictive; the second notion, which if left unana-
lyzed so dangerously resembles the first, makes no sense at all when
" = " is interpreted as standing for identity. It makes excellent sense,
however, if " = " is reinterpreted as standing for the relation of genetic
identity.
We opened this chapter by pointing out that Locke appeal's to think
that every statement of the form "A is the same as (is identical with) B"
is an incomplete version of one having the form "A is the same F as B."
"F" is to be replaced by an expression denoting a kind or sort. What
Locke says suggests that he believes "A is the same F as B" cannot be ana-
lyzed as asserting (l) A is F, (2) B is F and. (3) A is identical witn B,
for whether or not (3) is true depends on the sort whose name replaces
"F," and of which A and B are claimed to be the self—same instance. It
is "one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third
the same person ..." Let us consider an example of the sort of case in
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which we might feel disinclined to assent to a statement of the identity
of A with 3 without having it filled out as a statement that A is the
same F as B and then assuring ourselves that the name replacing "F"
designated the appropriate sort or kind. Suppose that we recognize in
the elderly man to whom we are presently being introduced a boy whom we
knew many years ago. We might well be reluctant to say simply "the old
gentleman is identical viith the little boy" and at the same time we
might find it perfectly natural to assert that the old gentleman is the
same -person as the little boy. I would suggest that the reason why the
unqualified statement of identity between the old gentleman and the
little boy may appear objectionable is that in making it we attribute to
the old gentleman all the properties of the little boy and vice versa.
Specifically, we seem to be attributing to the old gentleman the property
of being a little boy. This is something we may not want to do. Cer-
tainly it would be unnatural to reply in the affirmative if we are
asked, "Is this old gentleman a little boy?" or "Is he an embryo?" This
is an indication that in a context of this sort "this old gentleman" is
taken as referring, not to the person who at one time was a little boy
and at the present time is an old gentleman, but only to that, temporal seg-
ment of him which has the undated property of being an old gentleman.
For the person who includes this segment as a temporal part has the
properties of being a little boy and an embryo in just the same way as he
has the property of being an old gentleman* he has them all as dared
properties. So if we attribute one of these properties to him, we should
find the attribution of any of the others equally unobjectionable. On the
other hand, if we ask "Was this old gentleman a little boy? V/as he an
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embryo?" we seem to feel no difficulty with the affirmative answer.
Tensing the question apparently alters the context in such a way that
"this old gentleman" no longer refers to a late temporal segment of the
person in question, but rather to the individual as a temporal whole,
who as such is the subject of a variety of dated properties. In any
case, statements such as "the old gentleman is the little boy" seem to
be ambiguous. The singular terms may be taken as referring to persons
who are not themselves temporal parts of persons, or they may be re-
gained as denoting temporal segments of such persons. In the former
case the statements may be true; in the latter they are invariably
false. No temporal part of a person has both the undated property of
being an old gentleman and the undated property of being a little boy;
as undated properties these two are mutually incompatible. The ambi-
guity of such statements may explain the uncertainty some people feel
about regarding them as true or possibly true. That ambiguity is not
necessarily removed by recasting the statement in the mold of "A is the
same F as B." In the context of a statement such as "the old gentleman
is the same person as the little boy" "the old gentleman" and "the
little boy" may very well continue to refer to temporal segments. In
fact, it is more likely than ever that they should be regarded as doing
so. But even if we do interpret the singular terms this way, it does
not seem to be a bar to thinking that the expanded statement is true.
The explanation of this circumstance must be thac substituting "is the
same person as" for "is identical with" permits the statement to assert
a relation between the old gentleman and the little boy which is othei
than the relation of identity. It may transform an identity statement
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into one of genidentity. Another way of making the same point is to say
that the "is" in "is the same (or iaentical)person as" is not neces-
sarily the "is" of identity; it may be the "is" of composition. Then
we are saying that the old gentleman and the little boy go to make up
the person who has them both as temporal segments; the person is composed
of or constituted out of these and other segments. Understood in this
way, a statement of the form "A is the sane F as B" would assert that A
and B are both parts, although distinct parts, of a whole which is F.
Thus, although "this old gentleman is the same person as the little boy"
is, under the appropriate factual circumstances, perfectly acceptable,
we should certainly reject "the old gentleman is the same child as the
little boy" and "the old gentleman is the same little boy as the little
boy." That these formulations are unacceptable is a further indication
that the singular terms are regarded as referring to temporal segments.
The last two sentences are objectionable because they suggest, respective-
ly, that the old gentleman is part of a child and of a little boy.
Of course statements having the form "A is the same F as B" need
not be interpreted in this way, and sometimes they cannot be. If we
say "Tokyo is the same city as the capital of Japan" clearly we are not
maintaining that Tokyo and the capital of Japan are parts, either spatial
or temporal, of the same city. But unlike the case of "the old gentle-
man is identical with the little boy," here we have no reluctance to
assert simply that Tokyo is identical with the capital of Japan. There
is nothing problematic about this identification. Hence the only pur-
pose served by e:cpanding it into the statement that Tokyo is the same
city as the capital of Japan is to convey the additional information
that Tokyo, i.e., the capital of Japan, is a city. So this statement
does not resist analysis into the assertions that (1) Tokyo is a city,
(2) the capital of Japan is a city and (3) Tokyo is identical with the
capital of Japan. The truth of the Tokyo-capital of Japan identity is
not dependent upon the sort of name appearing in the place occupied by
"city" provided only that the name designates a sort to which both
Tokyo and the capital of Japan belong. This is doubtless due to the
fact that there is no ambiguity in the reference of the terms "Tokyo"
and "the capital of Japan." But where the terms may refer either to
temporal segments or to the wholes of which those segements are parts,
then substituting "is the same F" for "is the same" seems to open up
the possibility of reinterpreting the "is" and hence of regarding the
statement as true even if its singular terms are thought of as desig-
nating distinct parts of the entity which is F. Suppose, then, that a
philosopher should want to talk, at least part of the time, about tempo-
ral parts belonging to a single whole, rather than about the relation of
identity holding between such wholes. Suppose further that, lacking a
clear understanding of the distinction in question, he wished still to
cling to the "is the same as" locution, which is appropriate only to
wholes if the "is" is understood as the "is" of identity. Such a phi-
losopher would have a motive to insist that all statements of the form
"A is the same as B" should be expanded into ones with the form "A is
the same F as B." We suggest that was the case with Locke.
Let us see if, by substituting the relation of genidentity for
identity, we can now make intelligible Locke's puzzling contention that
A and B, both of them possessing the properties F and G, may oe the same
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F while failing to be the same G. That A and B are the same F we shall
accordingly translate as the proposition that A and B are distinct tempo-
ral segments of a temporally persistent whole which is of kind F. Now it
is entirely possible that an entity which forms a temporal segment of a
temporally persistent whole of kind F may also form a temporal segment of
a persistent whole of kind G, where "F" and "G" name distinct kinds. Thus
a collection of material particles which forms a temporal cross-section of
a mass of matter may also be a temporal segment of a living organism. Let
us assume that A at t^ is such a collection of material particles and so
is B at t 2* Does B at t^ belong to the same living organism to which A
belonged at t^? Clearly a necessary condition for an affirmative answer
is the continued existence at t? of the organism of which A was a temporal
part at t^ # in order to know whether the organism which existed at t-^ con-
tinues to exist at t2> we have to be able to specify those essential proper
ties, continued possession of which is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion of the persistence of an entity of this kind. Obviously the same
considerations are applicable when we turn to the question of whether B
at t2 belongs to the same mass of matter to which A belonged at tj_* But
the properties which are essential to the continued existence of an organ-
ism are not the same as the properties essential to the continued exist-
ence of a mass of matter. According to Locke, the continued existence
of a mass of matter requires sameness of the individual atoms making up
the mass. The continued existence of an organism, on the other hand,
depends upon the sameness of the organization of the particles. There-
fore it may well be the case that at t? the organism to which A belonged
at 1 1 still exists, whereas the mass of matter to which A belonged at t-^
38
no longer exists. Under these circumstances it is oossible that B at t
2
may be a temporal part of the same organism to which A belonged at t^,
while of course it is not possible for B to be a temporal part of the
same mass of matter to which A belonged at t^. This, then, is a case
where, to employ Locke's terminology, B at t^ may be the same F as A at
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t.^, while it cannot be the same G. The analysis rests on the assump-
tion that two or more material things may spatially overlap or may co-
exist in a given place, provided that they are of different sorts.
Another way of putting this is that a single temporal segment consisting
of a particular collection of atoms, let us say, may form a part of more
than one temporal whole, if the wholes in question are of different kinds.
In our example one whole was a mass of matter, the other a living organ-
ism. When this situation obtains we may say that they have a temporal
stage in common. Later we shall have to raise the question as to whether
some non-material entities, such as Locke conceives persons to be, may
have a temporal part in common even when they are of the same sort, that
is to say, when they are both persons.
b, A Parallel Reinterpretation of Geach's View
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In his article, "the same F," ^ John Perry has pointed out that ex-
pressions having the form "A is the same F as G" cannot always be under-
stood as asserting that the relation of identity holds between A and B.
The statement, for example, that the couch is the same color as the
chair merely asserts that the couch and the chair have the same color 01
are instances of the same color. It does not make the claim that the
couch and the chair are one and the same thing. Terry's point has been
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reaffirmed and further developed in a recent study by D. Gabbay and J.
M. Moravcsik. Although rejecting Geach's views concerning the rela-
tivity of identity, these authors were interested in finding a use of
"the same as," other than the assertion of identity, to which the
following contentions of Geach would be applicable. (1) The expression
"is the same as" needs to be expanded into one having the form "is the
same F as," where "F" is some general term. (2) Different substitu-
tions for "F" will produce different criteria for determining the truth
of a statement having the form "A is the same F as B." Therefore (3)
some statements of the form "A is the same F as B, but although A is G,
A is not the same G as B" may be true. We have seen that Locke's views
apparently parallel those of Geach in this respect. Now Gabbay and
Moravcsik point out, just as we have done, that where the singular
terms in what is apparently an identity statement may be taken as re-
ferring to the stages or segments of a temporally persistent whole, the
statement may have to be reinterpreted as an assertion of genidentity
rather than one of identity. And they go on to say, correctly it
seems to me, that Geach's claims (1) - (3) do apply to statements of
genidentity, although not to those of identity. What is true of Geach
is, pari passu
,
true of Locke. For whether a temporal segment, A, and
smother temporal segment, B, are such that they belong or could belong
to one and the same entity depends on what sort of thing that entity is
and what its essential properties are.
It should be noted here that Gabbay and Moravcsik make a claim that
is stronger than the one I have just put forward. I suggested that
where the singular terms in a statement of the foroi "A is the same as B
may refer either to temporal parts or to the wholes composed of such
parts, the expansion of that statement into one having the form "A is
the same F as B," permits us to reinterpret that expanded formulation
as "A is a temporal part of the same F of which B is a temporal part,"
and this in turn allows us to consider the statement true under circum-
stances where we might be reluctant to assent to the unqualified claim
that A is identical with B. But I did not contend that it is ever the
case that we are compelled to make this reinterpretation; it is my view
that in situations where the singular terms are ambiguous as between
temporal parts and wholes, statements which have the form "A is the same
F as B" are open to being understood either as assertions of identity or
as assertions of genidentity. Gabbay and Iioravcsik seem to think they
have an argument, or rather two arguments, to show that, at least in
some cases, these statements, and even statements of the form "A is the
same as B," must be taken exclusively as assertions of genidentity.
Both arguments are based on the premise that the following state-
ments are equivalent.
(1) The young woman I met eight years ago turned into the senior lecture
whom I met last year.
(2) The young woman I met eight years ago is the same (woman) as the
senior lecturer whom I met last year.
Gabbay and Moravcsik argue that since (1) and (2) are equivalent and
since (1) plainly does not express a relation of identity, neither does
(2), The second argument, again utilizing the equivalence of (1) and
(2) as its starting point, employs as an intermediate conclusion the
principle that substitution in one of them should have the same lesult
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as the same substitution in the other. But if we substitute "the
young woman I met eight years ago" for the occurrences of "the senior
lecturer whom I met last year" in both (1) and (2) and if we interpret
"is the same (woman) as" in (2) as expressing identity, the result is
to make (1) false, while (2) becomes a trivial truth. So Gabbay and
Moravcsik conclude that "is the same (woman) as" in (2) should not be
regarded as expressing identity and that the referring expressions in
(1) and (2) need to be taken as denoting exclusively temporal stages
of entities rather than the entities themselves. Since every statement
of the form of (2) would be equivalent to one having the form of (l),
it would seem that any assertion, the singular terms of which may be
construed as referring to temporal parts and having the form "A is the
same as B" or "A is the same F as B," must be interpreted as making a
claim of genidentity and not of identity.
Both arguments, it appears to me, are flawed by the questionable
character of their first premise, namely, the equivalence of (l) and
(2)
. All statements of the form "the F turned into the G" seem to imply
that before the "turning into something G" the thing that was F was not
a G. If we say "the prince turned into a frog," surely it can be in-
ferred that prior to the transformation process the prince was net a
frog. So (1) implies that eight years ago the young woman in question
was not a senior lecturer. As Gabbay and Moravcsik themselves say, (1/
expresses a process of changing into something or becoming something.
For that very reason it cannot express a relation of identity. But (2./,
it seems to me, need not express such a process. It says something of
the form "the F I met eight years ago is the same (H) as the G I met
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last year," and statements of this form do not imply that eight years
ago the F that I met was not a G. Consider the following statement:
(3) The young woman with whom I had a shipboard romance last summer is
the same (woman) as the assistant professor ox philosophy to whom I
was just introduced.
We cannot infer from (3) that last summer during the period of the ship-
board romance the young woman did not have the rank of assistant profes-
sor of philosophy. Nor can we infer from (2) that the young woman of
eight years ago was not, at that time, already a senior lecturer. If
this is right, then (1) and (2) have different implications and so can-
not be equivalent.
But perhaps Gabbay and Moravcsik are making the assumption that
"young woman" arid "senior lecturer," like "little boy" and "old gentle-
man," are incompatible as undated properties, and hence that (2) does
imply that the young woman of eight years ago was not a senior lecturer.
It would imply this not on account of its form, but through the meaning
of the singular terms. In that case they would not be claiming that all
statements whose referring terms are ambiguous as between temporal wholes
and parts and which have the form "A is the same (F) as B 1 ' must be inter-
px-eted as assertions of genid entity. They would be claiming that the
latter interpretation is necessary only in those cases where, in addition,
the properties through which the singular terms, A and B, pick out
their referents arc such that no temporally extended object and no
temporal slice could have them both as undated properties. let even this
claim seems to me to be too strong. Let us consider a statement in
which the singular terms consist of predicates clearly incompatible with
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each other, if left undated. I would say that a statement such as
(4) the little girl I met fifty years ago is the same (person) as the old
woman I met last year
is capable of being interpreted either as
(5) The person-segment which I met fifty years ago and which had the un-
dated property of being a little girl belongs to the same person as does
the person-segment I met last year and which had the undated property of
being an old woman
or as
(6) The person who, when I met her fifty years ago, had the dated proper-
ty of being a little girl is identical with the person who, when I met her
last year, had the dated property of being an old woman.
I can see no reason for thinking that one of these interpretations
is in general more acceptable than the other, although in specific con-
texts they may not appear equally natural. What, then, should we say
about the equivalence of (4) with (7)?
(7) The young woman I met fifty years ago turned into the old woman I met
last year.
Simply that (4) is ambiguous as between (5) and (6), and that (7) is
equivalent to (5) but not to (6). And this leaves us free to consider (6)
as a strict identity statement.
So whether a statement such as (1) is equivalent to something of the
form of (2) depends on the interpretation placed on (2). It is question-
begging to assume the equivalence of (2) with vl) and then on that baois
to rule out one of the possible interpretations oi (<;). In goneial, we
cannot know what statements are equivalent to (or paraphrase) a given
assertion until we know, on independent grounds, how each of the state-
ments in question should be interpreted and what its implications are.
It is surely mistaken to assume equivalence before the latter issue has
been decided and then to employ the equivalence thus assumed as a
premise in an argument that seeks to establish the unacceptability of
certain interpretations or implications that, apart from this assumption,
would appear entirely plausible. But this is essentially the procedure
which Gabbay and Moravcsik adopt. They assume, not unnaturally, that
the singular terms in (1) refer to temporal segments; they too quickly
assume the equivalence of (1) with (2); they then proceed to the claim
that the only acceptable way of interpreting the singular terms of (2) is
to regard them, too, as denoting temporal stages of entities rather than
the entities themselves.
The second argument adduced by Gabbay and Moravcsik in support of
the latter claim seems to run into trouble even if we accept the equiva-
lence of (1) and (2). It is true that if we interpret the singular terms
as referring to a woman, and not to her temporal stages, and if we substi-
tute in (l) and (2) the expression appearing on the left-hand side of
those statements in place of the one that appears on the right, the re-
sult is to make (i) false while (2) becomes a truism. And this contra-
dicts the assumption that they are equivalent. But reinterpreting "is
the same (woman) as" as "is a temporal stage of the same woman as is
will not make (2) any the less truistically true. Under the proposed
substitution, the expressions on the left and right-hand sides of the
statement will refer to the same thing, although on the genidentity rein-
terpretation this thing will now be a segment of the woman rather than
45
the person as a temporal whole, and (2) will trivially assert that this
thing belongs to the same personal whole that it belongs to.
If Gabbay and Moravcsik err in one direction in their contention
that a certain class of statements having the form "A is the same (F)
as B" must be interpreted as talk about temporal parts, it seems to me
that they make a mistake in the opposite direction by insisting that
the singular terms of another class of statements having this form be
interpreted exclusively as referring to wholes which are not themselves
stages or parts of more enduring entities. Specifically, they accept
Chisholm's thesis that "the agent, of an action is not a stage, but the
individual himself." Presumably they mean that it is forbidden to
ascribe predicates standing for actions to any entity which is a tempo-
ral part of an agent. Thus we may ascribe the property of being a young
woman or a senior lecturer to the various temporal stages making up a
person, but presumably not the properties of singing or listening to a
song, nor even -those of lecturing or listening to a lecture. If we per-
mitted the latter ascriptions
... there would be a conglomerate of agents, i.e., the various
stages, involved in the performance of such a simple act as the
singing of a song, and embarrassing Questions would emerge con-
cerning the individuation of stages.3®
It is not clear to me that under these circumstances there would be any
embarrassing questions regarding the individuation of stages. Temporal
stages are individuated by coinciding with different stretches of time.
If one does not believe in an absolute temporal dimension, one may say
that the temjjoral stages of any particular object are individuated by
their coincidence with certain temporal stages of other objects. The
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temporal segment of my life which extends from September 1
, 1939, until
August 15, 1945, coincides with the temporal parts of the lives of a
great many people such that all these life-segments constitute an exper-
ience of living through World War II. I am inclined to believe that
what Gabbay and Moravcsik really want to say is this. We cannot permit*
every temporal stage that coincides with a part of an action, such as
the singing of a song, to have the property of performing that action.
For if we do, then every such action will turn out to be performed by,
not one, but a multitude cf agents, perhaps an infinite multitude. But
to this difficulty there is an answer. We have already suggested that
there is a way of singling out from the multitude of agents the ’’true"
agent. He is the one and only one who does not have the property of
being a proper temporal part of an agent.
Let us now consider some embarrassing questions that may arise
from the attempt to prohibit us from interpreting definite descriptions
utilizing action predicates, such as "the woman who lectured on Aristotle
last year," as referring' to temporal segments. It is clear that Gabbay
and Moravcsik think that terms such as "the senior lecturer" may be, and
upon occasion, must be taken as referring to temporal stages. Obvi-
ously the same would apply to a term like "the youthful singer." But
apparently the things that are lecturers and singers do not lecture or
sing. Not only does this seem very strange; it does not even solve the
alleged problem concerning the proliferation of agents. For if tempo-
ral stages may be lecturers and singers, then inevitably for every
lecture there will be a "conglomerate" of lecturers and for every song
a similar conglomerate of singers. Moreover, every statement of the
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form exemplified by
(9) The girl who sang the solo piece at my high school graduation is
the same (person) as the woman who sang the title role in Aida at the
Metropolitan Opera last night
will be equivalent, according to Gabbay and Moravcsik, to one exhib-
iting the form instanced by
(10) The girl who sang the solo piece at ray high school graduation
turned into the woman who sang the title role in Aida at the Metro-
politan Opera last night.
According to them (10) does not express a relation of identity. There-
fore neither does (9)* The singular terras of both (10) and (9)? conse-
quently, must be taken as referring to temporal stages and (9) must be
construed as a statement of genidentity. So it will be necessary to
ascribe action predicates to temporal stages after all.
What all this indicates, it seems to me, is that the attempt to
demarcate any class of expressions having the form "A is the same (F)
as B" as subject exclusively either to the identity or the genidentity
interpretations is a mistake. Despite my general agreement with their
approach, I must part company with Gabbay and Moravcsik in this respect.
5. Criteria of Persistence and Identity
a. Persistence criteria . By now it should be evident that
"criteria of identity," commonly so-called, are not all of the same kind.
Some of these criteria have as theii' function specification of the prop-
erties, continued possession of which is essential to the continued
existence of an entity of a certain kind. Since the properties which are
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essential to the continued existence of one kind of thing are not
necessarily the same as those essential to the continued existence of a
thing of another kind, there are a variety of such criteria, corres-
ponding to the different kinds. Alternatively, these criteria may be
thought of as answers to questions such as, what are the relevant simi-
larities that must exist between A and B if they are to be regarded as
parts of a temporally persistent individual of kind F? Thus if the
individual in question is a mass of matter, Locke answers that the
property which A and B must possess in common is the property of con-
taining exactly the same component atoms. This is equivalent to the
assertion that what is essential to the continued existence of a mass of
matter is that no atom be added to it or subtracted from it. If A and B
are to count as segments of the same person, however, then Locke replies
that the later segment must contain, or be capable of containing,
states of consciousness that are appropriately similar to states in-
cluded in the earlier segment. This is equivalent to the claim that it
is essential to the continued existence of a pei'son that he retain the
capacity to remember his past experiences. To put it in a slightly
different v/ay, these criteria profess to perform the following function.
Given an individual, A, consisting of n temporal segments and existing at
times t. to t
,
a criterion of the kind we have been discussing tells
us what properties a new temporal segment, existing at some t later
than t
,
must possess if it is to count as a temporal part of the indi-
vidual, A. Gabbay and Moravcsik call such criteria "persistence
criteria," and say of them that they are "not conditions of identity,
49
but conditions individuating chains of temporal stages, in accordance
with essential properties of the particular in question."^" The latter
task they certainly do perform. We shall shortly be discussing whether
and by what means persistence criteria are also serviceable as condi-
tions of identity.
The existence of persistence criteria is dependent upon the notion
that individuals have essences, or that there exists for each individual
a non-empty set of properties, continued retention of which is both
necessary and sufficient to its existence. In Book III of the Essay
Locke takes up the topic of individual essences. We shall postpone until
Chapter II consideration of the question as to whether what he has to say
there is compatible with the kind of essentialisra that his criteria of
persistence for organisms and persons presuppose. What is important for
our present discussion is that the properties making up the essence of an
individual are of two kinds. One kind includes the properties which any
individual must possess to count as a being of a certain sort. Thus,
according to the traditional definition, nothing can be a human being un-
less it is both rational and an animal.. Since, according to this tradi-
tional view, no individual who is a. human being could survive the loss of
his humanity, it is essential to the continued existence of such a being
that he retain the properties of rationality and animality. The propex*-
ties constituting the essence of humanity are also part of his individual
essence. If he loses these, he does not change, he perishes. But there
are other properties, which an individual human person needs to retain
in order to remain the same individual, or, which comes to the same thing,
in order to stay in existence. Xt is the business of theories of
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'’personal identity" to state what these properties are. A theory of
personality, a theory which tells us what properties are necessary and/
or sufficient to qualify a being as a person, specifies what is some-
times referred to as the "Aristotelian essence" of a thing. Such a
theory provides what would ordinarily be thought of as a definition of
a person. It states what undated properties must be possessed by any-
thing belonging to the kind, person. In so doing, it states properties
which must be had by every temporal segment of that being. But the
special purpose of a persistence criterion is to tell us what relation
must be borne by the later temporal parts of a thing of a given kind to
its earlier temporal parts. So a theory of "personal identity" will be
concerned with the stipulation of dated properties, or properties that
attach to the later temporal segments of the individual.
Different persistence criteria stipulate different kinds of relations
that must hold between the later parts and the earlier ones. Sometimes
the relation is one of similarity. Thus Locke maintains that every
stage of a material compound must have the same component parts as does
the initial stage
,
although the arrangement of parts need not be the
same. On the other hand, every stage of an organism must display an organ-
isation similar to that of its first stage, but sameness of components is
not required. Some philosophers have required that the later parts 01 a
material object be spatiotemporally or causally continuous with its
earlier parts. The point is that the properties, retention of which is
essential to the continued existence of an individual of a certain kind,
are not identical 'with the properties that in the firso place qualified
the individual for membership in that class. The "individual essence
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of a thing is not the same as its "Aristotelian essence. For
example, if a physical object is to be reckoned as a compound material
substance, according to Locke, and perhaps to most philosophers, it is
both necessary and sufficient that it consist of more than one atom of
matter. This is the definition of a mass of matter. Let us assume that
Atom 1 and Atom 2 are joined together, creating a mass, v/hich we call M.
Possession of two or more atoms is sufficient to qualify M for member-
ship in the class of material compounds. But Locke holds that if M is
to continue its existence as a member of that class, continued posses-
sion of more than one atom is not sufficient. For if we add a third
atom to M, or substitute Atom 3 for either Atom 1 or Atom 2, M will
cease to exist. It is essential to the continued existence of the indi-
vidual, M, that it retain all and only its original atoms. This is
not identical with the property that is essential for membership in the
class of material compounds. Similarly, Locke teaches that anything
v/hich thinks and is conscious of its thinking is a person; thinking
and consciousness of thinking are the only attributes essential to par-
ticipation in personhood. This is his definition of a person. But in
order to continue to exist as the same person, it is not sufficient
for the being in question to continue to think. It is the heart of
Locke's controversial theory of personal identity that in addition to
continued thinking, it is necessary (as well as sufficient) that the
being retain the capacity to remember its past thoughts. In this case
it is particularly plain that the properties specified as necessary and
sufficient to the continued existence of a person are dated properties
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of the temporally whole individual (or undated properties of some, but
not all of his temporal parts). On the other hand, what would tradi-
tionally be thought of as the definition of a person, that is, the
specification of the "Aristotelian essence" of a person, makes use only
of undated properties, those that must belong to each of the temporal
segments composing the individual.
We may say, if we will, that there are two sorts of definition.
The first kind tells us what properties anything must possess if it is
to count as a member of a certain class. If the thing in question is
essentially a member of this class, then these properties attach to
es.ch of its temporal segments. If its membership in the class is merely
accidental, then it may be that only some of its temporal parts have
these properties. In any case, a definition in this sense may be
applied either to a whole that is not itself a proper temporal part or
to a segment that is such a proper part. The second kind of definition
tries to tell us what conditions are necessary and sufficient for a tem-
porally ordered series of parts to qualify as a temporal whole of a cer-
tain sort. If we restrict ourselves to material objects, we may say
that it delimits four-dimensional objects, whereas the first kind of
definition is primarily concerned with the classification of three-
dimensional entities. So this second kind of definition is applicable
only to wholes which are made up of temporal parts., It specifies the
relation these parts must bear to each other. That there are two sorts
of definitions to be distinguished along the lines just sketched be-
comes apparent when we consider the following excerpt from Chisholm's
discussion of the definition of a ship.
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'^e may say, then, that if a cornpositum A and a com-
positura N go to make up the same ship, it is necessary but
not sufficient that one of the composita have evolved from
the other. What more is necessary?
We are asking, in effect for a definition of a ship
.
But our question may be put somewhat more precisely as
"What is it for two different composita to make up or con-
stitute the same ship?" Actually, of course, we are nor
now interested in trying to fix a definition of a ship,
specifically. We are concerned with the more general
question "What is the relation that physical things, such
as ships, bear to the composita that make them up?" So
let us consider ships only in a very schematic way.
Noah Webster said that ship is "a structure used for
transportation in water." If this were an acceptable
definition, we could say of two composita, A and N, that
they make up or constitute the same ship provided that the
following condition holds:
A
is (or was) a structure used
for transportation in water and so is N; and every compo-
situra B such that B evolved from A and N evolved from B
was also a structure used for transportation in water.33
Webster's definition specifies the Aristotelian essence of a. ship. If
Webster's definition had been adequate, it would have been true of
every temporal whole that was essentially a ship that each of its tempo-
ral parts was "a structure used for transportation in water." (The
fact that this is not true is an indication of the inadequacy of the
definition, an inadequacy which Chisholm later points out.) But it is
plain that the kind ox definition which Chisholm is interested in con-
structing is of a sort entirely different from Webster's. Chisholm in-
dicates this when he says:
Actually, of course, we are not now interested in trying
to fix a definition of a ship
,
specifically. We are con-
cerned with the more general question "What is the rela-
tion that physical things, such as ships, bear to the
composita that make them up?"
Chisholm wants to give a persistence criterion for ships; he wants
to specify what relation must hold between earlier and later temporal
stages if these stages are to be regarded as constituting a temporal
whole which is a ship. Of each stage we can meaningfully inquire
whether it meets Webster’s specifications. But we cannot ask whether
any such stage, taken by itself, meets the requirements of Chisholm's
definition. The latter is designed to apply to pairs of stages, or,
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with suitable modifications, to a whole composed of such stages.
The view that for each kind of thing there are properties in addi-
tion to those mailing up its Aristotelian essence which every individual!.
of that kind must continue to possess if it is to stay in existence has
35been criticized by Baruch Brody. Brody seems to think that if there
are any properties, other than those constituting the Aristotelian
essence of a thing, retention of which is necessary for that thing’s
continued existence, then those additional properties are wholly unique
to the individual in question. They are not shared with other entities
having the same Aristotelian essence. Thus Brody defines "individuating
essentialism" as signifying "the view that each object has a set of
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properties which only it has and it has them essentially." He
rightly regards this as a "strange, very strong" type of essentialism.
Since the concept of a persistence criterion, including a criterion of
personal identity, is dependent upon the notion of individual, essence,
it is not strange to find Brody believing that "any theory of personal
identity (or of the identity of any other type of substance)" faces
fundamental problems It should be remarked, however , that Brody has
other reasons, too, for this belief. Regarding the principles put tor-
ward by Locke which seem to state non-Aristotelian persistence criteria
for the various kinds of entities, Brody lias the following to say:
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At first glance it seems that these principles have
the same -import for each member of the class in question,
but, on further analysis, this turns out to be a mistake.
For example, what I have to retain to continue to exist
is different from what you have to retain to continue to
exist. I must remember some of the things I am now
conscious of experiencing or doing while you must remem-
ber some of the things that you are now conscious of
experiencing or doing. Similarly, different masses must
retain different compositions and different oak trees
must continue to participate in different common lives. °
But all that Brody succeeds in showing, it seems to me, is that in pos-
sessing the properties necessary for the continued existence of things
of its kind, every individual necessarily possesses other, more
specific properties, which are indeed unique to it, and which may be
said to constitute the particular way in which it instantiates the more
general, less determinate properties it shares with other members of
its class. Thus, according to Locke, it is essential to the continued
existence of a person that he retain the ability to recall his past ex-
periences. Every person who has a past necessarily has this ability;
without it he could not stay in existence. Having this ability is a
property common to every member of the class of persons. But each per-
son manifests this ability by being able to recall the members of a
particular set of experiences, the set of experiences which are his
own. Naturally these experiences vary from individual to individual.
But at any given point in time it is not essential to the continued
existence of an individual person that he have precisely the experi-
ences which in fact he does have at that time. What is unique to him,
the precise nature of his experiences, is not essential to him, is not
part of his individual essence. On the other hand, the properties
essential to him, that is, having experiences and being able to recall
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the previous ones, are not unique to him. So I think we may conclude
that Brody is wrong in holding that anyone who believes there are indi-
vidual essences is committed to "the view that each object has a set of
properties which only it has and it has them essentially," and that it
is erroneous to try to foist such an opinion on Locke.
b. Criteria of identity
. Should the criteria for the continued
existence of different sorts of entities, such as persons and organisms,
which we have been discussing also be regarded as criteria of identity?
We shall shortly be discussing the circumstances under which they may
play that role. At this point it is important to note that criteria of
identity, which are not persistence criteria, do indeed exist. What is
a criterion of identity, if it is not a persistence criterion? Are there
more than one? And if so, what inter-relationships obtain between them?
Certainly the fundamental principle of identity is the familiar one
that A is identical with B just in case A and B have all their properties
in common.
(I) (x) (y) /Tx = y) = (F) (Fx 5 Fy)/
It may be maintained that this is the only principle entitled to the name
of a criterion of identity. Certainly it alone can be thought of as ex-
pressing the meaning of "identity." We have seen that it applies
equally to an entity which is considered at different moments of its
existence in time and to one which is considered unner ciifferent descrip-
tions at the same moment of its existence. It is also clear in what way
this principle differs from a persistence criterion. Unlike the latter
it is devoid of any references to essential properties* hence it is
powerless to individuate chains of temporal stages or zo tell us whether
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a temporal part existing at some time later than tn is such that it may
belong to an individual composed of n temporal segments and existing
from t until t^. Nor can it inform us whether a dated property of a
certain kind is compatible with another such property. It will not tell
us, for example, whether one and the same thing may have the property of
being made of wood at t^ and of being composed of ashes at t^.
So perhaps it is the case that there is one and only one criterion
of identity and that all the other more special criteria for different
kinds of objects should be understood as persistence criteria. In the
next chapter we shall be discussing the several criteria for individu-
ating objects of different sorts proffered by Locke. None of them is
identical with the fundamental principle of identity we have been dis-
cussing. Should they all, then, be construed as specifications of the
essential properties which things of a particular kind must retain in
order to continue in existence? It will become apparent that not all of
them can be so interpreted. Specifically, Locke will offer a criterion
for the identity of simple substances belonging to the same sort, that
is to say, for atoms of matter, for simple immaterial substances and for
the unique infinite immaterial substance, which is God. This criterion
will depend upon the notion that no two or more of such substances, if
they are of the same kind, can exactly occupy the same place at the same
time. The notion of exact occupation will be clarified later. The im-
portant point for the purposes of our present discussion is that this
criterion cf identity, like the fundamental principle itself, has
nothing to do with the specification of essential properties, necessary
for the continued existence of an entity of a certain ki.nd. Locke, of
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course, intends no suggestion that it is necessary for the continued
existence of a finite substance, at any rate, that it continue to
occupy the same place it had previously occupied. The reference to
occupying the same place at the same time shows that this test is use-
less for determining whether distinct temporal stages existing at
different and non-overlapping times are stages of the same enduring
whole. In short, there is no way in which this criterion can be re-
garded as a persistence criterion. What, then, is its function? Since
we have (I), the fundamental principle stating the logically necessary
and sufficient conditions of identity, why should we require other
principles stating additional necessary and/or sufficient conditions?
The answer in a nutshell, it seems to me, is that epistemic consid-
erations impel us to develop such additional criteria. N. L. Wilson says
that (I) "... merely states the syntactical properties of the identity
sign but gives us no help in deciding in a given case whether to declare
two individuals identical . Precisely because (I) is absolutely uni-
versal in scope, applying to all objects whatsoever no matter what
their kind, it is, as Jack Nelson remarks, "terribly uninteresting and
uninformative." It is the vacuousness of (I), he points out, that
leads us to seek for other "more restrictive and therefore more infor-
mative requirements for the identity of particular kinds of things ...'
Both Wilson and Nelson are particularly concerned to point out the un-
helpfulness of (I) as applied to material objects picked out as
existing at different times. But it is also true that we derive
little guidance from (I.) in those ca.ses in which we are inquiring




that is to say, when we ask whether two undated properties or
two properties having the same date are exemplified by a single object.
For in order to know whether any A and B satisfy the requirements
specified in (I) we need to know whether they have all their proper-
ties in common. But since everything has an indefinitely large or in-
finite number of properties, it is impossible to check every one of
them.
I intend to leave out of consideration the special problem involved
in the application of (I) that arises from the fact that the properties
of an object include its identity-properties, that is, the fact that
among the properties of A are the properties of being identical with
every object with which it is in fact the same. If we could not ascer-
tain whether A and B were identical without first discovering whether A
had the property of being identical v/ith B, clearly we should be caught
up in a circular proceeding and the attempt to apply (I) would be
utterly futile. However, as has already been indicated, it seems to me
that it is not possible that A and B should have all their properties,
other than identity-properties, in common and yet fail to have the prop-
erties of being identical with each other. I am willing to accept in
substance the view of Baruch 3rody "... that there is an ontological
dependency here, that identity is a second-order relation that holds be-
tween entities a and b just in case they have their first-order proper-
ties in common."^
1
But even with this difficulty cleared away, it seems
that we could never assure ourselves that a given A and B possessed all
their first-order properties in common, without first knowing that they
were in fact identical.
6o
What then justifies us in making identity claims? Surely we are
dependent upon the assumption that if an A and a B of a given kind
possess certain key properties in common, then every property had by
the one will also be had by the other. Joint possession of these
critical properties, or the lack of it, will then serve as a test for
the identity of the objects in question. These tests profess to state
the sufficient and necessary conditions which an A and a B of a certain
sort must meet if they are to be identical in the full sense. They have
the following form. If A and B are things of kind F, then there is some
property, G, such that A and B both possess it if and only if A and B
possess all their properties in common. Following Locke's lead, it has,
for example, been widely accepted that if A and B are material objects,
then there is a place which A and B exactly occupy at the same time if
and only if A and B are identical. In theory there is no reason why
there should not be chains of such criteria. There may, for example, be
some other property, H, such that A and B both have it if and only if
they both possess G* Adding on another such link to the chain of tests
will have a point just in those cases where it is epistemica'lly easier
to establish whether A and B are both H than to determine if they are
both G.
A failure to understand the function of tests of identity and
their relationship to the fundamental principle which alone can be said
to give che meaning of identity bedevils nearly the whole of Brody's
critique of Locke's system of criteria for persistence and identity.
This failure is particularly strange because in an earlier article we
find Brody, in the course of denying that there is any philosophical
6l
problem about coming to know that A and B are identical, saying:
Why couldn't we, by examining only some of the proper-
ties of both a and Is and finding that they have them in
common, be justified in concluding that they have all
their properties in common and are identical. -
Here Brody seems to have the notion of tests of identity and to under-
stand their function. But in his article on Locke, which is supposed
to be an application to a concrete example of the principles set forth
in the article from which the foregoing quotation was extracted, this
understanding appears to have vanished. The leading theme of his dis-
cussion of Locke is that any philosopher who accepts a plurality of
identity criteria is "in trouble" and is "making commitments whose jus-
tification is very unclear."
The problem, in its most general form, is a simple one.
If you have (because of the adoption of the identity of
indiscernibles) a view that a certain condition is
sufficient for identity, then the adoption of the view
that some other condition is necessary for identity
of a certain type of entity commits you to the claim
that C can be satisfied by entities of that type only
when C 4 is. Similarly, if you have (because of Leibniz'
Lav?) a view that a certain condition is necessary for
identity, then the adoption of the vief? that some other
condition is sufficient for identity of a certain
type of entity commits you to the claim that can be
satisfied by entities of that type only when is.
Since these conditions often seem unrelated, ahd. conse-
quently, these commitments often seem to be unjustified,
this result casts doubt upon theories of identity that
contain both of these conditions.4^
In fact, there is no reason to be disturbed by the proliferation
of logically necessary and/or sufficient conditions for identity.
Nelson correctly points out "It should be clear that having one logi-
cally necessary and sufficient condition for the holding of some rela-
tion does not preclude there being more specific conditions for that
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relation's holding." It will, of course, be the case that if there
are two distinct conditions, each of them logically necessary and
sufficient for the holding of a certain relation, then they will be
equivalent to each other. The one will be met just in case the other
is. Brody’s suggestion that there might be two necessary and sufficient
conditions for the identity of objects of a certain type and that these
conditions might be logically unrelated to each other is simply impos-
sible. If they are unrelated, then they are not both of them necessary
and sufficient conditions of identity. The same applies to any pair of
conditions, one of which is sufficient and the other necessary.
(I), the criterion of identity which is of universal applicability,
is necessarily the contradictory of the criterion of non-identity. Every
pair of objects, A and B, must stand to each other either in the rela-
tion of identity or non-identity, but not both. An epistemic test for
identity, however, need not be the contradictory of an epistemic test
for the non-identity of the thing in question. Thus the test for the non-
identity of material objects A and B is the existence of a place which at
some time is occupied by A and not by B. This is not the contradictory
of the criterion for their identity which was suggested above. So if
one inspects only the logical form of these tests, it might seem that
some pair of material objects could satisfy both the criterion of iden-
tity and. that ox non-identity. But the nature of material objects is
thought to be such that if any A and B exactly occupy the same place at
the same time, it follows that at every moment of their existence, they
exactly occupy the same place. It follows further that it as impcssi—
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ble for there to be a place which at some time is occupied by one of
them and not ny the other. Hence any pair of material objects which
satisfies the test of identity will necessarily satisfy a further cri-
terion which is the contradictory of the test of non-identity. In gen-
eral, if tests for identity and non-identity are properly framed, it
will never be possible for any pair of objects of the relevant kind
to meet them both. We do not wish to require, however, that the tests
of identity and non-identity themselves be contradictories, since the
purpose of devising such tests is precisely to isolate the unique prop-
erty, or at any rate the smallest cluster of properties, common posses-
sion of v/hich will serve to guarantee the identity or non-identity of
the objects in question. Characteristically, then, the criteria of
identity and non-identity will both be shorn of universal quantifiers,
and hence they will lack the proper logical form to be contradictories.
One of the morals to be drawn from the preceding discussion is
this. When confronted with a formula of the form, "A is the same F as B
if and only if A and B both possess G (are similar in respect G)" with-
out investigating the content of the right-hand side of the formula one
cannot tell \\rhether one is being presented v/ith a test for identity or
a persistence criterion that will enable one to determine whether or
not distinct temporal segments belong to a single temporally persistent
entity.
c Relation between the two kinds of criteria . What is the rela-
tion between tests or criteria for identity and persistence criteria
that serve to individuate chains of temporal stages i Are there any cir-
cumstances under which the latter are suited to specify conditions of
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identity? Contrary to the suggestion of Gabbay and Moravcsik, it would
seem that there are. Every identity statement which picks out its sub-
jects by means of dated properties and which consequently has the form
"(1) There is something, A, which has F^, (2) there is something, B,
which has G^.' and (3) A = B" is equivalent to one which asserts (1) the
existence of a temporal segment coinciding with t and having F as an un-
dated property, (2) the existence of another temporal segment coinciding
with t'and having G as an undated property and (3) the fact that these
two segments are parts of a single temporally extended whole. In those
cases where t = t',the relation of identity is asserted to hold, not
merely between the wholes picked out by means of dated properties, but
also between the temporal segments coinciding with t and t'» If we say
that there is a person who was King of England during 1936, a person who
had a love affair with Mrs. Wallis Simpson during 1936 and that these per-
sons are one and the same, this is equivalent to saying that there is a
person segment coinciding with the year 1936 which has the property of
being King of England and that this temporal part of a person is identical
with the person segment coinciding with 1936 that has the property of
being engaged in a love affair with Mrs. Simpson. In general, two tempo-
ral stages, A and B, are stages of the same object if and only if there
exists a single temporally extended entity which has as its properties
all the properties of A and all the properties of B, excluding those,
such as being a proper temporal part, which flow from their nature as
temporal segments.
So all persistence criteria that specify necessary conditions for
the continued existence of objects of a certain sort and that conse-
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quently are useful for determining whether a given temporal segment may
possibly belong to a given temporal whole also have the function of de-
termining whether the properties specified by different temporal predi-
cates are compatible as properties belonging to a single enduring entity
of a certain kind. The persistence criterion for objects such as
tables, for example, would presumably lay it down that no table can be
made of wood at t and be composed of ashes at any time later than t, but
the persistence criterion for objects of another sort, collections of
particles, perhaps, might not find these predicates incompatible. So a
persistence criterion which specifies properties as essential to the con-
tinuance of an individual of a given kind will tell us whether an A which





tell us that an individual who is a young woman at can be identical
with an individual who is a senior lecturer at t^
,
but that, Greek
mythology notwithstanding, nothing can be a young woman at t^ and a laurel
tree at t 0 . It should be noted that some properties that could not con-
sistently be assigned to a single entity if they bore the same date (if
they were regarded as undated properties of a single temporal segment of
that entity) can be so assigned if they bear different dates and if the
dates are related to each other in the right order and are appropriately
spaced. Examples are "little boy" and "old gentleman." Nothing can
have both of these either as undated properties or as dated properties
with exactly the same dates. Nothing can have the second property at a
time earlier than the time at which it has the first, and there must, be a
temporal distance of an appropriate length separating the date attached
to the property of being a little boy and that attached to tne property
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of being an old gentleman. On the other hand, there are some properties
which may not be ascribed to a single individual if they bear different
dates, but which are compatible if their dates coincide. An example
might be the property of being an infant and the property of being less
than a year- old.
Given that an individual possesses certain properties at a certain
date, it may follow necessarily that he possesses or does not possess
certain other properties both at that date and at other dates. The
necessity in question may be either logical or natural. Given that some-
thing is a full-grown horse at t, it is analytically impossible for that
thing to be a colt at t. The meaning of the terms "full-grown horse"
and "colt" rule out the possibility of those terms being correctly
applied, without having different dates attached to them, to the same ob-
ject. But given that something is a full-grown horse at t, it is
natural or causal necessity which dictates that the thing in question
was a colt at some time previous to t and that it will not be a colt at
any time later than t. "Full-grown horse at t" and "colt at t" are
temporal predicates which are analytically inconsistent. But "full-
grown horse at t" and "colt at some time later than t" or "not a colt at
any time previous to t" are rendered incompatible predicates by the j.aws
of nature. It is one of the jobs of a persistence criterion to tell us,
concerning differently dated temporal predicates, whether they may be
consistently assigned to an entity of a particular sort. In so aoing -.t
lays down necessary conditions for the truth of certain kinds of identi-
ty statements having the form "the A which has F. - the B which has G *x 2
6?
Now let us consider a persistence criterion which lays down specifi-
cations that are both necessary and sufficient to insure that any tempo-
ral part. A, which meets them belongs to a certain temporal whole, W,
not itself a proper temporal part. If W and W' belong to the same kind,
does it follow that any whole, V, also not a proper temporal part, will
have as one of its own temporal segments an A which meets these specifica-
tions if and only if W' is identical with W? Let us represent the speci-
fications by "F." If the answer to the foregoing question is affirma-
tive, then it will follov; that any temporal whole, W, having F as a dated
property, will be identical with any whole W of the sane kind which also
has F as a dated property, no matter v/hether the dates in question are
the same or different. If this holds true, then a persistence criterion
of the kind we have been discussing would obviously be well suited to
stipulate conditions of identity for wholes which are not themselves tem-
poral parts, whether the entities under consideration are being picked out
by properties v/hich have dates that are the same, or by ones having differ-
ent dates. But can the question be affirmatively answered? It would seem
that it can. Let us look at a specific example.
According to Locke, a collection of atoms continues to exist just
so long as its components remain the same. In other words, every such
collection must be made up of temporal parts such that each part has ex-
actly the same atomic components as every other part « Now let us con-
sider a particular collection of atoms, C. The persistence criterion
for such collections permits us to stipulate that a temporal segment, A,
is composed of atoms a.
,
a^, »»., a.^ if and only if A is a temporal part
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of C* Then C consists of all the temporal segments so composed and only
of those. It follows that any collection of atoms, C', which has a tempo-
ral segment composed of atoms a^, a^, a^ is identical with C, pro-
vided that C' is a temporal whole and is not itself a proper part of any-
more inclusive temporal whole. For if 0 s has some temporal segment com-
posed of a^, a^, ..., a^, then each of its temporal parts must be simi-
larly composed. But every temporal segment having that composition is a
part of C. So each temporal part of C 1 is identical with some temporal
part of C. This shows that C' is either a proper temporal part of C, or
else it is identical with C. But we have stipulated that C is not a
proper temporal part of any larger whole. So it follows that C* is iden-
tical with C. The argument employed in this case is applicable to any
situation where possession of a property, F, is both necessary and
sufficient to insure that a temporal segment. A, belongs to a whole , W.
In all such cases it will be true that if W is of the same kind as W
and is not itself a proper temporal part, then W’ has a temporal segment
that is F if and only if V/' = W.
But the success of the argument in this case is dependent on the
fact that the persistence criterion for collections of atoms demands
that every temporal part of such a collection have exactly the same compos
nents as every other temporal part. It was this feature of the criteri-
on which permitted us to say of an arbitrary collection of atoms, C,
that a temporal segment has a particular atomic composition it and only
if it belongs to C. It would be a mistake to assume that this feature
is possessed by every persistence criterion which specifies necessary
and sufficient conditions for the co-membership of two temporal segments
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in a single temporal series that constitute a whole. For some such cri-
teria stipulate the sort of relation that must hold between such seg-
ments, without singling out a property that is required to attach to
every temporal part considered individually. We shall see that Locke is
committed to the view that a person continues to exist just so long as
he retains the ability to recall his past experiences. So if A is a
temporal segment of a person which has the property of having an experi-
ence, £, and B is a temporal segment of a person which has the property
of being able to recall then A and B belong to the same person, P.
Let "F" stand for the property of having the experience, e, and ”G" for
the property of being able to remember eu Then Locke's persistence cri-
terion for persons enables us to assert the truth of an identity state-
ment of the form "the A which has F_, = the B which has G^ But this
*1 ‘2
criterion does not stipulate that there is some property, F, which is
both necessary and sufficient to insure that any arbitrarily selected
temporal segment possessing it belongs to a given person, P. In the case
of our example, for instance, it is not necessary that the temporal seg-
ment, A, have the property of being able to recall its own experience,
and it is not necessary that B possess the property of having the ex-
perience, So if a particular person-segment, A, coinciding with t,
belongs to a. person-whole, P, by virtue of the fact that it remembers
the experiences had by segments of P coinciding with times earlier than
t, it cannot be inferred that a person-whole, P' , (not itself a. temporal
pant) which has A as its own temporal part is identical v/ith P. It does
not follow from the fact that P' possesses one part which remembers the
experiences of P that each of the parts of P' remembers the experiences
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of P. And so there is no way to shov; that every part of P' must be a
^f P* Thus it is possibie that persons P and P* be distinct while
possessing a temporal part in common. This circumstance will turn out
to be of great importance for Locke's theory of persons.
Is a persistence criterion of any use in determining the identity
or diversity of entities which are picked out by properties whose dates
do not differ? Well, among the properties which a thing of a given
kind must retain in order to continue to exist are those making up its
Aristotelian essence. If B is to be identical with A, it is obvious
that, no matter how B is described, B must possess every propez’ty in-
eluded in the Aristotelian, essence of A. So it may be useful to know
what these essential properties of A are in determining whether a B
that is picked out by a property whose date does not differ from the
date of the property by which A is picked out can be identical with A.
If we want to determine whether the tallest basketball player in America
is identical with the tallest man in the world, and if we know that
rationality is essential to the latter, it might be appropriate to in-
quire if that property is possessed by the basketball player. After all,
it is neither logically nor physically impossible that the basketball
player should be a gorilla. Moreover, we have just seen that a persist-
ence criterion which lays down a property which is sufficient, as well
as necessary, to insure that any temporal part possessing it will belong
to a given temporal whole works just as well for entities that are
picked out by properties whose dales do not differ as for those singled
out by dated properties with different dates.
However, it is in general true that the special purpose of a persist"
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ence criterion is to say what relation must be borne by the later tempo-
ral parts of a temporally extended object to its earlier parts. An ex-
ample is the requirement that the temporal parts of a material object
be spatiotemporally or causally continuous. If all we know about A is
that it is F at t, and all we know about B is that it is G at t, our in-
formation about both these entities is limited to temporal segments which
coincide with the same time. And the requirement that every temporal
part of an entity be continuous with its preceding temporal part does
not help us to compare temporal parts that coincide with the same time.
Suppose we want to know if the mountain which at present is called Everest
by English speaking people is the sane as the one now called Gaurisanker
by speakers of Hindu. The criterion which will be of assistance in a
case like this is one that has nothing to do with stipulating conditions
for the persistence of mountains. It is the test for identity which stipu-
lates that if A and B are material objects, then there is a place which
they occupy at the same time if and only if they have all their proper-
ties in common. In order to find out if Everest is identical with
Gaurisanker we look at a map to see if the place in which the one is
situated is the same as the place in which the other has its location.
What is true of Everest and Gaurisanker will in general apply to deter-
minations of the truth of identity statements about material objects
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^ identity without difference is nothing at all. It takes
tv/o to make the same. ..." (F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic
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The question may be raised as to whether the contention that a
temporally persistent whole possesses all the properties it ever will
possess from the beginning until the end of its existence implies that
the future is determined or that some form of fatalism is true. The
short answer, which is all that time and space permit us here, is that
the status of this claim is exactly like that of the assertion that
propositions regarding the future are true or false prior to the occur-
rence of the events they predict. If the latter claim implies that
some form of determinism or fatalism is true, then so does the conten-
tion regarding temporally persistent objects which we have been dis-
cussing. Aristotle, who believed he had resolved the problems connected
with future-referring propositions by denying them truth values in ad-
vance of the occurrence they describe, would have found himself faced
with a new and difficult dilemma if he had permitted himself to agree
that an object -which continues to exist over time has all of its prop-
erties from the first moment of its existence.
1
7
Cf. N. L. Wilson, "Space, Time and Individuals," The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 52 (1955), PP* 5o9-5SS. See especially p'pV 5&9-90.
Wilson, hov-ever
,
does not think that we need to conceive of physical ob-
jects in these terms, and in fact he thinks it "odd" and ultimately mis-
leading to do so. He wishes to preserve the ordinary language concept
of a "substance-individual" which is a subject of change in the sense of
gaining and losing properties. But he does not explain how this concept
can be made coherent. A similar position, fraught with a similar diffi-
culty, is assumed by Karl R. Popper in "The Principle of Individuation,"
Proceedings ci the Aristotelian Society
,
Supp. Vol. XXVII (1953),
PP* 97-120. See especially pp. 114-115.
O
° The terminology stems from Kurt Lewin, Begriff der Genese (1922).
See Popper, o_n. cit
. ,
p. 114. Also see Gabbay and Horavcsik, J. M.,
"Sameness and Individuation," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70 (1973),
pp. 513-526.
This terminology is employed by Popper, on. cit . , p. 114. It
originates with J. H» V/oodger, "Science without Properties," British
^
Journal for the Philosophy of Sc ience , Vcl. I-II (1950-1952), pp. 193-21o.
p(\
Joseph Butler, Of Personal Identity .
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Roderick M. Chisholm, "Problems of Identity," in Milton K.














^ The distinction between these different senses of "is" is made
by Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philo-
sophical Senses of Identity," in Norman S. Care and Robert H. Grimm,
eds., Perception and Personal Identity , pp. 82-106. See p. 91f«
Chisholm points out that the expression "the 'is* of composition" was
first employed by U. T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain-Process?",
British Journal of Psychology , XLVII (1956), pp. 44-50.
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Gabbay and Moravcsik employ an example which is exactly parallel
to the Lockian one we have been utilising.
"As an example we may consider
(10) This is the same human body as that which I saw seven
years ago, but not the same collection of body cells
as that which I saw seven years ago.
This statement can be interpreted as being about stages. Stage (a) is
both a stage of a human body and a stage of a collection of body cells.
So is stage (b)s but although stages (a) and (b) are stages of the same
human body, they are stages of different collections of body cells. Both
at (a) and at (b) a human body and a collection of body cells coincide.
But there are two collections of body cells involved and only one human
body." D* Gabbay and J. M. Moravcsik, op. cit ., p. 513.












32 Ruth Barcan Marcus in her article "Essential Attribution,"
Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII (1971), pp. 187-202, makes the distinction
between Aristotelian essentialism and individuating essentialism. But as
she employs it, the term "individuating essentialism" does not refer to
the view that there are certain properties over and above those constitui.
ing its "Aristotelian essence," which every individual be1ongi^g_to_a
certain kind must retain in order to continue to exist. It rexers
TnsteaTToThe thesis that there are certain properties peculiar to an
individual, quite independently of the kind of being it is, which dis-
tinguish it from ether objects of the same kind. Some 01 these proper
ties are essential to the individual, are such that the individual must.
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possess them; others are inessential. Socrates, for example, is wholly
individuated by the properties of being "a snub-nosed, hen-pecked,
hemlock-drinking philosopher
. . . but although being a philosopher may
be essential to his nature, presumably being snub-nosed is not." (p.
191) It is obvious that the properties of being snub-nosed, hen-pecked,
hemlock-drinking and a philosopher are not those that a person must in
general preserve in order to retain his identity. At best such proper-
ties might constitute a criterion of Socratic identity; they are wholly
unfitted to serve as a criterion of personal identity. But since some
of the properties mentioned in this list are admittedly accidental
rather than essential, they will not even form the basis of a criterion
for the persistence of Socrates. Socrates could have continued to be
himself even if Xanthippe had ceased hen-pecking him or if he had
chosen to escape to Crete rather than drink the hemlock. Properties
that, taken together, are unique to a particular thing and distinguish
it from objects of the same kind, unless they are essential to the
existence of that thing, will not serve as a criterion for the persist-
ence even of the individual in question. This is because it is not
necessary that a new segment of such an individual should possess them,
even although they may have been possessed by some or all of its
earlier temporal parts.
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A distinction which is at least analogous to the one we have
been making between two kinds of definition is drawn between two kinds
of criteria by Michael Dummett in his monumental discusssion of Frege,
Frege : Philosophy of Language, pp. 73-80. What we have been calling
the specification of the Aristotelian essence Dummett calls a criterion
of application; what we have been calling the stipulation of the indi-
vidual essence or the persistence criterion for a thing of a given kind,
Dummett labels a criterion of identity. He says this term was intro-
duced into philosophy by Frege. In fact, Frege's word is "Kennzeichen"
which is more literally translated as "distinguishing mark." Frege
thought we required such a mark in order "to recognize the object as the
same again." (The Foundations of Arithmetic, sects. 62 and 66.)













^ Jack Nelson, "Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Identity through Time." American Philosophical Quarterl y, Vol. IX (1972),
pp. 177-185. See especially p. 177f,
41
Baruch A. Brody, "Is There a Philosophical Problem about the
Identity of Substances?" Phllosophia
,
I (1971), pp. 43-59.
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SIMPLE SUBSTANCES, MASSES OF MATTER AND ORGANISMS
Locke proposes distinct "criteria of identity" for four different
kinds of beings. They are (1) simple substances (both material and im-
material), (2) masses of matter, (3) living organisms and (4) persons.
I have already suggested that the criterion for simple substances is a
true identity criterion, having the form "if A and B are of kind F,
then A and B both possess G if and only if A and B are identical." It
is not a persistence criterion; it has nothing to do with the specifica-
tion of properties essential to the continued existence of an individual
of a given kind. It is an epistemic test designed to determine whether
an A and a B, both of them temporally extended .individuals, are the same
object or different objects. It is useful primarily on those occasions
when two material objects (or two simple substances) axe picked out by-
properties that are either dateless or have the same dates. The cri-
teria for the other three kinds of entities are persistence criteria.
Their chief function is .to determine whether two or .more temporal,
stages are stages of the same object, but they have the limited useful-
ness in deciding questions concerning the identity or diversity of tempo
ral wholes that was described at the end of the last chapter. They are
helpful as identity criteria mainly when the properties by which the
temporally extended objects are singled out have different dates.
1. Simple Substances
Implicit in Locke * s discussion of the identity and diversity of sub
stances is a division of substances into two categories, simple and com-
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pound* Of simple substances there are three sorts, namely, God,
finite souls and particles of matter. For all three kinds, identity
is defined primarily in terms of spatial location. It should be
pointed out that Locke maintains that every kind of substance, whether
material or spiritual, occupies space and is in place. His theory that
finite souls occupy space and are capable of motion appears to be based
on the fact that each human soul can operate only on its own body, and
not on bodies in places distant from its own. Locke takes this as an
2indication that the soul is in the same place as its body. There is no
contradiction, he thinks, in a spiritual substance occupying the same
place at the same time as a material substance* Furthermore, God, who
is the unique infinite immaterial substance, is spatially and temporally
omnipresent and hence coexists in the same places at the same times with
both atoms of matter and individual souls. So some places are occupied
at the same time by both an infinite and a finite spiritual substance.
According to Locke this assertion is also free from inconsistency. But
when we confine ourselves to considering substances of a particular sort,
that is to say, infinite spiritual substance, finite spiritual substance
or material substance then spatial location at a given time can serve as
an individuating principle. This is because no two substances of the
same kind are capable of occupying the same place at the same time. Why
Locke should think that it is impossible for two finite immaterial sub-
stances, i.e., two souls, to occupy the same place at the same time may
seem difficult to understand, but we cannot pursue the matter further
here. V/e shall later observe that his attitude toward the topic of
spiritual substance is marked by a certain ironic ambivalence, to say >-he
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very least.
A more fundamental criticism has been raised by Baruch Brody.
Brody believes that Locke faces special problems because of his belief
that location in a given place at a given time is an adequate individ-
uating principle only v;hen applied to individuals which belong to the
same substantial kind.*,
"Locke is saying that x and £ are identical if they are in the same
places at the same times and have certain properties (the ones that make
them God, or a finite spirit, or a particle of matter) in common. The
question that naturally arises is t What makes these properties special?
What reason is there to suppose that, the common possession of these prop-
erties, and not others, makes it impossible for two objects to be in the
3
same place at the same time?"
In the next paragraph Brody says that Locke's theory runs "into
trouble just because it picks out certain properties as special" and
suggests that the way to avoid such problems is to "treat all properties
equally." He briefly considers the possibility of reformulating Locke's
criterion in such a way as to permit it to assert the identity of any x
and v that occupy the same place at the same time. But he rejects this
alternative on the grounds that, after all, Locke was correct in think-
ing that certain entities of different types can be in the same place
simultaneously. "After all, my body and I are in the same place at the
same time, but they cannot be identical since there are some properties
that they do not have in common." One might think that this statement
constitutes a recognition of what makes some properties "special" in the
sense that "the common possession of these properties, and not others,
8o
makes it impossible for two objects to be in the same place at the same
time." But Brody apparently does not see it in this light. His final,
reformulation of Locke's sufficient condition for the identity of
simple substances is as follows: "x and £ are identical if they are in
the same place at the same time and have all their properties in
common."
He considers this to be "the most plausible version for a general
theory of identity like Locke's, although, unfortunately, it is not the
one that Locke actually adopted."
Brody's version of "a general theory of identity" states as the
sufficient condition for the identity of any substances, x and Zs iheir
indiscernibility plus their simultaneous location in a given place.
The first and most obvious comment is that if one is stipulating the in-
discernibility of x and j as a sufficient condition of their identity,
it is wholly redundant to add to that stipulation any ether condition
whatsoever. If x and possess all their properties in common, then
clearly one of them will not have the property of being in a certain
place at a given time unless the other likewise possesses it. So Brody
could and should simplify his sufficient condition by removing the re-
quirement that x and ^ be in the same place at tne same time. So sim-
plified, his "general theory of identity" turns out to be the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles. As a restatement ox one half oi the
fundamental principle ox identity, this formulation is faultless. But
as an epistemic test for the identity of things of a particular kind, it
is absolutely futile. What Locke was properly in quest of was pre-
cisely a criterion adequate to inform as when simple substances, x and
8l
have all their properties in common. Brody shows little understand-
ing of the nature of this undertaking.
Concerning criteria of identity for simple substances, Locke has
the following to say:
... one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence,
nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for
two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same
instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing
in different places. That, therefore, that had one be-
ginning, is the same thing; and that v/hich had a different
beginning in time and place from that, is not the same,
but diverse.
^
Where "A” and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple sub-
stances of the same sort, we may render "... it being impossible for two
things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very
same place ..." as:
(1) A/ 3 & /T3 t) (3p) (A occupies p at t and B occupies p at t)/j.
(1) provides a fairly literal rendering of Locke's words, but it is
clearly a defective principle, and as such, perhaps should not be re-
garded as capturing his intent. A "place" occupies a spatial location
of indeterminate magnitude. There seems to be no reason why a "place"
should not be large enough to accommodate more than one atom, or for
that matter, more than one physical object of any finite magnitude.
Two stars, for example, can be said to be in the same place at the same
time. They are situated in the same galaxy. Therefore, in order to do
justice to Locke's intentions, it seems necessary to develop a concept
of total occupation. We may say that a simple substance, A, totally
occupies a place, P, at t if and only if every part of P is such that A
is in it at t. Then it will be reasonable to assert that distinct
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Bimple substances of the same sort cannot totally occupy the same place
au the same time. Perhaps this was what Locke intended to convey by
his statement that two things of the same kind could not exist "in the
same instant, in the very same place." So we may amend (1) to read as
follows;
(2) “-0 {(A f B) and /G 1) (dp) (A totally occupies p at t and B
totally occupies p at t)77.^
From chis principle we can derive, not indeed a criterion providing the
necessary and sufficient conditions of identity for simple substances,
but a statement of the sufficient condition.
(3) Z(3t) (3 p) (A totally occupies p at t and B totally occupies p at t)7
(A = B).
We may also derive a statement of the necessary condition for the diver-
sity of simple substances of the same sort.
(4)
(A f B)-Z> ™ /Gt) Gp) (A totally occupies p at t and B totally
occupies p at t)/.
(4) entails (5).
(5) (A f B)~^ /Tt) (p) (A totally occupies p at t -y B does not totally
occupy p at tj)/7 .
The most straightforward way of expressing the statement that it is
impossible for one and the same thing to exist in different places at
the same instant would seem to be as follows;
(6) ™ OfJA - b) Sc {(3t) (3p) (3p ’ > </(p f o’) S'. (A totally occupies p
at t & B totally occupies p* at t)/f ,
'~~>J
So formulated, the principle would serve, for example, to eliminate the
possibility that a given soul might inhabit more than one body at any
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one time, and this is something Locke presumably would wish to do. How-
ever, among Locke's teachings there is a doctrine which is a stunning
counter-example to (6). God is in every place at every time.
According to (6), God would fail to be self-identical. In addition,
there is a difficulty in connection with atoms of matter. According to
Locke, every material particle, no matter how small, possesses the prop-
g
erty of being extended. Hence there is a possibility of its totally
occupying more than one spatial location at a given time. In view of
these considerations, it does not seem likely that Locke intended to
assert (6), even although (6) appears to be the most direct and literal
formulation of his verbal statement. Once again, in order to capture
his intent it seems necessary to elucidate a new concept, that of being
limited or confined to the occupation of a certain place. Let us say
that a substance A is limited to the occupation of a place, p, at t if
and only if there is no place p' such that (a) no part of p* is in-
cluded in p and (b) A is in any part of p' at t. We may then formulate
the notion of exact occupation. A exactly occupies a place, p, at t if
and only if (a) A totally occupies p at t and (b) A is limited to the
occupation of p at t. Using this concept, we shall reformulate (6) as
follows s
(7) — (} - 3) and C(3t) Gp) Gp’) /fp / P') and (A exactly
occupies p at t and B exactly occupies p* at t)/.
Like (6), (7) is a fairly straightforward rendering of Locke's actual
words, but unlike (6), it states a principle that is both true and that
would unquestionably be acceptable to Locke. The claim that it makes,
however, turns out upon examination to be extremely weak. For it A and
B exactly occupy distinct places at the same time, it will follow that
at one and the same time there is some place totally occupied by the one
which is not totally occupied by the other. Now every substance,
according to Locke, necessarily occupies some place. So if there is a
place which at a given time is totally occupied by A and not by B, then
there is a place v/hich at that time is exactly occupied by B and it is
not the same as the place exactly occupied by A. Consequently, the
assertion that A and B at the same time exactly occupy places which are
distinct is equivalent to the statement that there is some place which
at a given time is totally occupied by A and not by B <pr vice versa).
So the claim that A and B cannot be identical while exactly occupying
distinct places at the same time amounts to no more than a version of
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. For the sake of
bringing (?) into line with principles (2) - (5), we may restate it, in
a slightly abbreviated form, as follows:
(8)
— (^> q(A = B) and /C3t) (dp) (A totally occupies p at t and B does
not totally occupy p at t)/tj .
(8) yields the following sufficient condition for the non-identity of
simple substances of the same sort.
(9) /JBt) (dp) (A totally occupies p at t and B does not totally occupy
p at t2? -2 (A / B),
It also yields a necessary condition for their identity.
(10) (A - B) — ZT3t) (3p) (A totally occiipies p at t and B does net
totally occupy p at t)A




(A-B) Z(t) (p) (A totally occupies p at t B totally
p at ty.
As we have seen, Locke subscribes to the doctrine that every substance,
no matter what its kind, necessarily occupies space. Hence, where "A"
is replaceable by the name of any substance, he would assent to the
following statement.
(12) (3t) (dp) (A totally occupies p at t).
When we conjoin (12) with the consequent of (11), we may infer:
(13) (3t) (3p) (A totally occupies p at t and B totally occupies p at t).
So the result of combining (11) and (12) is a new statement of the neces-
sary condition for the identity of simple substances of the same sort.
(1h) (A = B) /(3t) (3p) (A totally occupies p at t and B totally
occupies p at t V«
Combining (l4) with (3) enables us to state a full criterion of the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions of identity for simple substances. When
"A" and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple substances of
the same sort, the following biconditional will hold.
(15) (A = B) 4“^ /T3t ) (3p) (A totally occupies p at t and B totally
occupies p at t_)7»
Similarly, the consequence of conjoining (12) with (5) is another state-
ment of the necessary condition for the diversity of simple substances
of the same kind.
( 16 ) (A / B) /(3t) Op) (A totally occupies p at t and B does not
totally occupy p at t,Y7.
So ( 9 ) may be transformed into a biconditional asserting the necessary
and. sufficient conditions for the diversity of simple substances.
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Where "A" and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple sub-
stances of the ssme sort, the following will be true-
(17) (A B /T3t) (Jp) (A totally occupies p at t and B does not
totally occupy p at t)/.
It may be noted that the necessary condition for the identity of
simple substances that would have been derivable from (6), when con-
joined with (12), would have failed to yield (14). Hence, if we had
accepted (6) as the correct formulation of Locke's statement that it is
impossible for one and the same thing to exist in different places at
the same instant, we would have had no legitimate basis for transforming
(3) into the biconditional, (15), and thus we would not have been able
to obtain a full criterion for the identity of simple substances of the
sane sort. Similarly., (16)
,
which is derivable from the conjunction of
(12) and (5), would not have legitimated turning the sufficient condi-
tion for diversity derivable from (6) into a biconditional. But, in any
case, such a transformation would have led to undesirable consequences.
For if we were to make existing at different places at the same time a
necessary condition for the non-identity of A and B, we should not be
able to assert that substances with non-overlapping life spans were
diverse. Every finite spirit and every atom of matter has its beginning;
any of them could be annihilated at any time if it were God's pleasure to
do so. Consequently the possibility of such non-overlapping life spans
for simple substances cannot be ruled out.
There is yet another reason why it is preferable to derive the cri-
terion of non-identity from (8) rather than from (6). The necessary
and sufficient condition for identity presented in (15) and the neces-
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sary and sufficient condition for non-identity presented in (1?) are
not contradictories. However, (11) tells us that any simple substances,
A and B, which satisfy the conditions for identity stipulated in (15)
will necessarily satisfy a further condition, (l8).
(18) (t) (p) (A totally occupies p at t B totally occupies p at t)„
( 18 ) is the contradictory of the necessary and sufficient condition of
non-identity presented in (17),
Similarly, if A and B satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition pre-
sented in (17), then according to (5) they will necessarily satisfy (19).
(19) (t) (p) (A totally occupies p at t ^ B does not totally occupy p
at t)
.
(19) is the contradictory of the necessary and sufficient condition pro-
vided in (15), Consequently it is impossible that any pair of simple
substances of the same sort should ever satisfy both the criterion of
identity and that of non-identity. The relation between the necessary and
sufficient conditions presented in (15) and (1?) exemplifies one kind of
logical relationship which in Chapter I we argued it is proper for
tests of identity and non-identity to exhibit. But this is not true of
the relation holding between the conditions for identity and diversity
which could be derived from combining (6) with (2). The universally
quantified version of the sufficient condition for diversity derivable
from (6) is not the contradictory of the sufficient condition of identity
presented in (3). Nor is it the case that any A and B satisfying the
sufficient condition, of diversity derivable from (6) would necessarily
satisfy the universally quantified version of that condition.
It is readily apparent that Locke's test of identity for simple sub-
stances cannot be regarded as a genidentity criterion determining
whether or not distinct temporal segments belong to a single persisting
whole. For if two temporal segments do not overlap, then, even if they
belong to the same persisting individual, there is no place which they
occupy at the same time. They cannot meet the necessary and sufficient
condition specified in (15). Perhaps less apparent, but equally impor-
tant, is the fact that Locke's criterion for the identity of simple sub-
stances also fails to serve as a true identity criterion for temporal
segments. This is because Locke proceeds on the assumption that spatio-
temporal overlapping on the part of distinct simple substances belonging
to the same sort is an impossibility. We have already seen that overlap-
ping on the part of temporal segments of the same object is always a pos-
sibility. Any overlapping but non-identical pair of temporal stages of
the same object meets the necessary and sufficient condition for identity
laid doxtfn in (15) , since there is a time at which its members both
totally occupy the same place. At the same time these members meet the
requirement for diversity stipulated in (17), for there is a time at
which one of them totally occupies a place that the other does not
totally occupy. In order to make Locke's identity criterion applicable
to temporal segments of objects, we should need to reinterpret (2) along
the following lines;
(20) — (} £(A / B) and /Jt) (p) (A totally occupies p at (or during)
As long as we retain (2) and the identity criterion that is derived from
it, we shall be compelled to stipulate that it is not permissible to
substitute for "A" and "B" in (l) - (19) the names of proper temporal
t B totally occupies p at (or during)
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parts of simple substances*
Let us turn now to Locke's principles concerning the beginnings of
existence. First of all, we need a definition of "beginning." A thing
may be said to begin at t if and only if it exists at t and did not
exist at the time immediately preceding t. This is the broad sense of
"beginning" which makes it permissible for us to say that things
"begin again," or that they resume an interrupted existence. We may
also define a strict or absolute sense of "beginning," according to
which a thing may be said to begin at t only if it never existed at any
time previous to t„ Let us say, then, that a substance, A, begins in p
at t if and only if (1) A totally occupies p at t, (2) there is a period,
t ~ n to t, such that every moment in it is prior to t and such that
there is no time that is both later than any moment in this period and
also earlier than t and (3) during t - n to t there is no place such
that it is totally occupied by A. A substance. A, has an absolute be-
ginning in p at t if and only if A totally occupies p at t and there is
no place such that it was totally occupied by A at any time earlier than
t. Naturally, no substance can have more than one absolute beginning.
Now Locke's principle that txro things cannot have one beginning v/ill
hold good no matter which interpretation of "beginning" is chosen, for
in either case, if a substance begins in p, it totally occupies p.
The principle may be expressed as follows
:
(21) =»• A |^(A / 5) & /C3t) (3p) (A has its beginning in p at t & B has
its beginning in p at t)_/j •
From (21) we may derive another sufficient condition of identity:
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(22) ZGt) (3 p) (A has its beginning in p at t & B has its beginning in
p at t)/ (A = B).
Since the antecedent of (22) implies the antecedent of (35)
,
(22) is de-
rivable from (3)o Note that we cannot transform (22) into a bicondi-
tional and. preserve its truth. If we made beginning in the same place
at the same time a necessary, as well as a sufficient, condition of
identity, eternal substances, e.g., God, would fail to be self-identical.
There are serious difficulties concerning the proper interpreta-
tion of Locke's principle that one thing cannot have two beginnings of
existence. This teaching has often been regarded as asserting that
nothing which has ceased to exist can at a later point of time resume
7its existence or that there can be no secondary beginnings. Locke's
choice of words does., indeed, seem to suggest this reading. If this is
what he meant to say, the principle should be expressed as foilowss
(23) 0 ((A = B) & .((3t) Gt') (3 p) Gp') /Ta has its beginning in p
at t & B has its beginning in p* at t') & (T / t' or p Z v'l/
According to (23) all beginnings of substances are absolute beginnings.
(23) yields (2*+) as a sufficient condition of diversity for simple
substances.
(2k) i Gt) (3f) Gp) (3p') /Ta has its beginning in p at t & B has its
beginning in p* at t') & (t / T 1 or p / P'2/j (A / B).
But the difficulty to which this interpretation is exposed is immedi-
ately apparent. Locke makes it clear that he thinks the principle in
question is derivable either from the proposition that two things of
the same kind cannot "exist in the same instant, in the very same place"
or from the proposition that one and the same thing cannot exist in
different places at the same time, or from both of these together. ljut
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(24) is not derivable either from (3) cr (9) or from both together.
Nor is the situation improved by intei’preting the claim that it is im-
possible for one thing to exist in different places at the same time as
(6). The sufficient condition of non-identity derivable from (6) is not
implied by the antecedent of (24). Furthermore, the claim expressed in
(23) and (24) is so much stronger than and so unrelated in subject matter
to the principles expressed in (1) - (9) that it is difficult to believe
anyone could have regarded the former as a logical consequence of the
latter. Under these circumstances it seems more reasonable to interpret
Locke's dictum that one thing cannot have two (or different) beginnings
as the following weak claim, which like (8) is a direct consequence of
the indiscernibility of identicals.
(25) =» (A = B 8t /T t) ( p) (A has its beginning at p at t & B does
not have its beginning at p at t )7 •
From (25) we derive the foliov/ing sufficient condition of diversity for
simple substances of the sarnie sort.
(26) /( t) ( p) (A has its beginning- in p at t and B does not have its
beginning in p at t}/ — (A f- B).
(26) cannot be transformed into a biconditional for reasons similar to
those that prohibit the parallel transformation of (22).
(26), unlike (24), appears to be derivable from (9)* We need to
show that the antecedent of (26) implies the antecedent of (9). By the
meaning of ’’beginning,' 1 if A has its beginning in some p at t, A did
not totally occupy any p during a period, t - n to t, which is such
that every moment in it is prior to t and such that there is no time
that is both later than any moment in this period and also earlier than
t» (We are not excluding the possibility that A may have totally occu-
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pied some p at some t prior to the period, t - n to t, and ceased to exist
during this period or before it commenced.) But if B does not have its
beginning in p at t, then either B does not totally occupy p at t, or,
if it does, it totally occupied some p' during the period, t - n to t
(p * may or may not be identical with p). In the former case p is
totally occupied by A at t, but not by B. In the latter, there is a p'
which is totally occupied by B during the period, t - n to t, but not by
A. If the disjunction is to be exhaustive, we must rule out the possi-
bility of the following state of affairs. B totally occupies p at t,
there is a p' (non-identical with p) which B also totally occupies at t,
and B has its beginning at p s , although not at p. However, it seems
reasonable to assert that if a substance has its beginning at t, then it
has that beginning in every p which it occupies at t. So if B occupies
p and p ! at t and has its beginning in p’ at t, it also begins in p at
We conclude that the passage we have been discussing does not pro-
vide adequate grounds for attributing to Locke the view that the exist-
ence of a simple substance must be continuous or uninterrupted. We
know that Locke did not hold that every kind of entity must exist unin-
terruptedly. As we shall see when we take up the question of personal
identity, he thought that the existence of a person need not be tempo-
rally continuous. But since a person is a non-substantial entity for
Locke, this leaves open the question of the continuity of the existence
of substances. It must be admitted that when he is discussing the
identity of a living creature, Locke does frequently mention continued
existence in a way that suggests he thought of it as a necessary condi-
9.3
tion for that identity. It is not altogether certain whether Locke
thought of an organism as a substance; if he did, it was as a compound
rather than a simple substance. Most relevant to the issue are Locke's
remarks concerning the continued identity of an atom of matter. Unfor-
tunately they are extremely difficult to understand.
... it is evident, that considered in any instant of
its existence, it is in that instant the same with
itself. For, being at that instant what it is, and
nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue
as long as its existence is continued: for so long
it will be the same, and no other.
9
Interpreted literally, this passage seems to say no more than that an
atom which continues to exist will continue to be identical with itself
and with nothing else. But some commentators have regarded it as a
"groping toward the conception of individuality as spatiotemporal contin-
uity."'
1
'^ The latter viewpoint must base itself, so far as I can see,
upon the fragment "... it is the same, and so must continue as long as
its existence is continued; ..." Apparently these words are construed
as saying that if some temporal parts of an atom are spatiotemporally
continuous with earlier atom-parts ("... as long as its existence is
continued then the later and earlier parts belong to a single
atom ("... it is the same This interpretation seems exceed-
ingly strained. Even if it is correct, it does not seem likely that
Locke is making the point that uninterrupted existence is necessary to
an atom. It would appear that he is saying, rather, that if an unin-
terrupted thread of existence connects earlier and later temporal
parts of an atom, that is sufficient to insure that they are parts of
the same atom
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Unless we adopt the problematic view that the quotation just cited
puts forward a sufficient condition for the continued existence of an
atom, we shall be obliged to say that Locke offers no persistence cri-
terion for simple material substance. If we do not have a criterion
to determine when two or more temporal segments of an atom belong to
the same atom, then we cannot give a definition of what it is to be a
temporally extended atomic whole, that is to say, an atom viewed as a
four-dimensional object. We can, however, lay down certain necessary
conditions which any such object must meet.
(27) SMS is a simple material substance which is a temporal whole
only if
SMS is composed of a series, S, of temporal segments such that
(a.) each segment of S consists of exactly one atom of matter
and
(b) S is not itself a member (a proper temporal part) of any series
which meets the requirement specified in (a).
2. Masses of Matter
a. Nature of a mass . The only kind of compound substance consid-
ered by Locke is a material compound; presumably there are no compound
spiritual substances. The terms ''compound," "mass," "body," and
"parcel of matter" are employed, by him interchangeably. The most obvi-
ous difference between a simple material substance and a compound one is
that, while the former is identical with a single atom, the latter con-
sists of at least two atoms. But we have not exhausted the properties
making up the Aristotelian essence of a material compound when we say
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that each of its temporal segments must be identical with a collection
of atoms containing more than one member. Locke comes closest to speci-
fying that essence when he distinguishes a mass of matter from an
organism by saying that the former is "only the cohesion of particles
of matter any how united" whereas an oak tree (serving as an example of
an organism) is "such a disposition of them ^/particles/' as constitutes
12
the parts of an oak ..." So we may say that the Aristotelian essence
of a mass of matter is the property of being a "cohesion" of atoms.
This implies, of course, that it consists of at least two atoms. Since
the atousmay be "any how united," possession of a specific organization
of its components is not essential to a mass. Accordingly, the persist-
ence criterion for masses specifies that in order to continue to exist a
mass must retain exactly the sarnie atomic components but that it does not
matter whether or not these parts are "differently jumbled." The problem
is how to determine whether or not a given set of particles constitutes
a "cohesion." Clearly not every such set does, because then it would be
meaningless to speak., as Locke does, of taking atoms away from a mass,
or adding new ones to it, except, possibly, in the case of the annihila-
tion or creation of atoms. It might be that, in speaking of collections
or cohesions of atomic particles, Locke had in mind a paradigm typified
by that of two rock piles. What makes each of them one and the pair of
them two? We might try saying that the distance which separates any two
rocks belonging to a given rock pile is considerably less than the
distance separating any rock belonging to pile A from any rock belonging
to pile B. To take a rock away from pile A is to remove it to a
distance from the rock in A that is nearest to it which is greater than
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the distance separating the rocks in A and B which are nearest to each
other,* To add a rock to A is to place it in a proximity to some other
rock in A which is closer than the proximity in which it stands to any
rock in B. However, if the rock piles are sizable, it might well be
that a rock situated, let us say, at the bottom of A is further away
from a rock at the top of A than it is from the nearest rock in B. So
this account is not satisfactory,.
In any case, if we model the notion of a mass on the rock pile para-
digm we fail to capture the element of "cohesion" which appears to be of
considerable importance to Locke. "Mass" and "body" are synonymous terms
for him and he says that one of the primary ideas "peculiar to body" is
13
"the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable, parts." In fact,
the analysis he offers of the notion of the extension of body is that it
is "nothing but the cohesion of solid parts." "... body is no further,
nor otherwise, extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid
] 4parts In the next paragraph "sticking firmly together" is offered
as a synonym for "cohesion." Locke rejects the hypothesis that it is the
pressure of a circumambient external body, such as air, that holds to-
gether the parts of sensible bodies. It is rather the case that the
union and cohesion of these parts is incomprehensible, both as to "the
,.15
manner of thinking, and how it is performed."
He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose
little bodies together so firmly, he that could make known
the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another,
would discover a great and yet unknown secret
These passages seem to offer the strongest possible support for the
view that it is essential to a mass of matter that its component atoms
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"stick firmly together." In weariness, we shall ignore the question of
how firmly they must stick. Now apparently what we would ordinarily
call a "body of water" (water in a cup, water in a lake) does not count
as a body for Locke, and, if a mass of matter is to be identified with
a body, such a collection of water particles would not constitute a
mass. For the particles of water are "perfectly loose one from another”
and "have no cohesion one with another." But if the water freezes and
the parts cohere, then a body or mass presumably comes into being, only
to disappear from existence, one would suppose, when the ice again melts
and to reappear if the water once more freezes. When we come to consider
the persistence criterion for masses it will be obvious that a body, or
mass, will thus be capable of an interrupted, non-continuous existence,
but as we have seen, this consequence need not be thought of as incon-
sistent with Locke's principle regarding the impossibility of one thing's
having two beginnings. It simply constitutes a further ground for re-
fusing to interpret that principle as a statement of the impossibility
of a thing's going out of existence and then beginning to exist a second
time.
However, this view of what it is to be a mass of matter is net
wholly unproblematic when placed in the context of some other Lockian
teachings. In Book III of the Essa^ Locke makes a distinction between
real and nominal essence. Emphatically rejecting the notion that the
real essence of a being is to be identified \i/ith its substantial icrm,
Locke tells us that real essence is "the very being of anything, whereby
it is what it is. ... the real internal, but generally (in substances)
unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable quali (.res
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depend In yet another passage Locke explicitly states that the
real essence or internal constitution of body can be nothing but
the figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts . Synonyms for
"connexion" provided later in the paragraph are "situation," "putting
together," and "posture."
In a typical statement, very often repeated, Locke informs us:
Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently
(which is the end of sorting) denominate them, by their
read, essences; because we know them not. Our faculties
carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction
of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas
which we observe in them.^O
We may remark in passing that Locke's view concerning the unknowable
character of the read, essence or the real constitution of things does
not seem to fit well with his doctrine of primary and secondary quali-
ties. According to that teaching, secondary qualities, such as colors,
sounds, smells and tastes, do not in reality belong to the substances
to which we attribute them. Sensible ideas of secondary properties are
induced in us through the operation upon our senses of the insensible
primary qualities of body. But the primary qualities of bodies, viz,
bulk (extension plus solidity), figure, mobility and number, axe proper-
ties that really inhere in material substances and our ideas of these
21
qualities are truly resemblances of them. Furthermore, he holds that
these primai’y qualities are "... utterly inseparable from the body, in
what state soever it be . and hence, presumably, they axe really
essential to it. Clearly the primary qualities of bulk and figure, at
least, are being asserted to be part of the real essence of body.
Since our ideas of these qualities do resemble them, it seems to follow
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that we have knowledge of them, and hence that we also have partial
knowledge, at any rate, of the real essence of bodily substance.
The problem v/ith which we must immediately deal is as follows.
The real essence of a material substance, e.g.,gold, a horse, is that
arrangement, texture or constitution of its insensible parts (atomic
components) upon which its observable properties depend. Typically, a
natural body, whose parts cohere together, will be a material substance
of a certain sort. It will be a nugget of gold, a piece of ice, a
horse or a man. As such it will have a real essence; the arrangement of
its atomic parts will not be one of its merely accidental properties,
but will be essential to it. Locke goes so far as to say that a real
essence is "that particular constitution which every thing has within
23itself." However, the arrangement of its atomic components is ines-
sential to a mass of matter. It is in this v/ay that a mass is distin-
guished from a living organism. Is it an inconsistency, then, on
Locke’s part to identify a mass of matter with a body? Can a piece of
ice or a nugget of gold, to which a certain atomic structure is essen-
tial, be identical with a mass, to which such a structure is inessen-
tial?
b« Individuals and their essences . In order to obtain an answer
to this question we must now turn to Locke's famous discussion of the
topic of individual essence which appears in Book III, Chapter VI, of
the Essay . The cardinal point made by Locke in this passage is pre-
cisely that individuals as such have no essences; that nothing is
essential to the existence or the continued existence of an individual





in the ordinary use of the word, relates to
sorts, and that it is considered in particular beings no
further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from
hence : that
,
take but away the abstract ideas by which we
sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and
then the thought of anything essential to any of them in-
stantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one without
the other, which plainly shows their relation. It is
necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me
so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An
accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape;
a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both;
and an apoplexy leave neither sense, nor understanding, no,
nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with
more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I have;
and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body
very different from mine. None of these are essential to
the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till
the mind refers it to some sort or species of things; and
then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort,
something is found essential. Let any one examine his ovm
thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or
speaks of essential., the consideration of some species, or
the complex idea, signified by some general, name, comes
into his mind; and it is in reference to that that this or
that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be
asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particu-
lar corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more
than it is essential to this white thing I write on to
have words in it. But if that particular being be to be
counted of the sort man, and to have the name man given it,
then reason is essential to it; supposing reason to be a
part of the complex idea the name man stands for; as it is
essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I
will give it the name treatise
,
and rank it under that,
species. So that essential and not essential relate only
to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which
amounts to no more than this, that whatever particular
thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in
the abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot
be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name;
since thaj: abstract idea is the very essence of that
species.24
In this passage Locke appears to be telling us that statements of
the form "F is essential to A" are intelligible only when they are in-
terpreted as abbreviations of statements having the form "Ac<k A is
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F," where is replaceable by the name of a class. Thus the state-
ment that rationality is essential to Locke must be understood as
asserting that Locke is a member of the class of men only on condition
of being rational. Stripped of his rationality, the individual we
denote by "Locke" would continue to exist, although he would no longer
exist as a man. Essentiality is always essentiality for class member-
ship; it is a relation holding between species or properties, rather
than an individual and a species. "It would be absurd to ask, whether a
thing really existing wanted anything essential to it." "... particular
beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their
qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be
25
essential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all."
At first sight this passage seems to contradict two well-known
Lockian teachings. The first is the doctrine we have just been discus-
sing, that everything has within itself a particular constitution which
is its real essence. The second is the thesis upon which his construc-
tion of persistence criteria for entities of various sorts is founded,
namely, that the continued existence of any individual is dependent upon
its retention of certain key properties, or upon the maintenance of a
particular sort of relation between its temporal parts.
Let us attempt to resolve the first contradiction. If we succeed
we shall at the same time be able to explain away the inconsistency in
Locke's apparent identification of a body, to which a certain atomic
structure is essential, with a mass, to which it is not. Now Locke is
aware of the tension between his denial that individuals, "considered
barely in themselves," have no essence and his doctrine that everything
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is possessed of a real essence,, This essence, he tells us, is a con-
stitution which it has "within itself, without any relation to any-
thing without it," that is to say, quite independently of any ranking
or sorting of the thing on the part of human beings
. This is his
attempt to reconcile the two teachings.
It is true, I have often mentioned a real essence
,
distinct
in substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I
call their nominal essence. 3y this real essence I mean,
that real constitution of anything, which is the foundation
of all those properties that are combined in, and are con-
stantly found to co-exist v/ith the nominal essence; that
particular constitution which everything has within itself,
without any relation to anything without it. But essence,





For, being that real constitution on which the
properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things,
properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals:
v.g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of
such a peculiar colour and weight, v/ith malleability and
fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the
parts of matter on which these qualities and their union
depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua
regia and other properties, accompanying that complex idea.
Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition
of a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as
immutable; but there is no individual parcel of matter to
which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essen-
tial to it or inseparable from it. That which is essential
belongs to it as a condition v/hereby it is of this or that
sort: but take away the consideration of its being ranked
under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is
nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. u
When Locke says that properties belong only to species and not to
individuals, I think we must understand him as asserting that proper-
ties belong essentially only to species. As usual, this passage is not
easy to comprehend. Locke seems to have something of the following
sort in mind. Each body, each parcel of mat ter, possesses a particular
kind of atomic arrangement or internal structure. That it does so is
a natural fact not dependent upon our observation of it nor upon our
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classifying the body as belonging to a certain kind. Possession of
this real constitution causes the body to manifest a certain set of
properties observable by us. Ideas of these properties combined to-
gether (plus the idea of a support) make up for us a nominal essence
or abstract idea and it is this which forms the basis of our ranking
the body as a member of a certain sort or species. The atomic con-
stitution of the body is the causal basis of properties which anything
must have _if it is to be classified by us as a being of a certain sort.
Having a certain arrangement of atomic parts causes a given parcel of
matter to exhibit the properties of malleability, fusibility, yellow
colour and a particular weight. We classify anything having such proper
ties as gold. Having each of these properties is an analytic necessity
for anything which is so classified; having the appropriate atomic struc
ture is a causal necessity for any body manifesting the properties.
Therefore we may say that possession of an atomic constitution of a cer-
tain sort is essential to every gold thing. "Take but away" this real
constitution, i.e., disrupt the underlying organization of the atoms,
and the parcel of matter will no longer be a piece of gold. It would
seem to follow that a previously existing piece of gold ceased to exist.
But Locke doesn't want to say this. He does not view this phenomenon
as the disappearance from the world of a real individual, namely, a
piece of gold. No doubt this is connected with that part of his teach-
ing according to which "being a piece of gold" is a property conferred
upon a thing by men, rather than by nature.
And to talk of specific differences in nature
,
without
reference to general ideas in names, is to talk unin-
telligibly. For I would ask anyone, v/hat is sufficient
104
to make an essential difference in nature between any
two particular beings, without any regard had to some
abstract idea, which is looked upon as the essence and
standard of a species?^-?
So when a parcel of matter loses the internal organization of its
parts that is the causal foundation of its being classified as gold,
Locke denies that an individual has perished. The individual still
persists, he thinks, but it is no longer classifiable as gold. This
shows that the properties essential to being a piece of gold are not
essential to the individual. Clearly Locke is identifying the individ-
ual with the parcel of matter. For possession of the set of observable
properties essential to a thing's being a member of the species, gold,
or any other particular species of material substance, is not essential
to a mass of matter as such. A body or mass consists of a number of
atoms sticking together. Those atoms presumably must always be arranged
according to some definite pattern; hence it may be that possession of
some such patterning of parts is essential to a body. But any particu-
lar organization of atomic components is always a merely accidental
feature of a mass of matter. Consequently it can survive the loss of
such a patterning and remain the same body. Every natural body whose
parts cohere together is always a body of a particular sort; in addi-
tion to being a mass of matter it is a nugget of gold or a piece of ice
or an animal. According to this analysis, "mass of matter" or "body"
becomes the genus of which gold, ice, living organism, etc. constitute
particular species. Just as every animal must also be either a horse,
cow, roan, etc., so must every mass be a particular kind of material
substance. But its continued existence as a parcel of matter is com-
patible with its belonging to different species of material substance
.105
at different times, just as the continued existence of an animal might,
for example
,
be compatible with its being a caterpillar at one stage
of its existence and a butterfly at another. So Locke has not been
inconsistent in identifying a mass to which any particular organiza-
tion of parts is inessential, with a natural body whose parts cohere to-
gether, even although every such body does possess a particular organi-
zation which is the basis of its being classified as a substance of a
special sort, and which is essential to its being so classified.
Locke's identification of an individual, with a parcel of matter per-
mits him to say that belonging to any particular species of material sub-
stance is not essential to an individual as such. Does it justify him
in saying that there is nothing essential to an individual? In malting
the latter claim, Locke seems to adopt the view that in every case of a
property loss, there is an individual!, which had been existing as a being
of a certain kind, and which after the property loss continues to survive,
although no longer as a being of that kind. This is what is suggested
by his statement that if he were to lose his rationality, he would
cease to be a man, but would continue to exist as a corporeal being,
that is, presumably, as an animal organism. Here the thought seems to
be that the underlying individual is the animal body, and that humanity
is a property which may or may not attach to that body. Let us suppose
that the organism loses the organizational pattern that is essential to
its existence as a living creature of that sort. Then the organism
dies. But there is still a surviving entity and that is Locke's ulti-
mate individual, the material compound of atoms which now makes up
the corpse of the former organism. The compound or mass that at one
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time had possessed the property of animality and at a still earlier
time the property of rationality continues to exist, but no longer a_s
a living creature. But does Locke imagine that nothing is essential to
the continued existence of a mass of matter? If that v/ere so parcels of
matter would be immortal, but certainly Locke knows this is not the case.
The mere fact that he proffers a persistence criterion for masses, and a
very stringent one at that
,
shows that he recognizes that the retention
of certain key properties is indeed essential to the continued existence
of a parcel of matter. That persistence criterion teaches us that if a
compound loses an atom, which is always a possibility, then it ceases to
exist. Under these circumstances is it possible to locate an individual,
more real and more ultimate than the mass, which may sensibly be spoken
of as surviving the destruction of the mass and as continuing to exist,
but in the form of something other than a mass of matter? The new com-
pound which consists of the atoms, minus one, that made up the original
mass does not seem to be a likely candidate. In the first place it is
itself a mass; it has not lost the property of being a material compound.
Secondly, it did not come into being until the original compound passed
out of existence, so it cannot be thought of as that which survives the
disappearance of the original, mass. If the objection is raised that
every sub-set of the collection of material particles which comprises a
given mass is itself a mass, we may change the example so that an atom
is added to, rather than subtracted from, the original compound. But
in either case the persistence criterion for masses forbids us to con-
sider the new compound as being the same individual as the old. Per-
haps we could say that the mass is survived by its component atoms.
10?
Clearly in cases where the compound is wholly dissolved these would be
the only survivors. The difficulty is that there is no one individual
which we can thihl: of as being the successor to the mass. Furthermore,
since none of the individual atoms ever possessed the property of being
a compound, we cannot truthfully aver of any of them that it once
existed as a mass, but now exists as an atom. The theory that nothing
is essential to an individual, or that every loss of a property leaves
intact an individual that survives that loss appears to be untenable.
It seems particularly unfortunate that Locke, who ostensibly held
that there are non-material beings such as souls, and who unquestionably
was committed to the view that some entities, persons, for example, are
not substances at all, should have attempted to identify parcels of mat-
ter as the real or ultimate individuals. It makes a certain amount of
sense to view an organism as a mass of natter whose component parts are
organized in such a way as to constitute a living creature. When the
organization is fatally disrupted, instead of saying that an individual,
the organism, has ceased to exist, we may say simply that the status of
the material compound has undergone a change; it no longer has the prop-
erty of being alive. But neither a soul nor a person, according to the
conception Locke had of them, can conceivably be regarded as a parcel of
matter displaying a particular type of organization. It is initially
plausible to hold that the genus-species relation holds between masses
of matter and each of the various sorts of material substances, of
which organisms may be viewed as one variety. Every particular material
substance, whether it be a piece of gold or a human body, seems to be a
parcei. of matter displaying in addition a special sort of patterning of
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parts* But the genus-species relation most certainly does not hold be-
tween a mass or matter, on the one hand, and a soul or a person on the
other. Neither a person nor a soul, nor any temporal part of either
one, belongs to the genus, mass of matter. Consequently if, according
to the Lockian notion, through loss of ability to recall his past ex-
periences a person is annihilated, he may indeed be survived by the
body with which he was formerly associated. But the body which sur-
vives is an entity entirely distinct from the person who has perished.
We cannot say, as we could in the case 'where an organism "dies," that
the only event that has occurred is a change in the status of the body,
e.g., that it is no longer "personified." There is no persistent indi-
vidual underlying the person in the way that the mass of matter may be
thought of as the continuing individual which sometimes may and some-
times may not have the property of being a living organic body. The
doctrine that the ultimate individuals are parcels of matter not only
conflicts with Locke's teaching that there are non-material entities,
such as souls and persons; it is also incompatible with his view that
there are certain species of material substances, notably living organ-
isms, which have persistence criteria of their own and which are not re-
quired to meet the persistence criterion which must be met by any tempo-
rally extended mass of matter. It is essential to a mass, but not to
an organism, that all of its temporal parts have exactly the same com-
ponents. The view that an organism is in reality a mass of matter dis-
playing certain special organize.! ional traits, traits which it may lose
without ceasing to exist as a mass, is equivalent to the thesis that
the class of material masses stands in the genus relation to the class
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of organisms. The notion is that an individual belonging to the genus
may lose the differentiating properties which qualify it as a member of
the species, and yet continue its existence as a member of the genus.
Indeed it is true that every organism, considered as a temporally ex-
tended whole, must possess the undated properties of being material,
compound and cohesive, but it is not necessary that every mass possess
the undated property of being organic or even that it possess that prop-
erty at all. So at first glance the genus-species relation does seem to
hold between a mass and an organism. A mass can lose its organic prop-
erties and yet continue to exist, just as Locke suggests. So it is cer-
tainly correct to say that the property ox being organic is not essen-
tial to any mass. On the other hand an organism must always retain the
properties of being material, compound and cohesive. It is essential to
an organism that each of its temporal segments have these properties.
The thesis that the class of organisms is a species, or sub-set, of
the class of masses of matter is destroyed, however, by Locke's stipula-
tion that an organism, considered as a temporally extended whole, need,
not meet the requirements which temporally extended masses must meet if
they are to be considered as wholes. This means that there can be an
organism which is not identical with, nor a part of, any particular mass
of matter. There can be an organism which simply does not qualify for
membership in the class of (temporally extended) raatex’ial masses. All
of its temporal segments must indeed be material, compound and cohesive;
but the crucial point is that they need not belong to the same cohesive
material mass. The principles which are sufficient to unify an organ-
ism and make a temporal whole out cf it will not serve to constitute a
110
temporally whole mass of matter. Consequently, if an organism ceases to
possess the properties which are essential to its continued existence as
the same organism, we cannot assume that there is a single parcel of
matter, of which that organism was once a part, that will survive the
demise of the organism and continue to exist as a mass.
Probably the most serious criticism that can be lodged against
Locke's teaching that individuals, except insofar as we have assigned
them to a certain classification, have no essential properties is its
apparent inconsistency with the fundamental notion which underlies his
persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and persons. The
persistence criteria presuppose that for every individual of a given type
there are certain properties which are essential to its continued exist-
ence. Locke appears to challenge the assumption upon which an important
part of his philosophical work rests.
Locke might defend himself against the charge of inconsistency in
the following way. He fully recognizes, so he might contend, that once
the Aristotelian essence of an individual has been specified, that is,
once it has been typed, there will be another set of properties making up
the "individual" essence of the thing in question. The members of this
set will be precisely those properties that are stipulated by the per-
sistence criterion for the sortal kind to which the individual has been
assigned. Indeed, he might argue, in the course of his discussion of
identity, it was one of his chief concerns to emphasize that the
"identity" of an individual (i.e., its persistence requirements, rules
for its re-identification) is differently determined according to the
kind of being it is. "... for such as is the idea belonging to that
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name, such must be the identity ..." Because he talks about identity
where he should be talking about persistence and because he uses "A is
the same F as B" where he should say that A and B are distinct parts of
the same F, this part of Locke's teaching seems to bring him close to
the position of a contemporary relative identity theorist such as Peter
Geach. In making statements such as "it is possible for the same man
to be two distinct persons "'0 Locke suggests that where A and B are both
men and both persons, A may bear to B the relation of being the same man
and yet fail to bean to B the relation of being the same person* But we
have seen that there is a strong case for reconstructing Locke's asser-
tions so that he is understood to say merely that temporal segments A
and B may belong to a single enduring entity of type F and yet belong to
different enduring entities of type G» We may say that Locke's deep in-
sight, never clearly or explicitly articulated by him, is that the prin-
ciples according to which temporal wholes are constructed vary according
to kind. We cannot define a temporal whole as such; it is questionable
if we can even give a definition of what it is to be a material object
which is a temporal whole. Consequently, there is no one persistence cri-
terion that will serve for all objects or that is competent to inform us
when any pair of temporal segments belong to a single entity of what-
ever kind. Definitions of temporal wholes are always definitions of
kinds of wholes* Rules for recognition and re-identification over time
(i.e., persistence criteria) are always rules for things belonging to a
certain sort. This is the truth that appears in a distorted form both
in Locke's teaching about different kinds of "identity" and in the
following thesis advocated by Peter Geach; "For every proper name there
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is a corresponding use of a common noun preceded by 'the same' to ex-
press what requirements as to identity the proper name conveys."2 "
Locke and Geach distort the truth because they fail to distinguish
between temporal persistence and identity. They are correct in thinking
that there is no absolutely general or universal answer to the question,
what is a temporally extended thing? But they are wrong in thinking
that there is no absolutely general answer to the question of what it is
for an object A to stand in the relation of identity with object B« This
answer is provided in the fundamental principle of identity which is uni-
versal. in its scope. It is true of arr£ A and any B that they are iden-
tical just in case they have all their properties in common. "Being a
temporal whole" is a property which must be analyzed differently for
different sorts of beings; what properties are entailed by possession of
that property is a question which must be answered separately for each
sort. But "being identical with A" always has the same analysis. It al-
ways entails having all properties in common with A. Correctly glimps-
ing that "being a temporal whole" names a property which can be ana-
lyzed only relatively to kinds, Locke and Geach incorrectly proceed to
the conclusion that "being identical with A" names a relational property
of which the same thing holds good.
It is true, of course, that particular tests for identity are al-
most invariably framed for entities of a specific type, e.g., material
objects.''0 But this is primarily a matter of epistemic convenience. It
is sometimes possible to discover that entities of a particular kind can
be counted on to have all their properties in common if (or if and only
if) they have a given property in common. For practical cognitive pur-
poses this may be very important. But what constitutes the identity of
A with B is not their joint possession of this particular1 property
,
but
the having of ail properties in common. What varies with the kind is
not the nature of identity but the way in which we can discover whether
A and B do in fact have all properties in common.
If we reconstruct Locke's theory by replacing the concept of iden-
tity with that of temporal persistence, can we successfully claim to
have eliminated the apparent contradiction between his view that there
are persistence criteria and his teaching that an individual "considered
barely in itself" has no essence? Can we reduce the latter contention
to the sound thesis that there are no persistence criteria for individ-
uals simply, but only for individuals of a certain kind? It is tempting
to think this possible. But, as usual, Locke places obstacles in the
path of the would-be charitable interpreter. If there are no persistenc
criteria for individuals simply, then it is impossible to recognise or
re-identify a temporal whole which has not been classified as being of a
certain kind. Talk of a temporally extended individual which lacks
essential properties and for which, accordingly, there is no persistence
criterion involves a contradiction in terms. The notions of being a
temporal whole, on the one hand, and of having properties essential to
continued existence, on the other, are strictly correlative. The per-
sistence criterion marks the boundaries of a temporal individual and in
so doing actually constitutes the individual. In order to be consistent
then, Locke should take the view that there are no individuals, "consid-
ered barely in themselves" or abstracted from a species. This he does
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not do. The passages from Chapter VI, Book III which we have quoted at
length make it abundantly clear that he thinks such untyped individuals
can be both identified and re-identified, and he proceeds to make a
variety of assertions about them. He begins and ends the discussion by
asking the reader to take away in thought "the abstract ideas by which
we sort individuals" and then to consider whether the entities thus
stripped can be considered to have any essential properties. "... there
is nothing I have is essential to me," he says, thus assuming that the
individual., Locke, exists and is identifiable even when abstracted from
his species. Such an individual has no essential properties, says Locke,
"till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things," and in so
saying he reveals the assumption that the existence of the individual
antedates this referral.
The alternative way of interpreting these passages is to regard
Locke not as asserting that there can be untyped, individuals lacking all
essential, properties, but rather that the real individuals are parcels
of matter, fully equipped with the appropriate essential properties.
What appear to be individuals of a different sort (men, organisms) are
simply parcels of matter displaying a, certain special kind of organiza-
tion. This view would entail the conclusion that there is ultimately
only one persistence criterion, namely, the criterion for material
bodies. But Locke did not maintain this opinion either, so the alterna-
tive interpretation also leads to the conclusion that Locke was incon-
sistent. We can, however, weaken the thesis which according to the al-
ternative interpretation Locke is putting forward in a way that would
render it true. Let us assume that Locke is talking only about material
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entities, and. let us consider that his statement that nothing is essen-
tial to an individual means merely that it is not essential to a tem-
porally extended material substance that it belong to (or be identical
with) a sintiLe temporally extended individual. Then we can regard his
statement as true. For it is indeed the case that a given temporal seg-
ment which is a cohesion of material particles may at one and the same
time form a part of a mass of matter and of an organism. Those two
entities of different kinds may have a temporal part in common or may
spat i ot emporally overlap. It is also possible that they could com-
pletely coincide, in which case they would have all their properties in
common and would constitute a single individual which was both a mass of
matter and an -organism. We can now provide the following weak interpre-
tation of the thesis that nothing is essential to an individual. Let us
assume that at t there is a segment which is a member of two series, one
of them constituting a temporally persistent mass of matter, M, the
other an organism, 0. At t the component atoms of M, while remaining
the same individuals, are jumbled in such a way as to unfit M for member-
ship in the series that is the organism. Then it may be that the series
constituting the organism comes to an end, but the series making up the
temporalljr persistent mass will nevertheless continue. This shows that
it is not essential to the continued existence of the series which is
the temporally persistent mass that some of its temporal segments should
also participate in another series constituting an organism. Being a
living creature is not essential to a material compound. So the state-
ment that nothing is essential to the existence of an individual is in
this case paraphrased as the claim that it is not essential to the
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continued existence of a series constituting a mass that its members be
participants in some other series in which they have the capacity to par-
ticipate « However, it seems fairly clear that Locke intended to assert a
thesis far more ambitious than the modest claim we have been describing.
About all that can be said for this weal: interpretation is that it has
the virtue of construing the words of a great philosopher charitably.
c. Persistence and identity criteria for masses of matter .
... if two or more atoms be joined together into the same
mass.
. .whilst they exist united together, the mass, con-
sisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the
same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled.
But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one
added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body .51
This statement of Locke's provides a genuine persistence criterion
for material masses and permits us to give a definition of a mass of mat-
ter considered as a four-dimensional whole persisting through time.
Following Locke's indications, we shall offer the following defini-
tion of a "cohesion" of atoms.
(28) C is a cohesion of atoms
if and only if
(a) C consists of more than one atom
(b) The atoms composing C stick firmly together
(29) M is a mass of matter which is a temporal whole
if and only if
M is composed of a series, S, of temporal segments such that
(a) each segment of S is a cohesion of atoms
and
(b) (A) (B) j (A is a member of S and B is a member of S) only
if
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/Tx) (x is an atomic component of A if and only if x is an
atomic component of B_)/j
and
(c) S is not itself a proper temporal part of any series meeting
requirements (a) and ( b ).
It is clause (b) of (29) which specifies the sufficient individuating con-
dition for masses of matter; no counterpart to (b) is included in ( 27 ).
Any series meeting the requirements laid down in (b) will compose or con-
stitute a genuine temporally persistent individual, whereas the require-
ments in (a) and (b) of ( 27 ) can be met by seri.es made up of temporal seg-
ments belonging to different temporally persistent individuals.
From Locke's persistence criterion for masses we can also derive a
statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the co-member-
ship of distinct temporal segments in a single series constituting a mass
of matter. Where "A" and "3" are replaceable exclusively by names of
temporal segments which meet the requirement specified in ( 29a), we rnay
say:
(30) B at t- and A at t, belong to the same mass of matter
2 x
if and only if
Cx) (x is an atomic component of A if and only if x is an atomic
component of B).
No comparable statement parallels (27).
In the last chapter we pointed out that Locke's persistence cri-
terion for masses of matter is also capable of yielding a true identity
criterion for these entities. Where and "M" are replaceable ex-
clusively by names of masses of matter which are temporal wholes, and "A"
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if and only if
(-3 A) (3b) (/K is part of and B is part of 11^7 and /Tx) (x is
an atomic component of A if and only if x is an atomic component of
As in the case of the identity criterion for simple substances, it is im-
perative that we assure ourselves that names of proper temporal parts of
material masses not be substitutable for "M " and "M^." Otherwise (31)
would have the undesirable consequence of permitting us to declare such a
mass identical with one of its temporal segments. This stipulation is
taken care of by requirement (c) of (29) which every mass of matter must
meet
.
Nov; it is apparent that Locke thinks his criterion of identity for
simple material substances is also applicable to masses of matter. We
find him saying;
"... could two bodies be in the same place at the same time; then
those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or
little ..."' 2
A particular time and place, he says, is "incommunicable to two beings of
the same kind." "This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple sub-
stances or modes; yet when reflected, on, is not more difficult in con-
33pound ones."
Clearly Locke's central intuition is fhat it is impossible for two
distinct substances of the same kind, whether simple or compound,
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totally to occupy the same place at the same time. The consequence is
that we are in possession of two independent criteria for the identity
of material masses, one depending upon spatial location at a given time,
the other upon atomic composition. Does this represent a redundancy in
Locke's system of criteria? The answer to this question, I think, is
that such a duplication of criteria can do no harm, providing both of
them are correctly framed. It may well be epistemically useful. Some-
times it is possible or convenient to refer to the members of a pair of
masses by means of the place they occupy at a given time; sometimes it
may be easier to pick them out with reference to their atomic composi-
tion. The criterion for identity based upon composition is, of course,
more versatile in that it permits us to refer to the members of the pair
by dated properties having different dates. We may compare the mass
which is composed of atoms a-,, a 2 > . .., an at t-j with the mass that is
similarly composed at t 2 and declare them to be identical masses. When
we use the criterion of identity originally proposed by Locke for
simple substances we are restricted to dated properties having the same
dates. We compare objects A and B by referring to the places they
totally or exactly occupied at the same time and asking if those places
are the same or different.
So the only question which remains to be settled is whether the
criterion for the identity of simple substances of the same sort which
appears in (15) is suitable as an identity test for masses of matter.
The answer seems to be, not as it stands. Locke identifies simple
material substances with material particles or atoms. (15) provides an
adequate criterion for atoms precisely because a spatial part of an
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atom, lacking an immutable physical superficies, cannot itself qualify
34
as an atom. Hence it is not permissible to substitute for "A" and "3"
the name of any such spatial part. But presumably the spatial parts of
masses of matter are cohesions of atoms and hence are themselves masses
of matter. (15 ) would compel us to declare the part identical with the
whole. There are, however, two obvious ways in which (15) can be modi-
fied so as to make it an adequate criterion for the identity of masses,
while at the same time it remains a suitable test for the identity of
atoms.
(15') (A = B) fg) /T3t) (3p) (A exactly occupies p at t and B exactly
occupies p at t )/
(15") (A = B) /ft) (p) (A totally occupies p at t )> B totally
occupies p at t)7.
It might be thought that porous bodies, such as sponges, would pro-
vide counter-examples to (15') and (15"). One will run into problems if
one thinks that the sponge exactly or totally occupies "the whole of
the space which would be enclosed by a flexible sponge-bag which touches
-35
the exterior surface at as many points as possible." For then it will
appear that some other bodies will be able , exactly or totally to occupy
parts of that space, namely, the places coinciding with the holes in
the sponge. But in fact the sponge does not exactly occupy the whole of
the space enclosed by the sponge-bag. It is, indeed, limited to that
space, but it does not totally occupy it, because the parts of the space
coinciding with the holes do not have any parts of the sponge occupying




Having completed his discussion of the criteria for the identity
and persistence of material bodies, viewed as cohesions of atomic parti-
cles, Locke turns immediately to the topic of the persistence criterion
appropriate to organisms. He is emphatic that this criterion is not the
same as the one for masses of matter. He never explores the question as
to whether there are not also separate criteria for the persistence of
particular material substances, such as gold or ice, which are not ani-
mate bodies. Yet it seems plain that there are properties necessary for
the continuance of these substances which are not the same as those
essential to the continued existence of a mass. A nugget of gold or a
piece of ice must retain the particular organization of atomic parts,
which is the causal basis of its observable properties, if it is to con-
tinue to exist as a nugget of gold or a piece of ice. In this respect
such an entity more closely resembles an organism than it does a mass.
On the other hand, it may be that a nugget of gold, in order to remain
the same nugget, must also retain exactly the same atomic components,
and in this respect it would be similar to a mass rather than to a
living creature. Locke's refusal to consider , objects belonging to the
particular species of substances as genuine or ultimate individuals no
doubt \’/as a bar to his proffering distinct persistence criteria for
these entities, but, as we have seen, had he been consistent this re-
fusal would also have barred the development of. a unique criterion for
organisms. The need for a test ox persistence different from that
which is suitable for material aggregates seems particularly acute in
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the case of inanimate natural objects such as mountains, planets or
stars. According to ordinary ways of thinking, a mountain or a planet
most certainly does not cease to exist simply because one or more atoms
of matter has been added to it or subtracted from it. Application of
the persistence criterion for masses of matter to such entities would
have the consequence of making the massive objects, which we ordinarily
think of as the most enduring of physical things, extremely ephemeral.
Problems also result when this criterion is applied to artifacts such
as houses, tables, chairs, etc. It is rather the retention of a certain
form cat structure, or perhaps the capacity to fulfill a certain function,
which appears essential to the continued existence of things such as
these. Locke displays an awareness of this fact in his discussion of
machines. In the relevant respect, he tells us, machines resemble or-
ganisms rather than masses of matter.
For example, what is a watch? It is plain that it is nothing
but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain
end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is
capable to attain.^ 13
Presumably, then, a watch can continue to exist even although parts
of it have been replaced, provided that it retains the organization
"fit” to the functioning of a watch. This notion should probably be
generalized to cover all artifacts. These examples serve to indicate
that, so far as persistence criteria are concerned, the crucial division
may not be that separating inanimate from animate bodies, as Locke some-
times seemed to think, but rather that between mere material aggregates
and organized bodies. Whether the latter are alive or not does not
affect the fact that retention of a certain patterning of parts is
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necessary to their continued existence.
a. Nature of an organism
. Before considering the persistence cri-
terion for organisms, let us try to enumerate the properties which Locke
thinks of as making up the "Aristotelian essence" of such entities.
These are properties which should be attributable to every temporal seg-
ment of an organic body. But at the very outset of this enterprise we
face a difficulty. It is natural to attempt a definition of an organism
as a particular kind of material mass, that is, as a material body dis-
playing such-and-such organizational properties. Indeed this is pre-
cisely the way in which Locke proceeds. However, in the course of our
discussion of the relation holding between masses of matter and organisms,
we saw that Locke cannot place organisms, considered as temporal wholes,
in the genus of material bodies, since the former are not required to
meet the persistence criteria stipulated for the latter. What is true
of temporal wholes also holds good cf temporal segments possessing dura-
tion. Every temporal segment of an organism, like the temporal whole of
which it is a part, is made up exclusively of masses of matter. But it
cannot be made definitionally identical with any particular mass. This
situation contrasts with the relation holding between an organism and an
animal, or an animal body and a human body.. Animals must meet the per-
sistence requirements for organisms; human bodies must meet those for
animal bodies. Hence every temporal segment of an animal is identical
with some particular temporal segment of an organism and every temporal
part of a human body is the same as some temporal part of a given animal
body. However, when Locke defines an organism as being a cohesion of
particles having a certain disposition, we shall have to understand this
as a definition of a dixrationless temporal slice of an organism, that is,
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a definition of a three-dimensional object altogether lacking temporal
depth. For it will be true of every such durationless slice that it is
identical with some particular mass of matter. Heedless to say, such
considerations were hardly in the forefront of Locke’s mind. The state-
ment in the Essay which most closely approximates to a definition of an
organism is the following.
We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a
mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that
the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any
how united, the other such a disposition of them as con-
stitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization
of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute
nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark,
and leaves,. &c„
,
of an oak, in which consists the vege-
table life .
^
Locke appears to offer a. two-part definition of an organism, or, as
we should prefer to say, a durationless temporal slice of an organism.
An organism, he suggests, is a cohesion of particles (a mass of matter)
displaying an organization which is (a) characteristic of the species
to which the organism in question belongs ("... such a disposition ...
of particles ... as constitutes the parts of an oak and (b) fitted
to sustain the organism in being. The first thing to say about this
definition is that it is grossly flawed by circularity in both of its
parts. It Is obvious that we should reject as unacceptable a defini-
tion of a mammal which attempted to stipulate that a mammal is an animal
displaying a physiological organization which is (a) peculiar to the
particular mammalian species of which it is a member and (b) fitted to
sustain a mammal in being. But this definition is exactly paralle.'- to
the one put forward by Locke for organisms. Secondly, clause (b) is
wholly inappropriate if we are taking the term "organism" to refer to a
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durationless time slice. It is inappropriate even if we do not bring
such sophisticated notions into the picture. For what is the entity
which the organization is fitted to sustain? By Locke's own account it
cannot be the mass of the matter. His central teaching regarding the
nature of an organism is that it, unlike a mere material mass, can sur-
vive both the addition and the subtraction, not only of atomic particles,
but of macroscopic parts. It survives the disappearance from the world
of an indefinite number of material masses which enter into its temporal
composition. So it seems that the entity which the organization is
fitted to sustain in being can only be the organization itself. What,
does it mean to say that an organization is fitted to sustain itself in
being? It seems to me that all we can do is to attempt to formulate the
answer along the following lines. If the organization is displayed by a
temporally enduring mass of matter at a given time, then, if certain
minimal conditions are met (e.g. the organism is not destroyed by an
agency external to itself), that organization will again be displayed at
a later time by a temporally enduring mass of matter which may or may not
be identical with the first mass. Translating this "into talk about dura-
tionless temporal slices, we may say that if a temporal slice of a mass
that coincides with a given point in time displays the organization, the
organization will be displayed again by a temporal slice of a mass coin-
ciding with a subsequent point in time. The temporal slice may or may
not belong to the same mass. We shall not attempt to answer the
question as to whether the later time must be an immediate successor of
the earlier time. Since it is also impossible to specify the "minimal
conditions" with any precision, this is an explication that inevitably
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suffers from vagueness. Let "t" designate either a durationless tempo-
ral point or a temporal stretch possessing a finite magnitude. We
shall now have to content ourselves with the crude statement that a
temporal part of a material mass coinciding with t displays an organi-
sation fitted to sustain itself if and only if Mat organization has a
tendency to be displayed anew (will probably be displayed anew) by a
temporal part of a mass coinciding with a time later than t.
Let us now attempt to construct a somewhat improved version of
Locke's definition of an organism. Clause (a) of the original definition
is wholly useless and is best abandoned. Let us say that an organism,
more precisely a durationless temporal slice of an organism, is a cohe-
sion of atoms displaying an organization which is fitted to sustain
itself in being,
bo The persistence criterion for organisms . What does Locke have
to offer as a persistence criterion for organic beings? The answer, un-
fortunately, is not so clear as it was in the case of his discussion of
the conditions for the continued existence of masses of matter. His
initial statement is as follows;
That being then one plant which has such an organization of
parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life,
it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of
the same life, though that life be communicated to new par-
ticles of matte:' vitally united to the living plant, in a
like continued organization conformable to that sort of
plants .-"0
So the first answer seems to be that an organism persists just so long
as its temporal, parts continue uo partake of the same lifej A and B are
temporal parts of the same organism if and only if they partake of "one
common life." The problem now becomes one of explaining what the life
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of an organism is and what makes temporal parts of a life parts of the
same life. A philosopher such as Leibniz would have identified that
life with the soul of the organic being.
If vegetables and animals have no soul, their identity is
only apparent; but if they have, individual identity is
in truth strictly speaking there, although their organized
bodies do not preserve it.^9
But this solution is clearly unacceptable to Locke. Searching for an
alternative answer, he is driven to say that the "continued organiza-
4o
tion conformable to that sort of plants" "Is that individual life."
The italics are his. On the basis of this statement we may interpret
Locke as saying that it is necessary and sufficient to the continued ex-
istence of an organism that its new temporal parts have the same organ-
ization as did its earlier ones. A and B are temporal parts of the
same organism if and only if they display the same organization of
their atomic components. It is true that Locke sometimes makes remarks
which are inconsistent with the statement in which he identifies the
life of an organism with the organization displayed by its temporal parts.
For example, we find him saying of "that continued organization" that it
is "fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united." But in
view of the fact that he offers no other definition of the life of an
organic being, such inconsistencies should probably be dismissed as due
to carelessness.
Now we are prepared to present a definition of an organism con-
sidered as a four-dimensional temporal whole.
(32) 0 is an organism which is a temporal whole
if and only if
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0 is composed of a series, S, of (duration!!.ess) temporal slices
such that
(a) Each slice is a cohesion of atoms
(b) Each slice has an organization of its atomic parts such that the
organization is fitted to sustain itself in being
(c) (A) (B) /Ta is a member of S and B is a member of S) only if
(A and B have the same organization^?
(d) S is not itself a proper part of any series meeting requirements
(a), (b) and (c).
There might be an objection to (32) on the ground that not even a
nondenumerably infinite series of durationless instants can compose a
temporally extended object <» If we revise (32) to say that 0 is composed
of a series of temporal parts having duration, then we shall have to
weaken (a) to reads
(a®) Each temporal part has as its ultimate spatial components exclu-
sively atoms of matter.
Following the procedure we employed when discussing masses of matter,
we might try to develop an identity criterion for organisms which are
temporal wholes. Where "0^" and "0^" are replaceable exclusively by
names of such temporal wholes and "A" and "B" by names of tempoi’al parts
that meet the requirement of (a) or (a*) and the requirement of (b).s we
may assert
( 33 ) 01 =
0
2
if and only if
(3A) (3b) /Ta is part of 0
1
and B is part of 0 and (A and B
have the same organization)?=
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Before we cam assess the adequacy of this definition of a tempo-
rally extended organic whole and of the identity criterion which is
based upon it, we need to know more precisely what kind of organization
it is that the temporal parts of a single organism are being required
to share. Is Locke saying that all of the temporal parts of an organ-
ism must display exactly the same atomic configuration? Is any alter-
ation in the patterning of its component atoms sufficient to bring an
organism to an end? Clearly no temporally extended organic body could
meet such a criterion. But it seems likely that Locke had a far less
stringent requirement in mind. Using the example of an oak tree, he
describes the organization which must be displayed by all the temporal
parts of the tree in the following terms:
"such a disposition of ^articles^ as constitutes the parts of an
oak"
"such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and dis-
tribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and
leaves, &c„, of an oak"
4
'
"a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants"
It seems quite clear that the organization which must be had in common
by all the temporal parts of an oak is simply that organization which
is characteristic of the species. If A and B are temporal parts meeting
the requirement (a) or (a f ) and the requirement (b) of (J2), then they
are parts of the same oak if and only if they both display oak tree
organization. Any series made up of temporal parts all of which have
the characteristic oak tree properties will constitute a single oak.
If oak tree
^
and oak tree., both have a part that displays oak tree
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organization, they will be identical oaks.
Nothing is plainer than the falsity of the last three statements.
Oak tree organization is common to all oaks; it does not serve to indi-
viduate them. If each member of a plurality of temporal parts of the
requisite sort displays oak tree organization, these parts may belong
to the same oak or to different oaks. The fact that the parts of oak
treei and the parts of oak tree2 all display oak organization does not
legitimate the conclusion that they are the same oak.
It seems that Locke was not altogether blind to this defect in
his criteria for the persistence and identity of organisms. We find
him saying:
"For this organization, being at any one instant in any one collec-
tion of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all
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other ..."
Now a patterning or organization of material, particles may be regarded in
two v/ays . It may be viewed as an abstract entity, that is to say, a
property which is capable of being instantiated by more than one
collection of particles. This is probably the most natural, way to re-
gard it. Or it may be thought of as a particular collection of partic-
ular material particles arranged in a certain pattern. In other words
an organization may be identified either with a pattern or with the
collection of things that displays the pattern.
If Locke intends to identify an organization as an abstract
pattern, then it is feasible for him to think, as he doe3, that the same
organization may be displayed by distinct masses of matter or by tempo-
ral segments belonging to masses which are diverse. So it will be
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possible for- a single organism to have temporal parts belonging to
diiferent masses* But his definition of an organism and his criteria
for the identity of organisms will suffer from the fatal defects we
have been describing. In the sentence just quoted, Locke, apparently
sensing the problem, wants to identify the organization common to the
different temporal parts of an organism with a particular collection of
material particles that is arranged according to a certain pattern.
When "organization" is interpreted in this way, it will no doubt be
true that no two organisms, even of the same kind, will be able to
possess the sane organisation, and difference of organization will serve
as an individuating principle. The difficulty that now arises is that
organization or patterning ceases to be a property that can be exhibited
by diverse collections of particles. So Locke's persistence criterion
for organisms will require that if temporal segments A and B are to be
parts of the same oak, they must not only both display oak tree organiza-
tion; they must be temporal, parts of the same mass of matter. And this
clearly violates Locke’s basic intention in framing the persistence
criterion. If we think of the organization which all the temporal parts
of a given organism must display as the organization characteristic of
its species, then we shall be in trouble whether we interpret "organiza-
tion" as referring to an abstract entity or to a concrete collection of
things. But is there perhaps some organization, other than that typical
of the species, which would invariably be displayed by all the parts of
a particular organism and which would be unique to them? If we could
discover such an organization or pattern, it would enable us to assert
that any two non-identical temporal segments of masses of matter dis-
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playing that organization belong to the same organism. It seems un-
likely, hov/ever, that such an organization is discoverable. Any living
organism undergoes profound organizational changes in the course of its
existence. A mature oak displays an organization that resembles the
organization displayed by other mature oaks far more closely than it
does the organization manifested by itself v/hen a young seedling or an
acorn. It is difficult to believe that any similarity between the or-
ganizational patterns displayed by the acorn and the mature tree grown
from that acorn would not also exist between the organizational patterns
of most full-grown oaks.
But perhaps we have been neglecting an important element in Locke 9 s
discussion of the properties essential to the persistence of organisms.
There is some evidence that he wished to include spatiotemporal continu-
ity of parts as one of these properties.
For this organization ... is that individual life, which existing
constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the
same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the
living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the
same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant,
during all thp^time that they exist united in that continued
organization. ^
In a subsequent discussion of the nature of human beings we find him
saying:
"... the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well
44
as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.
The notion which he is trying to express in this passage seems to be
that if two distinct masses of matter constitute successive temporal, parts
of the same organic body, it must be the case that the successor mass re-
tains some of the particles of matter that entered into the composition
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of its predecessor.
Sc perhaps we should supplement the definition of an organism as a
four-dimensional temporal whole which was presented in (32) with addi-
tional clauses specifying, first, that the temporal parts of such a whole
must exhibit spatioternporal continuity and, second, that when successive
temporal parts of an organic whole consist of different material masses,
the masses must have some atomic components in common.
There are enormous difficulties involved in developing an account of
spatioternporal continuity adequate to serve as a persistence criterion
for material objects or as the basis for logically necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of identity for material objects picked out as existing
at different times. In a recent article, Jack Nelson has argued power-
fully that we have no such adequate account and that it is unlikely that
vre shall ever be able to develop one.
"Indeed it now seems that talk of the spatio-temporal continuity of
material objects is a loose and popular way of talking, a way of talking
ff5
which does not allow of rigorous refinement."
An exploration of this complex topic lies wholly outside the bounds
of our discussion. We shall have to content ourselves with a crude and
admittedly inadequate formulation of the concept. Let us assume that A
and B are temporal parts of objects of the same sort, e.g., they are both
temporal parts of atoms, of finite spirits, of masses of matter, of
organisms, etc. Let us further assume that A coincides with t and B with
t * „ Then A and B are spatiotemporally continuous just in case there is
some C, which is a temporal, segment of an object of the same sort to which
A and B belong, at every temporal instant t" between t and t', such that
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each C ar each f 1
!
occupies a place contiguous with the place occupied by
the C at the prior and succeeding instants of time, the series beginning
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with A at t and ending with B at t'» The central, notion is that if A
occupies a spatial position P_
L
at time t^ and B occupies a spatial, posi-
tion P. at time t
,
then A and B are spatiotemporally continuous if and
J J
only if there is a contiguous series of places (volumes of space) connec-
ting P. and P such that those places are occupied at successive times
J
between t^ and t ..by temporal segments of objects of the same kind as that
to which A and B belongs
In order to male© more precise the notion behind Locke's requirement
that "the same successive body" not be "shifted all at once," we shall
borrow the terminology and definitional, apparatus developed by R„ M»
Chisholm for the purpose of explicating the relation that must hold between
• 47different composita making up a material object such as a ship* Except
for the fact that a compositnm apparently cannot survive a rearrangement
of its component parts, Chisholm's composita do not differ from Locke's
masses of matter,, The requirement that a mass of matter must retain some
of the elements composing the mass which is its immediate temporal prede-
cessor is expressed by Chisholm sis the specification that a compositum
directly evolve from its predecessor.
Let us say that a given compositum N directly evolves from a
certain compositum A provided the following condition holds
r
N and A have some parts in common! and N is that compositum
which directly results either from rearranging parts of A, or
from adding parts of A, or from removing parts from A. And,
for simplicity, let us misuse the word "evolves" so that we
may also say that any given compositum also evolves from
itself; if N is identical with A, then N has evolved from A,
and A has evolved from N. °
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If we remove the phrase "from rearringing parts of A," and substi-
tute "mass of matter" for "compositum," this definition of direct evo-
lution will suit our purposes nicely. However, it is plain that the re-
lation of direct evolution will not hold between any two arbitrarily se-
lected masses of matter that enter into the temporal composition of an
When we encounter the same ship on two different occa-
sions, the compositum we encounter on the second occasion
in all probability will not have evolved directly from the
compositum we encountered on the earlier occasion. There
will rather be a series of composita, one of v/hich will have
evolved directly from the one we encountered on the earlier
occasion, another of which will have evolved directly from
that, and so on, perhaps for many different composita, re-
sulting finally in the compositum we encountered on the
later occasion. The later compositum will thus have evolved
from the first, even though it did not directly evolve from
the first.
The relation that evolving bears to directly evolving
will thus be analogous to the relation that ancestor bears
to parent « And thus we could define "evolution" in terms of
"direct evolution" by imitating Frege's definition of the
ancestral relation. N is an ancestor of A, Frege said in
effect, provided that the following condition holds: N is a
member of every class C such that (1) A is a member of C and
(2) whatever is parent of anything that is a member of C is
also a member of C,
Let us say, then, that a compositum N evolves from a
compositum A, provided that: N is a member of every class
C such that (1) A is a member of G and (2) whatever directly
from anything that is a member of C is also a member
The notion that an organic body "may not be shifted all at once"
may be expressed by saying that two masses of matter (or temporal seg-
ments of such masses), M and M*
,
belong to the same organism only if M
has evolved from M* or M* has evolved from M.
So we may add the following clauses to (32), which is our definition
of an organism as a temporally extended whole.
organism,
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(e) (A) (B) /Ta is a member of S and B is a member cf S) only if (A and
B are spatiotemporally continuous)/7*
(f) (A) (B) /Ta is a member of S and B is a member of S) only if (A has
evolved from B or B has evolved from A_)7*
It may be thought that the presence of (f) makes (e) redundant; that any
series satisfying (f) would necessarily satisfy (e)„ But this is not the
case. It will be recalled that if the compositum, A, is identical with
the compositum, B, then it is said that A has evolved from B and also
that B has evolved from A. The same would hold true of any A and B that
were temporal parts of the same compositum or mass* But both Chisholm and
Locke allow for the possibility that a compositum or a mass of matter may
go out of existence and then at a later time once again commence to
exist. The parts of such a mass would not be spatiotemporally continued.
So it might be possible for an A and a B to meet requirement (f) either
because they were- identical masses or parts of an identical mass and yet
fail to satisfy (e).
It is apparent that (32), supplemented by (e) and (f), provides a
persistence criterion for organisms far superior to that derivable from
the original (32). The chief defect of the new criterion is its depend-
ence on an unsatisfactory concept of spatiotemporal continuity. Even if
we ignore this difficulty, however, there appear to be counter-examples
to it. For the most part they involve entities standing in the parent-
offspring relation. Gabbay and Moravcsik remark that "a mother dying at
childbirth and her baby exemplify both /spatiotemporal-7 continuity and
causal connection, but are clearly not construed as temporal- stages of a
single entity."'^0 They are surely correct in thinking this. Mother and
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baby have the same human organization, enabling them to satisfy our
clause (c), and the baby has evolved from the mother, so that they sat-
isfy (f). Yet they are two organisms, not one. We may observe in
passing that the mother-baby pair would seem to be a counter-example to
the supplemented (32) even if the mother did not die at childbirth.
Under these circumstances we should be obliged to say that there existed
two temporally extended human beings, having as a common part the mother
prior to the baby's birth (or conception) but having later parts (the
mother after the birth and the baby after the birth) that were distinct.
The situation of the mother prior to the birth, in other words, would be
analogous to that of an amoeba before the occurrence of fission. This
certainly conflicts with our ordinary ways of thinking.
We may use clauses (e) and (f) of the revised (32) to supplement the
criterion of identity for organisms presented in (33) ° Then (33) will
have the same strengths and weaknesses that were discussed in connection
with the new version of (32).
4. The Relation between the Test for the Identity
of Simple Substances and the Persistence Criteria
Locke's system of criteria for the identity and persistence of ob-
jects of different sorts has been subjected to grave criticism of a funda-
mental sort by his contemporary commentator, Baruch Brody. It is the
central thesis of Brody's critique that, having proffered a test for the
identity of temporally enduring objects (what Brody calls "a general
theory of identity'*), it was a profound conceptual mistake on Locke's
part to go on to propose a variety of persistence criteria for entities
of different types (referred to by Brody as "special, principles govern-
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ing the identity of different types of objects”). This criticism of
Brody's is difficult to comprehend in view of the fact that at several
points in his article he displays some understanding of the unique role
performed by a persistence criterion and of Locke's reasons for wanting
to put forward such criteria. For example:
In summary then, Locke felt that, for any given entity, there
were only certain changes that it could undergo and still con-
tinue to exist, that it had to retain certain properties from
t^ to t-, if there was going to be any entity existing at t^
identical with it. Moreover, he felt that what properties""
these were would vary from one type of entity to another. In
some cases, the properties in question were, composition prop-
erties, but usually this was not the case.^1
"... he felt that his general theory did not do justice to our intui-
tions about the type of charges that an object can undergo while still
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continuing to exist.”
While not denying that vie have such "essentialist” intuitions,
Brody nevertheless seems to believe that some sort of inconsistency will
inevitably be generated by any attempt to combine a criterion for iden-
tity, such as Locke proposes for simple substances, with persistence cri-
teria that specify the properties necessary for the continued existence
of individuals belonging to the various kinds. It never becomes clear
,
at least to this reader, why Brody thinks this is so. He begins his
article by pointing out that Locke's discussion of personal, identity
”... is found within the context of a much more general theox'y about
identity, a theory which (if true) raises considerable doubt about the
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noint of his discussion of personal identity.”'" This seems to suggest
that Brody thinks the theory of “personal identity" redundant, in view
of the fact that Locke ha.s "a much more general theory aoout identity.”
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After the discussion of the last chapter, it hardly seems necessary to
comment that the former is a persistence criterion, the latter, an episte-
mic test for identity, that the roles they perform sire different, though
not unrelated, and that their coexistence in a system of criteria for
identity and individuation involves no redundancy whatsoever. Brody
goes on to intimate that the consequences of combining criteria of these
different sorts are worse than mere redundancy.
On the one hand, I want to show that, given Locke's general
theory, a theory of personal identity of the type he advances
faces much more fundamental problems than the familiar ones
raised by Reid and Butler .
^
This claim is repeated in the last paragraph of the article, v/ith
the difference that the "fundamental problems" have become "fundamental
defects." Apparently Brody thinks that the problems resulting from the
combination of the "general theory" with the theory of personal identity
are insoluble. "... similar things can be said about all special theories
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of the identity of physical objects, persons, etc."
What are these fundamental defects? Why does Brody think it incon-
sistent to propound a criterion or criteria for identity and at the same
time to set forth a variety of persistence criteria for individuals of
different kinds? First of all, he seems to believe, as we noted in the
last chapter, that there are difficulties entailed by the stipulation of
more than one necessary and sufficient condition of identity. He is
aware that these conditions would have to be such that one of them would
hold good just in case the other did. For reasons never made clean he
appears to think that this requirement would not or could not be met.
We have already pointed out that this view is erroneous. Here it may
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simply bo mentioned that if Brody were consistent about this matter he
should be criticizing Locke for putting forward a test for identity
which depends on the notion that no two simple substances of the same
sort may exactly occupy the same place at the same time. For Brody
thinks that anyone accepting the principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles is thereby debarred from subscribing to a necessary condition
of identity other than the principle of the indiscernibility of identi-
cals t and likewise, anyone accepting the latter principle is forbidden
to make use of a condition sufficient to insure identity other than the
principle of the identity of indiscernibles
.
Anyone who is prepared to accept the identity of indiscernibles
. .. and yet wants to say that physical object is identical
with physical object o? only if they are spatio-temporally con-
tinuous has the same problem. And even if one is not prepared
to accept the identity of indiscernibles, one will still be in
the same trouble if one adopts Leibniz' Law and also claims that
spatio-temporal continuity is sufficient for the identity of
physical objects.5°
Now Locke, of course, did not formally subscribe either to the prin
c-iple of the identity of indiscernibles or that of the indiscernibility
of identicals. Yet it is not credible to suppose that he would have re-
fused Ms assent to them if they had been propounded to him, said indeed
his test for the identity of simple substances presupposes these princi-
ples. So Brody should be saying that Locke has no right to put forward
even that criterion of identity which stipulates the sameness of objects
provided they are of the same substantial sort, exactly occupying the
same place at the same time. For clearly he believes that to subscribe
to more than one necessary and/or sufficient condition of identity is to
involve oneself in some sort of logical difficulty.
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The second cause of Brody's notion that it is somehow inconsistent
to combine a test for identity with a variety of persistence criteria may
be found in the fact that he never seems to have a clear grasp of the way
in which a persistence criterion differs from a test for identity. Re-
peatedly Brody falls into Locke's own mistake of thinking that the rela-
tion which holds between distinct temporal segments of a given whole is
one of identity.
"... an oak tree can be identical with an oak tree Op even though
the set of particles making up is not identical with the set of parti-
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cles making up Op" Brody apparently realizes that this sounds a little
strange for he appends a footnote saying "this does not contravene
Leibniz' Law since would be an oak tree at time t while o^ would be
an oak tree at a different time t0 ," What he should, of course, be saying
is that and Op are not (whole) oak trees, but oak tree parts that are
not identical with each other although they are parts of the same tree.
The same confusion reveals itself in statements such as "... on the
whole, there is no connection between x’s being identical with y and
their composition" and "It is ordinarily thought that in order for x at
to be identical with y at t_, y at tp must retain some of the properties
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that x had at (Note the failure to resolve the ambiguity of a
term such as "x at t^ If it refers to a temporal segment, then the
relation of identity does net hold between x at and y at tp. If it
refers to a whole by means of a dated property, then clearly that whole
must retain, not just some, but all of its properties in order to remain
self-identical.)
So Brody thinks that persistence criteria do not differ in kind
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from tests of identity; they simply specify additional necessary and/or
sufficient conditions for identity. He does not see that when they do
fill this role they are applicable primarily to wholes that are being
picked out by temporal predicates with dates that differ from each
other. Consequently he believes that the specification of persistence
criteria in addition to the specification of a criterion of identity
falls under his general prohibition against laying down mors than one
necessary and/or sufficient condition of identity. Repeatedly he says
that adding these additional, principles involves "making commitments
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whose justification is very unclear."
Finally,. Brody makes it clear that he has not understood the differ-
ence between the properties an individual of a certain sort must retain
in order to continue to exist as the same individual (its individual
essence) and the properties which it needs to qualify it as a member of a
certain class (its Aristotelian essence). Toward the end of the article,
Brody again appears to recognize that the essentialist principles Locke
puts forward as persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and
persons do perform a function that is not fulfilled by his test for the
identity of simple substances. The latter does not "do justice to our
intuitive feeling that objects do not continue to exist through radical
changes." But Brody thinks that it was unnecessary for Locke to make
such "strong" essentialist claims. It would, he suggests, have been
sufficient to specify the Aristotelian essence of the things in question.
This sounds as though he believes that we have laid down an adequate per-
sistence criterion for persons in saying that if a person is to con-
tinue in existence he must retain the property of being a person. But
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in the next paragraph Brody admits that a stipulation of the Aristote-
lian essence is not sufficient to distinguish from each other members
of a class of objects having the same Aristotelian essence. He thinks
it is plausible to assume that is why "Locke felt that what was needed
was a special requirement for the identity of each object
If, however, this suggestion is correct, then it is evident
that Locke has made a serious blunder here. After all, he
already has a principle that enables him to distinguish
objects with the same Aristotelean essence, viz., (2). If,
then, like Locke, one is adding essentialist principles to
a theory of identity that contains some principle like the
identity of indescernibles
,
there is no need to go beyond
Aristotelean essentialism. 1
This statement furnishes a magnificent example of the misconceptions
which can ©-rise from a failure to distinguish clearly between a number of
very different principles. We have, first of all, the fundamental prin-
ciple of identity, of which the identity of indiscernibles constitutes
one half, and what is commonly referred to as Leibniz' Law constitutes
the other half. Secondly, we have a very general epistemic test which
purports to tell us whether substances of the same sort can satisfy the
principle of identity, that is, whether they do in fact have all their
properties in common. This test is based upon the intuition that no two
such substances can totally occupy the same place at the same time.
Thirdly, we have specifications of the Aristotelian essence of things
of various sorts. These are what would ordinarily be considered as
definitions of kinds or species. Finally, we have the persistence cri-
teria properly speaking. A definition of a temporally extended whole
includes a specification both of the Aristotelian essence and of the
persistence criterion for entities of that sort.
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Each of these kinds of criteria has a distinct function to perform.
Brody's final criticism of Locke is based upon a failure to see the
difference between an epistemic test of identity, such as the specifi-
cation that any A and B totally occupying the same place at the same time
are identical, and persistence criteria v;hich tell us, for example, that
no mass of matter can survive either the loss or the acquisition of an
atom, vjhereas an organism, which can survive indefinitely many of such
losses and acquisitions, must meet other more complicated requirements in
order to stay in existence. He seems to think that a criterion of iden-
tity, which might be either the principle of the identity of indiscern-
ibles or the epistemic test based on spatial and temporal location put
forward by Locke, can do the work of a persistence criterion. Hence, he
concludes, Locke has made a serious blunder in adding persistence prin-
ciples to his tests of identity, thus going "beyond Aristotelian essen-
tialism." But this is surely erroneous. Neither a principle such as
the identity of indiscernibles nor Locke's epistemic test does anything
to specify what properties are essential to the continued existence of a
being of a certain kind. The identity principles do nothing to mark out
the boundaries of temporally extended individuals of different sorts.
That is not their purpose. Part of Bx-ody's confusion on this matter may
stem from his notion that the test fox- identity based on spatial and
temporal location does carry a commitment to a minimum form of essen-
tialism. Because this test is applicable only to substances of the
same sort, he seems to think of it as specifying persistence criteria
fox- things belonging to the different substantial kinds. But it does not
do this. The principle which asserts that things totally occupying the
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same place at the same time are the same thing does not so much as con-
tain a prohibition against an atom's transforming itself into a spirit-
ual substance or vice versa. It does not rule out the possibility of
there being a temporally extended individual which begins life as an
atom but in its later years is promoted to the status of a finite
spirit. For even if an individual, call it A, were to undergo such a
transformation it would still be true that any individual, B, which at
s. given time totally occupied the same place occupied by A, would be
identical with A. It would simply be the case that when A was an atom,
so was B, and similarly when A became a spirit.
It is not my intention to argue that Locke was aware of the differ-
ence in kind that separates his test for the identity of simple sub-
stances from his persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and
persons. Oblivious to the ambiguity of expressions having the form' 'A at
t fl and lacking clarity concerning the distinction between the very differ-
ent relations of identity and genidentity, he thinks of all these tests
as criteria of identity. This misconception is the source of some
serious difficulties for his theories. However, that he does in fact
provide both a general epistemic test of identity and a variety of per-
sistence criteria for entities of different sorts is proof that he was not
entirely insensitive to the difference between the notions of identity
and genidentity. His work manifests at least a subliminal awareness of
the distinction he was never able explicitly to articulate.
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Footnotes to Chanter II
"From what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much
inquired after, the rrincipium individuationis ; and that, it is plain,
is existence itself; which determines a being of any sort to a par-
ticular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.
This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes;









If it were permissible to substitute for "A" or "B" in (2) the name
of a proper spatial part of a simple material substance, there would then
be counter-examples to (2). Such a substance and one of its spatial parts
might both totally occupy the same place at the same time and yet fail to
be identical. It seems strange to speak of the parts of a simple sub-
stance, but we must remember that Locke identifies simple material sub-
stances with particles of matter, or atoms. He held that atoms, while
physically indivisible, were extended entities occupying space and as such
were mentally divisible ad infinitum . However, parts of atoms are not
themselves atoms, that is, they do not qualify as simple material sub-
stances. Hence we are barred from substituting their names for "A" and
"B" in (2). The proof of this is that, according to Locke, every atom has
an immutable superficies. It is impossible that it should be physically
divided. So parts of atoms have conceptual existence only and do not pos-
sess any physical superficies at all. But every part of an atom is men-
tally further divisible. So it lacks even a conceptually immutable super-




^ C. D. Broad in his article "Locke's Doctrine of Substantial Iden-
tity and Diversity," Theoria
,
Vol. 17 (1951), PP* 13-26 has the follow-
ing to say:
"I take it that v/hat Locke regards as self-evident is that a thing
which ceased to exist at a certain moment and a thing which began to
exist at a later moment must be different things." (p. 15) • The Game
interpretation of Locke's statement is proffered by Robert C. Coburn in
"Identity and Spatiotemporal Continuity," Identity and Individuation ,
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Hilton K. Munitz, ed., pp. 51-101. See p. 52 and esp. footnote 5. This
doctrine is unequivocally subscribed to by Locke's successor and critic,
Thomas Reid. Reid says, "I see evidently that identity presupposes an
uninterrupted continuance of existence ." Essays on the Intellectual"
Fowers o£ Han, III, Ch» 3, 1.
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attributes to Locke the mistaken attempt to derive the principle that
one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence from the doctrine that
it is impossible for two things of the same kind to be in the same place
at the same time. It is true that Locke does present the former as
though it were a logical consequence of the latter in his initial state-
ment of these principles. But this is a piece of carelessness which
Locke himself corrects within the compass of the offending sentence.
The second half of his statement makes it plain that the "no two begin-
nings for one thing" teaching is meant to follow, as we have just shown
it does, from the claim (properly interpreted) that it is impossible for
one and the same thing to be in different places. There is no basis for
Brody's assertion that "Locke normally did not see this point ..."
II, 27, 4.












































Peter Geach, Reference and Generality
, pp. 43-44.
30
It was Locke's belief that there was a single test for the iden-
tity ox simple substances. The test could be applied only when dealing
with substances of the same sort, but it was supposed to work equally
well for material substances, finite spiritual substances and infinite
spiritual substances. For Locke, even the test of identity did not dif-






See note 5 above.
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C. D. Broad, o£. cit .
,
p. 13. Broad says Locke held "that every
macroscopic body is a disconnected collection of ultra-microscopic par-
ticles of various kinds." Hence Broad's example of an aggregate or mass
of particles is a heap of rocks. Broad speaks of the components of an
aggregate as being "conjoined together," but he clearly takes this to
mean either "touching each other" or "in close proximity to each other."
Locke did indeed hold that every macroscopic body is composed of numbers
of separate atoms, but as wa have seen he believed it to be essential to
an extended body that its atomic parts stick firmly together. But the
rocks in a rock pile are "perfectly loose one from another," so a rock
pile would not qualify as a mass. In another part of his article Broad
uses liquid enclosed in a vessel as an example of a body. But Locke ex-
pressly disqualifies liquids from membership in the class of material



















Ibid . Italics mine. Mabbott interprets Locke as proffering spatio-




II, 27, 10. Italics mine. Mabbott incorrectly, I think, inter-
prets this passage as a mere reiteration of the principle that spatio-
temporal continuity is the criterion for "same body."
45
Jack Nelson, "Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for





This definition of spatiotemporal continuity is an adaptation of
one provided by Richard Swinburne in Space and Time
,
p. 23. It appears




' Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and
Philosophical Senses of Identity," in Perception and Personal Identi fy
,
ed. by Norman S» Care and Robert H, Grimm, pp. 62-106.
Ibid, p. 95.
^ ibid, p. 96 .
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THE MIND AS AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE
1. The Mind
In the opening paragraphs of the Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing Locke informs the reader:
This, therefore, being my purpose — to inquire into the
original, certainty and extent of human knowledge . .. I
shall not at present meddle with the physical considera-
tion of the mind? or trouble myself to examine wherein
its essence consists
If by "physical consideration of the mind" Locke intends to refer to the
physiology of the brain and the sense organs, we can easily understand
why he would wish fco excuse himself from such an undertalcing. It is
clear that he hopes to give an account of the operations of the under-
standing which could be true regardless of the nature of the physical
processes which may or may not accompany such operations. In fact, if
Locke had adhered more firmly to this resolution and, at least in the
initial stages of his discussion, had avoided talk concerning the
working of the physical organism, his account of the understanding would
have been more consistent than it actually is. On the other hand, it
may well seem surprising that an inquiry concerning the human under-
standing should seek to bypass the question of the essence of the mind.
For the understanding, according to Locke, is nothing more than the
2
power of perception which the mind possesses, and in many instances he
appears to employ the terms, "mind,! and"understanding, "synonymously.
Contrary to his preliminary disavowal, Locke seems at first sight,
to have little hesitation in informing us regarding the essence or. the
152
mind. He refers to the mind as a "thinking substance," a"spiritual"sub-
stance," or as a "being that thinks end wills." The terms "mind,"
"soul," and "spirit" are for him interchangeable.^ He is careful to
distinguish the mind from the physical brain. Cheerfully violating his
initial determination to refrain from discussion of "physical consider-
ations," he informs us that the simple ideas of sensation enter into us
by means of the "organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey
them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's presence
room (as I may so call it)." Nevertheless, alterations of the body do
not in themselves constitute perception, nor do they infallibly guaran-
tee that it will take place.
... if they reach not the mind, whatever impressions
are made- on the outward parts, if they are not taken
notice of within, there is no perception.
5
Concerning the existence of our own selves, Locke claims that we pos-




... if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of
the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought
which I call doubt. ... In every act of sensation,
reasoning or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of
our ov/n being.®
Judging on the basis of this passage, it would seem that Locke does not
intend to infer the existence of a thinker from the fact of the thought,
but rather that he claims immediate and intuitive awareness of himself
as a thinking being. Elsewhere, however, in a passage that more directly
parallels the Cartesian formula, he appears to be presenting an infer-
ence
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We know certainly, by experience, that we sometimes
think; and thence draw this infallible consequence, —
that there in something in us that has a power to
think.
7
In the next sentence that "something" is identified as a substance. It
is logically impossible, Locke here indicates, for thinking to take
place which is not the thought of some thinker, and to be a thinker means
to be a thinking substance.
Despite his original reluctance to examine wherein the essence of
mind consists, Locke continues to furnish illumination on this subject.
What he says is still in accord with the Cartesian, account.
Our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a
substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting
motion in body, by will or thought.
Our idea of body, on the other hand "is of an extended solid substance,
g
capable of communicating motion by impulse. 1 ’ That which especially dis-
tinguishes spirit or mind from body is its possession of active, rather
than merely passive, power. Only spirit is truly active, in that it
alone has the power to make or initiate any change. All power relates to
action, Locke tells us, and of action we have the idea of two sorts only!
thinking and motion.
(1) of thinking, body affords us no idea at all; it is
only from reflection that we have that, (2) Neither have
we from body any idea of the beginning of motion, ...
The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from re-
flection, on what passes in ourselves, where we find by
experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a
thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies
which were before at rest.
9
The active power of the mind to move the body, or to "order the con-
sideration of any idea," Locke calls the will. The second great power,
that of perception or thinking, he entitles the understanding, 'l’he power
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of thinking, in its turn, possesses both a passive and an active
capacity. The "power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of
any external substance" is purely passive. That is to say, in receiving
the simple ideas of sensation, the understanding has no more power to re-
fuse or alter them "than a mirror can refuse, alter or obliterate the
images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce."10
For this reason we cannot avoid the painful sensation of being burned
except by removing ourselves from the vicinity of fire, a circumstance
which is, of course, biologically salutary. But there is another aspect
to the understanding.
...» to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at
one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks
fit, this is an active power.
U
This leads us to the conception of the mind as the locus of active intel-
lectual powers or the seat of faculties. Locke is anxious to prevent us
from thinking of these faculties as real beings cr distinct agents of the
12
soul. The faculties are no more nor less than capacities cl the mind
to act, or in the case of the passive faculties, to be acted upon. The
active power of the mind to fix its attention upon whatsoever object it
chooses is a prerequisite for the discovery of the second great source of
simple ideas? reflection. It lies within the power of the understanding
to turn inward upon itself, to observe its own internal, operations and
thus to acquire self-knowledge. All our knowledge of our own minds is
gained in this way. But if attention is not deliberately directed upon
the inner world of mental activities, clear and distinct ideas of such
13
operations will not be forthcoming. In addition to the act which is
necessary for self-discovery, the mind actively operates upon the simple
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ideas which it derives from the two sources of sensation and reflection.
It first shows itself active in recollection, which is the deliberate
revival of previously imprinted ideas. Secondly, it possesses the
power of actively distinguishing between ideas, that is, of seeing them
as same or different. Here, according to Locke, it is infallible and
acts without pain, labor or deduction. Thirdly, by means of its faculty
of comparing, the understanding gives rise to ideas of relations. Most
important is the further power of compounding, by which the understanding,
acting voluntarily, combines simple ideas into complex ones. Finally,
the mind has the power to name and the power to abstract. In the latter
operation, the mind considers an appearance as separate from the circum-
stances of its real existence, such as its time, place or concomitant
ideas. The color of chalk, snow, milk and so forth, considered in
itself, is then made "a representative of that kind" and called "white-
„l4
ness."
V/ith the exception of his teaching regarding abstract ideas, Locke’s
account of the mind or soul, insofar as we have hitherto sketched it,
differs very little from the view of Descartes. The mind has been
described as an immaterial thinking substance, a res cogitans , possessing
both the power passively to receive idea.s in sensation and the power ac-
tively to combine, compare and otherwise operate upon them in thinking.
Furthermore, the mind has been presented either as accessible to its own
direct observation, or failing that, as logically inferrible from those
of its operations which ere directly obsei'vable. Let us now consider the
ways in which the Lockian conception of the mind diverges from the
Cartesian pattern.
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It is Locke's denial of the doctrine of innate ideas and innate prin-
ciples that constitutes the most famous deviation. His claim that the
mind is at birth a tabula rasa is based on the teaching, which will prove
to be central for his theory of the mind, that to have an idea is to be
consciously aware of it. This teaching seems to have the status of an
analytic truth for Locke. The word, "idea," is defined as "whatsoever is
the object of the understanding when a man thinks."1 '’ If there are any
innate principles, he maintains, they must have been imprinted upon the
mind since its inception. "For if they are not notions naturally im-
printed, how can they be innate?" But it is incoherent to assert that the
mind has imprinted upon it a notion of which it is ignorant.
... it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that
there are truths imprinted on the soul which it per-
ceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify
anything, being nothing else but the making certain
truths to be perceived.
Hence he is able to argue that since children and idiots neither apprehend
nor assent to propositions such as the law of contradiction, these propo-
sitions cannot be imprinted upon their minds and cannot have the status
of innate ideas for them.
Locke's teaching rules out the possibility of unconscious or unper-
ceived ideas. Ideas, he tells us, are "nothing but actual perceptions in
the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them."
Strangely enough, in the first edition of the Essay Locke nevertheless
sets out to explain memory in the traditional way as a storehouse of un-
17
perceived ideas. By the second edition he seems to have realized tne in-
consistency of this account with his main teaching, for he inserts the
following paragraph.
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••• this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the
memory signifies no more but this, that the mind has
a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has
once had, with this additional perception annexed to them,
that it has had them before .-*-0
Whether the memories are numerically identical with the original
ideas or whether they are simply more or less accurate and lively copies
of the originals is a difficult point* In his chapter on memory Locke
speaks as though he held the former opinion.
This farther is to be observed, concerning ideas lodged
in the memory, and upon occasion revived by the mind,
that they are not only (as the word revive imports) none
of them new ones, but also that the mind takes notice of
them as of a former impression, and renews its acquaint^
ance with them, as with ideas it had known before. 1 9
But in his chapter on identity and diversity v?e find him saying that a
thought, since it perishes at the moment it begins, cannot exist at
different times as permanent beings can. Therefore a thought which
exists at a time, cannot be the same as a thought existing at a
20different time, It is the latter passage that seems to represent
Locke's considered opinion, and which seems most consistent with the
totality of his teaching.
The pov/er of the mind, then, to revive perceptions which it once had
must be understood as a power to produce copies of the original impres-
sions. After the mind has received a certain idea through the avenues
of perception or reflection it is typically able to produce in itself new
ideas which more or less resemble the first one. This is a power it did
not possess prior to the original perception or act of reflection. It
would seem that the mind’s acquisition of a new power 1 can be explained
only by some alteration or modification in the mind produced by the
158
receipt of the original idea. In fact, Locke describes this process of
modification as an "imprinting" on the memory or a "setting of the
stamp" into the mind. This is strangely at variance with his statement
that it is nonsensical to speak of notions imprinted upon the soul and
yet unperceived by it. Ideas of which the mind is not consciously
aware but which are nevertheless "imprinted" or "stamped" on the mind
seem to be indistinguishable from the unperceived ideas which his theory
has prohibited. Yet what could the requisite modification of the mind,
consist of except some such imprinting of memorial, traces? If we have
no ideas other than those of which we are consciously aware, it is hard
to understand how we can possess any knowledge other than that which is
immediately and perpetually present to the mind. Considerations of this
sort were important in causing Leibniz, in his rejoinder to Locke, to
abandon the doctrine that thought must necessarily be self“Conscious, and
to replace it with the teaching that the mind is always characterised by
a mass of subconscious perceptions.
To the thesis that the having of an idea entails conscious aware-
ness of it, Locke adds the corollary that to think entails consciousness
21
that one thinks.
For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body
is extended without parts, as that anything thinks with-
out being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does
so. They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it
be necessary to their hypothesis say that a man is always
hungry, but that he does not always feel it, whereas
hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking con-
sists in being conscious that one thinks.
The doctrine that all thinking, all mental activity, is necessarily
accompanied by awareness of that activity comes as somewhat of a surprise
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to the reader who has already absorbed the teaching that the operations
of the mind reveal themselves only when they are made the objects of
deliberate attention. It is for the latter reason, Locke informs us,
that "it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations
of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of
23
the greatest part of them all their lives." Apparently Locke believed
that everyone always has a confused idea or awareness of his mental op-
erations. But a clear and distinct idea of them can be had only
through deliberate and attentive observation. Yet the admission that
the consciousness of thinking which invariably accompanies thinking may
sometimes be a confused czie seems to undermine the claim that thinking
consists in being conscious that one thinks. For surely children and
inattentive adults have some clear and distinct ideas of sensation. At
any rate, Locke tells us that the senses "do convey into the mind several
distinct perceptions of things ... And thus we come by those ideas we
have of ... sensible qualities." How is it possible for a clear and
distinct thought to consist of a confused consciousness of that thought?
Consciousness of thinking is itself an operation of the mind.
Hence, on the basis of Locke's teaching, it should not be possible for
such consciousness to exist without being perceived. For the sake of
consistency, then, Locke ought to have postulated yet another level of
consciousness upon which one could be conscious of one's consciousness,
and so on indefinitely. Without such an infinite regress, it will
always be necessary to settle for a set of mental contents which are not
themselves consciously perceived.
The path grows ever thornier. Invoking the doctrine that we can-
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not think without being sensible of that activity, Locke maintains that
it is possible, even probable, that for long periods of time, during
dreamless sleep, the soul does not think at all, and hence is entirely
24devoid of ideas, of activity and of consciousness. If the soul thinks
during sleep, it must be conscious of its sleeping thoughts. But,
Locke argues, if the soul of Socrates while asleep has its enjoyments
and concerns, its pleasures and pains, of which the man Socrates, con-
sisting of body and soul
,
when awake has no knowledge, then the soul of
sleeping Socrates and the waking man, are two distinct persons. Locke
seems to have gotten into a tangle on this point. If the sleeping and
waking Socrates have one and the same soul, one would be inclined to
think that the soul of the waking Socrates simply forgets its sleeping
thoughts, rather than that soul and man become two persons! But as we
shall see, Locke is savoring in advance the peculiarities of the theory
of personal identity he v/ill develop in a later section. In any event
Locke next attends to the possibility just mentioned: "that the soul
26
thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not."
His answer to this objection is strangely unsatisfactory, consisting of
hardly more than the assertion that such a state of affairs "is very
hard to be conceived and would need some better proof than bare assertion
27
to make it be believed." Clinching evidence against the theory is then
provided by the following anecdote.
Most men, I think, pass a great pari of their sleep with-
out dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar
,
and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed
in his life, till he had that fever he was then newly re-
covered of, which,.was about the five or six and twentieth
P r \year of his age. u
l6l
That certainly settles the matter! It is clear- that Locke is anxious to
reach the conclusion that the soul may spend indefinitely long periods
of time in an unthinking state. Why should this be so important to him?
The answer can only be that he wishes to overthrow the Cartesian view that
"actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is
29from the body,"
I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that
doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas;
nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul
always to think, than for the body always to move; the
perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul
,
what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one
of its operations.'^
Thinking, then, is not an essential attribute of the soul.
A strange asymmetry now makes itself apparent between Locke’s account
of our idea of body and his account of our idea of spirit. Both ideas are
classified as complex ideas of substances which, for Locke, are "such com-
binations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men’s
senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore supposed to
flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that
substance."''''" Powers, that is to say, capacities to alter "sensible
32
qualities in those subjects on which they operate" are in reality com-
plex ideas, but for the sake of brevity, Locke says he will reckon them
,33
among the simple ideas which when, "considered as united in one thing,"
constitute a specific idea of a substance. In a passage we have already
quoted Locke tells us that our idea of body is of "an extended solid sub-
stance, capable of communicating motion by impulse," while our idea oi
spirit is of "a substance that thinks , and has a power of exciting
V f,
motion in body, by willing or thought." So the simple idea of thinking
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is the component of our complex idea of immaterial substance which is
the counterpart of the simple ideas of extension and solidity in our
complex idea of material substance* But whereas extension and solidity
are regarded by Locke as essential attributes of body, he denies that
thinking is part of the essence of the soul* This is the asymmetry be-
tween the two accounts to which we referred above.
We have already seen that Locke makes a distinction between the
real essence of a being and its nominal essence. He is insistent that
the real essence is unknown to us and that "essence to us, which deter-
mines every particular to this or that classis is the nominal
essence, or the abstract idea to which the name is annexed. This is
^6
"all the essence of natural substances that we know The abstract
idea of every substance or sort is formed from the collection of simple
ideas associated with "particular existences" by the process of
"leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retain-
ing so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular
37
existences as they are found to agree in ..."
The essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole
complex idea comprehended and marked by that name; and
in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas
that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of
an unknown support and cause of their union, is always
a part; and therefore the essence of body is0not bare
extension, but an extended solid thing
Thus if the idea of body with some people be bare exten-
sion or space, then solidity is not essential to bodys
if others make the idea to which they give the name body
to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential
to body* That therefore, and that alone, is considered
os essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the
name of a sort stands for; without which no particular
thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to
that name. -^9
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Elsewhere, however, Locke maintains that solidity "seems the idea most
intimately connected with, and essential to body; so as nowhere else to
be found or imagined, but only in matter."40 Accordingly, he argues,
against the Cartesians, that pure extension cannot be the whole essence
of body; the essence of body must include solidity.
Now our complex idea of an immaterial spirit is framed, according
to Locke, by putting together "the simple ideas we have taken from those
operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as
thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion,
b2.
&c„" ' Understanding, willing and knowing may all be regarded as species
or modes of thinking. For this reason, Locke later says simply that our
idea of soul is of a substance that thinks and has a power of exciting
motion in the body. Clearly, thinking is the idea most intimately connect-
ed with spirit, just as solidity is the idea so connected with body.
How, then, is it possible for Locke to deny that thinking is part of
the nominal essence of the soul? The attempt to do so seems to involve
him in a contradiction. But nominal essence, he tells us, is the only
kind of essence knowable to us, the only kind by which we are able to
sort and rank. So Locke's position should be that the only conception
of the soul which, we are capable of framing is that of a being which
thinks. Hence if he truly believed he had evidence indicating that
thinking is not a continuous or uninterrupted process, it would have
been far more sensible for him to say that in the course of its life-
time the body is sometimes without a soul than to maintain, as he does,
that the soul exists in an unthinking state. Berkeley, as unwilling
as Locke to admit the possibility within the mind of unperceived ideas,
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found himself obliged to adopt the former solution.
Locke seems to be mistaken when he says thought is not
essential to the mind. Certainly the mind always and
constantly thinks and we know this too. In sleep and
trances the mind exists not there is not time, no
succession of ideas. To say the mind exists without
thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.^3
We have seen that Locke has no right to deny that thinking is part
of the nominal essence of the soul. It may be that we should not under-
stand him as making such a denial. Perhaps his statement that thinking
is not essential to the soul should be construed instead as a statement
about the real essence of spiritual substance. There is considerable
textual evidence to support this interpretation.
'That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances
into species consists in the nominal essences the mind
makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the
things themselves is further evident from our ideas of
spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on
its own operations, those simple ideas which it attri-
butes to spirits, it hath or can have no other notion
of spirit but by attributing all those operations it
finds in itself to a sort of beings; without considera-
tion of matter. 4
Since thinking is the chief of the mind's operations, this passage
suggests that the idea of thinking is indeed part o'f the mind-maae
nominal essence of spirit. In other places, Locke indicates that the
properties, ideas of which contribute to the nominal essence of a sub-
stance, do not form part of its real essence, but are to be regarded
instead ess causal consequences or as superficial manifestations of that
essence.
... the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea
the word gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a
body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible,
and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution
of the insensible parts of that body, on which those
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qualities and all the other properties of gold depend.
How far' these two are different, though they are both
called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover. b
So if thinking is part of the nominal essence of the soul, it seems
reasonable to conclude that it is not part of its real essence. This
inference is supported by yet another passage in which Locke makes a
distinction between the nominal and real essence, not simply of a soul,
but of a man, here considered as a compound of body and soul.
For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and
reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the
complex idea to which I and others annex the name man,
and so be the nominal essence of the species so called;
yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence
and source of all those operations which are to be found
in any individual of that sort* The foundation of all
those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex
idea, is something quite different; and had we such a
knowledge of that constitution of man, from which his
faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other
powers flow, and on which his so regular shape depends,
as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his
Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his
essence than what now is contained in our definition of
that species, be it what it will; and our idea of any
individual man would be as far different from what it
is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels
and other contrivances within of the famous clock at
Strasburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of
it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears




Sensation, reasoning and v/illing are all modes of thinking. The rele-
vance of this passage to our purposes is its explicit ascription of
these faculties to nominal essence* The real essence or constitution of
a man is said to ba the source and foundation of those operations, but
something quite different in kind from them. It is reasonable to con-
clude, then, that when Locke denies that thinking is an essential
attribute of the soul, he means to say that the idea of thinking is,
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indeed, a part of the nominal essence of spirit, but that it is not
part of the real essence of the soul.
There is, however, a very serious problem connected with the notion
of a soul possessing a real essence, given Locke's vievr that the real
essence of a being is not its form, but rather the constitution or
arrangement of its insensible parts. We have seen that in the case of
material substances Locke identifies the real essence with the size,
figure and "putting together" of its parts. Clearly he has in mind some-
thing like the atomic structure of the body in question. Likewise, the
real essence of the soul is supposed to be its constitution, the nature
of which is hidden from us, but which is compared by Locke to the invis-
ible system of springs, wheels and other contrivances that operates the
famous clock at Strasburg. But the soul is a simple substance. It has
no parts, sensible or otherwise. Thus it cannot have a. constitution, if
"constitution" is to be given its standard meaning of an arrangement or
ordering of parts, and it cannot display any "connexion" or "putting to-
gether" of those parts. It becomes obvious that the conception of the
real nature of the soul which Locke is suggesting, namely an arrangement
of insensible parts, fits far better with a theory that identifies the
mind v;ith the physical brain, than with a view that identifies it with a
simple, immaterial substance, V/e shall subsequently see that Locke was
not blind to this consideration.
Substance
Tbo conception of the mind originally presented to us by Locke,
that of an immaterial thinking substance, is of course an integral part
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of his wider teaching concerning the notion of substance in general.
Everyone would agree that an understanding of Locke’s view of substance
is centred, to an appreciation of his philosophical position; yet, un-
fortunately, the vacillating and contradictory nature of his statements
on the subject render such an understanding extremely difficult to
attain. It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess in any adequate
fashion this crucial topic. All that can be sard is that Locke appears
to oscillate between the pcles of asserting, on the one hand, that the
existence of substance is logically inferrible from the existence of
sensible qualities, and on the other, of maintaining that "substance" is
a meaningless word, and that the concept of substance is useless as a
principle of philosophical explanation. The strongest statements of
the view that sensible qualities cannot conceivably exist without being
supported by a substratum occur in his letters to Dr. Stillingfleet,
Bishop of Worcester. In these letters Locke was attempting to defend
hiraself against charges of heretical tendencies and, specifically,
against Stillingfleet's accusation that he had "almost discarded sub-
stance out of the world." Some scholars believe that this ecclesiasti-
cal context must be borne in mind when assessing the weight to be given
Un
these statements. ' Thus in the First Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke
says;
The idea of these qualities and actions or powers are
perceived by the mind to be inconsistent with exist-
ence ... thence the mind perceives their necessary
connection with inherence or being supported. (Italics mine).
And in the Third Letter;
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Your lordship grounds the idea of substance upon reason
,
or because it is a repugnancy to our just conceptions
of things that inodes or accidents should subsist by
themselves; and I conclude the same thing.
These assertions, if taken seriously, certainly constitute the strongest
possible support for the view that Locke believed the self-subsistence of
qualities or accidents to be a logical impossibility.
In the Essay
,
on the other hand, Locke often speaks of substance as
48
!,an obscure and relative idea,” as something of which we can have no
49positive concept
,
and no clear or distinct idea. Instead of stressing
the logical, inconceivability of self-subsisting qualities, we find him
saying:
... not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist
by themselves, we accustom ourselves to supnose some
substratum wherein they do subsist ...50
This passage suggests that the positing of substance is a psychological ,
rather than a logical necessity, founded perhaps in our inability to pic-
ture to ourselves the union of simple ideas other than in a substratum.
On either account of the idea of substance, however, Locke faces a
logical difficulty. Since all our complex ideas are formed out of the
simple ideas that come to us via sensation or reflection, how is it
possible for us to form the idea of a relation of inherence holding be-
tween a quality presented in experience
,
such as yellow or heavy
,
and
something which in principle cannot be experienced at all? The mind
forms other ideas of relation by comparing with each other ideas, all of
which have come to us through the medium of experience. But in the acci-
dent-substance relationship, one of the terms lies wholly beyond the
bounds of sensory experience,. Locke is hard put to explain how such an
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idea could have arisen in our minds or what it could signify to us.
Some of the passages in the Essay which deal with the notion of
substance indicate that Locke was not unaware of this kind of diffi-
culty. Interestingly enough, the most severe criticisms of the concept
of substance do not occur in the chapters explicitly devoted to that
topic. They are buried in discussions of quite different issues. In
the course of his critique of innate ideas, Locke remarks, as in passing,
that we neither have, nor can have, the idea of substance either by sen-
sation or reflection. Therefore we signify nothing by the word but an
51
uncertain supposition of we know not what. He inserts his most ex-
treme attack on the notion of substance, as both incomprehensible and
useless, into the chapter dealing with simple modes of the idea of
space. It is in this rather unlikely context that he tells us, when we
speak of substance we are committing the fallacy of taking the word for
a thing. We are ’’making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct
5?
significations." ' In order to "discover to us the very great clearness
there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what
- 55
use they are in deciding of questions of philosophy" he gives three
illustrations. First he compares the European philosophers, who say
substance is required as a support for accidents, with the Indian phi-
losopher who, imagining that the earth needed a support to bear it up,
explained that it rested on an elephant, v/hich in turn was supported by
glj.
a tortoise. The implication seems to be that, just as the earth does
not in fact require a support
,
neither ao the accidents. This little
story provides an interesting commentary on the remarks Locke addressed
to Stillingfleet. In the last two analogies Locke maintains that to ex-
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plain accidents in terms of substance is comparable to explaining our
architecture to an aborigine by saying that a pillar is a thing
supported by a basis and a basis something that supports a pillar, or
to say of books that letters are things inhering in paper, and paper a
thing that holds forth letters. "Would he not think himself mocked,
55instead of taught, with such an account as this?" The final illus-
tration is particularly startling since it cannot help but recall to
us the famous metaphor by which Locke had sought to elucidate the
nature of mental substance, that is to say, the identification of the
mind with a sheet of white paper
,
void of characters until imprinted
with the ideas of sensation. Are we to regard ourselves mocked,
instead of taug'ht, by such an account as this?
3. Mental Substance
The uncertainty and vacillation which becloud Locke's discussion
of substance in general, together with his seeming awareness of the
logical difficulties to which the notion is exposed, inevitably color
his discussion of mental substance in particular. For we arrive at the
idea of mind, or mental substrate, in a manner exactly parallel to that
which yields the notion of material substance. We put together the
simple ideas which we have taken from the operations of our own minds,
such as thinking, willing, power of beginning motion, etc., and join
them to substance, "of which we have no distinct idea." In this way
we derive the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. Throughout the
remaindei’ of the chapter on substance, Locke is concerned to emphasize
two points. The first is that the idea of spiritual substance is at
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least as clear and well-founded as the idea of matter. "The one is as
clear and distinct an idea as the other; the idea of thinking, and
moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of exten-
57
sion, solidity, and being moved." The two complex ideas contain among
their components simple ideas which do not differ in their clarity and
distinctness. That this is so is reiterated again and again. Locke's
second point is expressed succinctly, thus: "For our idea of substance
58is equally obscure, or none at all, in both." That is to say, both
complex ideas contain as a component an idea utterly lacking in clarity
and distinctness, an idea of "a supposed I know not what." So it is as
true to state that the two ideas are equally obscrire and ill-founded as
it is to say that they are equali.y clear and well-founded. This point,
too, is driven home again and again in the course of the next seventeen
paragraphs, the constant alternation of the two kinds of statement pro-
ducing a very comical effect.
Does no superiority of status attach to the idea of immaterial sub-
stance? In two or three passages Locke fleetingly suggests that it
does. For example;
For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, etc., that there
is some corporeal being without me, the object of that
sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some
spiritual being within me that sees and hears.59
But the over-whelming burden of this long section, monotonously repeated
,
is that the two conceptions of mental and material substance are equally
incomprehensible to us and equally fraught with difficulties.
Locke brings the discussion to a conclusion with the following re-
marks :
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We are no more able to discover wherein the ideas
belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit.
From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas
we receive from sensation and reflection are the bound-
aries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever
efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor
can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the
nature and hidden causes of those ideas.
So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, com-
pared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the
substance of spirits is unknown to usj and so is the sub-
stance of body equally unknown to us. D<^
Substance, both mental and material, has become a kind of Kantian thing-
in-itself. The point at which Locke has arrived is summed up by Gibson
as follows:
Starting with the realistic conception of the mind as a
substance, having its own definite nature and constitu-
tion, Locke had found himself compelled to relegate this
substance to the region of the unknowable, and to treat
the mind as empirically cognisable, through and in rela-
tion to its definite thoughts or experiences. °-*-
In the final book of the Essay Locke put forward a still more radi-
cal suggestion regarding the nature of mind. This was a proposal which
outraged his contemporary theological critics, and was regarded by them
as the most serious threat to accepted religious beliefs contained in a
generally heterodox work. The cause of the uproar was Locke's statement
that it is net logically necessary to assume that a distinct immaterial
substance exists at all. The passage occurs in the context of a sec-
tion emphasising the narrow limits of human knowledge, and urging upon
philosophy a suitable modesty in refraining from magisterial pronounce-
ments where evidence is lacking.
V/e have the ideas of matter and thinking , hut possibly
shall never be able to know whether any mere material
being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the
contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to
discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some
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systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive
and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so dis-
posed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being in
respect of our notions, not much more remote from our
comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases,
superadd to matter a faculty of thinking
,
than that he
should superadd to it another substance with a faculty
of thinking ; since we know not wherein thinking con-
sists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has
been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any
created being, but merely by the good pleasure and
bounty of the Creator, For I see no contradiction in
it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omni-
potent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain
systems of created senseless matter, put together as
he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and
thought , b~
Of particular* interest is Locke's statement that we are ignorant as
regards the nature of thinking, as well as regards its substantival
underpinning. In a later part of this section Locke repeats his previ-
ous assertion that we cannot doubt that there is something within us
that thinks (thinking implies the existence of a thinker), but we are
ignorant as to the kind of being it is. This would suggest that it is
logically necessary for thought to inhere in some kind of substance.
But the dependence of thought upon an immaterial soul , if it is indeed
the fact, is contingent merely, O'Connor sums up:
In other words, the evidence of our* ideas of reflection
does not logically imply the existence of a substantial
mind. 3
The active powers of the understanding, such as comparing, com-
pounding, abstracting, recalling, etc., may simply be powers of the body.
Such a. position opens up for Locke the logical, possibility of a monistic
conception of substance. Gibson suggests:
Since the idea of substance is in both cases alike
(i.e. matter and mind) merely that of "a supposed I-
know-not-what" to which the attributes revealed in ex-
perience are referred, we cannot set aside the possi-
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bility that one and the same substratum or substantial
basis may be involved, both in that which we experience
as solid and extended and in our own conscious life. b^
That such a view would possess great advantages for Locke is made
evident by the numerous passages, both in the Essay
,
and in his other
writings, in which he expresses himself as utterly at a loss to find a
solution to the problem of interaction betv/een mind and body, conceived
of as separate substances differing radically in kind, Thus, in the
little work entitled An Examination of Pc Malebranche 1 s Opinion he says
Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I
think 1 understand! and motions from thence continued
to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce
ideas in our* minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to
me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the
good pleasure of God., whose ways are past finding out,“5
how inconceivable it is to me, that a spiritual,
i,e.
,
an unextended substance should represent to the
mind an extended figure ,
Perhaps most striking of all is the statement of the problem in the
Essay ;
Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to
strike and affect body, and motion, according to the
utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce
nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to pro-
duce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound,
we are fain to quit our reason
,
go beyond our ideas,
and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our
Maker
This is virtually to say that mind-body interaction, conceived of as
talcing place between substances of radically different kinds, is a
logical impossibility. At the same time, Locke rejects as equally in-
comprehensible the kind of solution to the problem through the inter-
vention of God that was proposed by Malebranche, Under these circum-
stances, it would not be surprising to find him attracted by a funda-
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mentali^/1 monistic position, according to which all substance is mate-
rial in nature and mental activity is a kind of epiphenomenon of the
body. On this basis we can make sense of his earlier claim that think-
ing is not an essential attribute of the mind. If there is no
distinct kind of substance which is mental in nature, if all substance
is material, and yet thinking is an activity of substance, then to say
that the mind is sometimes without ideas is merely to say that the
/TO
body, or the brain, does not always engage in the activity of thinking.
The thesis that the mind does not always think is far more compatible
with a theory that identifies the mind with the body or the brain than
with a view that regards it as a separate immaterial substance. We can
begin to understand the reasons for Locke's singular attachment to this
thesis. We have already pointed out that identification of the miiid
with the brain is also the way to render sensible Locke's contention
that the real essence of the mind is to be found in its constitution,
that is to say, in the "putting together" and patterning of its insen-
sible parts.
Further evidence that Locke rejected the notion of a simple, indi-
visible, immaterial soul as the substrate of ideas is provided in his
Examination of Malebranche. Here he takes up for discussion the doctrine
that ideas (sensible qualities, sentiments) are modifications of the
soul. Locke objects to this teaching on two grounds. The first is
identical with the ground of his attack on substance in Book II,
Chapter 13 of the Essa^, namely, that the word, "modification," " ...
69is only a new sound brought in without any new conception at all."
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So that though they say sensations are modifications
of the mind; yet, having no manner of idea what that
modification of the mind is, distinct from that very
sensation, v.g.
,
the sensation Gf a red colour or a
bitter taste, it is plain this explication amounts
to no more than that a sensation is a sensation ... 1
0
One explains nothing by the assertion that accidents inhere in substance;
the claim that sensations are modifications of the soul is equally unin-
formative. We see that the charge of philosophical emptiness directed
against this kind of view is something of a leitmotiv in Locke's think-
ing.
The second criticism of the "modification-of-the-soul" theory is even
more serious, for it attempts to show that the doctrine leads to contra-
diction.
Different sentiments are different modifications of the
mind. The mind or soul that perceives is one immaterial
indivisible substance. Nov; I see the white and black on
this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel
the warmth of the fare I sit by, and I taste an apple I
am eating, and all this at the same time. Now I ask,
take modification for what you please, can the same un-
extended indivisible substance have different, nay, in-
consistent and opposite (as those of white and black
must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we
suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one
for black, another for white, and another fox’ red ideas,
and so of the rest of those infinite sensations which we
have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly
perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are
opposite, as heat aid cold, which yet a man may feel at
the same tirae??^
Thus the teaching that the soiil constitutes one immaterial, indivisible
substance is, Locke argues, logically incompatible with the variety of
distinct, and sometimes opposite, sensations which we experience simul-
taneously. The argument which he here presents is not altogether un-
like that offered by Plato in the Republ ic to prove that the soul has
177
parts. It would bo interesting to know if Locke had seriously consid-
ered the possibility of a divisible soul. In the passage just quoted
he appears to dismiss the idea as an absurdity. It is likely that he
inherited and accepted the Cartesian conception of the soul as neces-
sarily one and indivisible. Material substance, however, is charac-
terized according to Locke by separability of parts. So it is clear
that a theory which regarded thinking or sensation as inhering in or
annexed to the body would not be subject to the difficulty here adum-
brated. This may be another ground for guessing that Locke's real
sympathies lay in that quarter.
We have seen, then, that Locke regards the terms "immaterial sub-
stance" and "modification of the mind" as sounds without signification.
He has successively characterized mental substance as unknowable in
principle, as a useless and empty principle of explanation and finally
as leading to logically insoluble problems and hence to contradiction.
At the same time he has braved the "ugly mutterings of the drum eccle-
7 vi
siastic" ' to put forward the daring suggestion that there is no logi-
cal impossibility in supposing that thought may be a property of matter.
This is powerful evidence for the thesis that Locke rejected the idea
of an immaterial soul as a logical absurdity. Yet it will be urged
that there are many passages in which Locke not only fails to disavow
belief in the existence of the soul, but in which he indicates that he
positively inclines toward such a conviction. In the chapter on iden-
tity, for example, we find him saying that he regards it as "the more
probable opinion" that "consciousness is annexed to, and the affection
7A
of, one individual, immaterial substance," He emphasizes, however,
l?8
that nis theory of personality is in no way dependent upon the correct-
ness of this opinion. Nov/ how is it possible that a first-rate philos-
opher who thinks the notion of mental substance is both meaningless
and contradictory should regard the view that consciousness depends
upon such a substance as a probable opinion? The answer to this riddle
may be garnered from certain historical facts regarding the public reac-
tion to the publication of Locke’s philosophical and theological,
writings. Despite his cautious way of presenting his views, Locke
found himself bitterly attacked by representatives of orthodox religion.
His book, The Reasonableness of Christianity
,
was placed under legal
indictment, apparently because it taught, among other things, that
immortality is only contingently a property of the soul, and as such is
dependent upon the pleasure and goodness of God. The assault upon the
Essay was led by the formidable Bishop of Worcester, who clearly recog-
nized its subversive tendencies. Stillingfleet charged Locke with
having "almost" read substance out of the world. But Locke, who no
doubt had anticipated the possibility of just such an attack, had his
defensive positions already prepared. He answered Stillingfleet 's
criticism by seizing upon the Essay *
s
most conservative statements re-
garding substance, casting them into an even more orthodox mold, and
cheerfully ignoring those of his own utterances which pointed straight
in the opposite direction. It is fashionable today to say that the
Bishop understood the implications of Locke's doctrine better than ne
did himself. It might be more prudent to confine oneself to the
comment that in his replies to Stillingfleet Locke did not admit to




although never placed under legal indictment, was for a time
banned at Oxford because of its allegedly heretical doctrines. Had
Locke taken an openly agnostic position regarding the soul, it seems
certain that the Essay would have suffered at least as severe a fate as
The Reasonableness of Christianity
. Parenthetically, it is of interest
to note that the article on Malebranche, which probably contains Locke's
most explicit condemnation of the idea of immaterial substance, was not
published by Locke during his lifetime. It first appeared in print in
l?06c Locke left it unfinished, he says, "lest I should be tempted by
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anybody to print it."
Against this background, it comes as little or no surprise to dis-
cover that when Locke discusses the topic of personal identity he is at
pains to divorce the concept of the self from tlxat of the soul, and to
establish criteria for the persistence of a person which are logically
independent of those for the persistence of mental substance. In the
history of the philosophy of mind he is famous as the first thinker to
deny that the self is a substance, and hence he may well be regarded as
the pioneer in whose footsteps followed such later theorists of the self
as Hume, Russell, C„ D„ Broad and A. J. Ayer. If Locke was unwilling to
identify the self with the soul, he was equally reluctant to equate a
person with his body. Hence he was forced to develop a psychological
criterion for the persistence of a person, not dependent upon the per-
sistenee either of body or of soul. At least one commentator regards
his treatment of the self as "one of the most original and revolution-
ary of the positions developed in the Essay . It is even more fatal to
the traditional realistic dogmatism ... than his criticism oi its use
77
of the general conception of substance."
l8o
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"These letters to Stillingfleet have to be read with care. For
though they provide a welcome amplification cf some of the more puzzling
parts of the Essay
,
they represent the cautious second thoughts of a man
\rho was never eager to challenge religious orthodoxy too openly.
Stillingfleet had accused him of having ’almost discarded substance out
of the world,' and Locke was anxious to evade the reputation among
theologians of one addicted to dangerous thoughts." D. J. O'Connor.
"Locke," k Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. by D. J. O'Connor
p. 212. It was not always the fashion to classify Locke as a philosophi
cal champion of substance. Many of his contemporaries saw him in
exactly the opposite light. As late as the middle of the last century,
Cousin, in his celebrated study of the Essay
,
writes s "Locke, then,
systematically denies the idea of substance." V, Cousin, Elements of
Psychology
, p. 164. It is one of the chief purposes of Cousin's





















59 Ibid. Also, cf. II, 23, 28 and II, 23, 31.
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II, 23, 29-30,
^ James Gibson, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge
, p, 279. Contrasting
Locke’s position with that of Descartes, Gibson has the following to say:
"Locke finds himself in a position from which the dogmatic pretensions
of the system of his predecessor are still further discredited. Not only
are we unable to determine the essence of material and mental substances
by a process of abstract thought, but a knowledge of the real essences
of substances is found to be an ideal which is forever beyond our
grasp, . In place of two substances from whose clearly defined essences
the v/hole of their further determinations are conceived as deducible,
body and mind are only knowable as objects of a partial and therefore
imperfect experience." (p, 224).
IV, 3, 6, Locke is not denying that the omnipotence of God is
limited by logical necessity. This is ma.de clear in his Third Letter to
Stillingfleet in which he has occasion to say: "That Omnipotency cannot
make a substance to be solid and not solid at the same time, I think,
with due reverence, we may say: but that a solid substance may not have
coexisting qualities and powers which have no natural, or visibly neces-
sary, connexion with solidity, is too much for us (who are but of yes-
terday) to be positive in."






Gibson, op. cit .
,
p. 225.
J. Locke, An Examination, of P. Malebranche 8s Opinion, 10. The
Works of John Locke
,
ed. by J. A. St. John, Vol. II, p« -Kil,
66
Ibid., 18, p. 424.
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James Gordon Clapp, L'^gke^s^onception Hind , p. 2o f.
the viev; that: "The import ox the Essay seenis to indicate
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that it is more probable that matter thinks than it does not. A mind,
then, is something which exists and which is distinguished from other
existing things in virtue of its manifested powers, and which is real
only when it is specifically operating, and perceived through ideas
to individual minds." (p. 89).
An Examination of P. lialebranche's Opinion












John Laird, Problems of the Self
, p. 311.
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' II, 27, 25.
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0* Connor, oj). cit^.
, pp. 212-213.
Letter to Molyneux, quoted by A. C. Fraser , Locke *s Essay ,
Vol. I, p. xlvii. Locke ! s writings on the topic of substance may be
divided into three broad categories, those that he did not allow to be
published in his lifetime (e.g.
,
the Examination of Malebranche )
,
writings for the general philosophical public that were published while
he was living (the Essay, for example), and finally, replies to criti-
cisms and charges of heresy directed against him by persons influen-
tial in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, of which his Controversy with
William Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, is the most notable example.
The Examination of Malebranche
,
which falls in the first category, con-
tains a radical assault on the notion of immaterial substance. The
Controversy, on the other hand, which belongs in the last category, is
characterized by an extremely cautious and reverential attitude toward
the doctrine of substance, both material and immaterial. The Essay
,
which falls in the middle division, is markedly ambiguous and displays
the vacillation, or seeming vacillation, in dealing with these topics
for which Locke is so notorious.







BODY, SOUL AND PERSON
Locke's famous statement that it is one thing to be the same sub-
stance, another to be the same man and a third to be the same person
takes on additional significance when we come to examine his teaching
concerning the nature of human beings. In the context of this discus-
sion he uses the term "substance" to designate spiritual!, substance. To
be the same substance is to be the same finite soul. According to
Locke's official view, a human being is composed of three distinct ele-





are three names standing for three different
ideas" and "such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the
identity," Not only does each of these three entities have an Aristote-
lian essence not shared by either of the other two; each has its unique
persistence criterion, which is in some sense determined by its Aristo-
telian essence. This is the way in which we shall ultimately be obliged
to understand the "such as is the idea ... such must be the identity"
doctrine. The fact that the different entities making up a human being
have different persistence criteria opens up the possibility that their
life spans may, not be wholly coincident. This in turn renders it con-
ceivable that the same soul may be associated with different bodies,
the same body with different souls, the same person with different souls
and bodies and so on. But it may be somewhat misleading to say that
Locke has a conception of a. human being having a body, a soul and a
person as its component parts. As we shall see, he sometimes uses the
186
term "man" to refer to the compound of body and soul, but he never
employs that or any other designation as a name for the tripartite
being composed of body, soul and person. So perhaps he did not think
of this tripartite entity as a real being, although there seems to be
no reason, given his views, for it to possess less reality than, let
us say, the compound made up of body and soul. It is the person who
will emerge as overwhelmingly the most important member of the human
triad. In the sphere of material substance, Locke, as we have seen,
tends to identify the real or ultimate individual with a mass of matter.
In the human realm he will designate the person as in some sense the
real individual, although not in the same way as that in which he
identifies the mass of matter as the most ultimate of material beings.
The special importance of the person is that it, rather, than the soul,
is the being which experiences happiness and misery. It is the moral
agent and the bearer of moral responsibility! it alone is the proper
subject of reward and punishment. Consequently, of all the components
mailing up the human being, it is the person whose actions and whose
fate is a matter of ultimate concern.
1. The Man
Locke uses the word "man" in at least two different senses. Some-
times it designates the human body. At the beginning of the discussion
in which this term figures he says that "the identity of a man" must
not be placed "in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in
one fitly organized body."''" Locke gives a reductio argument to show
why a man cannot be identified with anything except a human body. It
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is based on the assumption that the only alternative to identifying a
man with his body is to identify him with his soul. Locke intends to
show that this alternative leads to absurd consequences* His next
assumption is that one and the same soul may be united to different
human bodies. Nothing in the nature of matter, he says, forbids this.
So a single soul might by turns inhabit the human bodies that we asso-
ciate with Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar
Borgia. In that event, Locke concludes, these individuals would "be
the same man," i.e., be temporal parts of the same man. But it is hard
to see why Locke thinks he has generated an absurdity. If "soul" and
"man" have one denotation, then it is no more paradoxical to say that
the sane man is united to different bodies at different times than it
is to make the assumption which Locke did not find ridiculous, namely
that the same soul may be united to different bodies. If, on the
other hand, the conclusion of the argument had been that the bodies
of these different individuals constituted the same human body, or
were temporal parts of the same human body, this would indeed have
been ridiculous. But Locke can draw no such conclusion. The key
premise of his argument is that the man and the soul are identical,
and by implication, that a man is not identical with his body. So if
the souls of Seth, Ismael and company are all parts of a single soul,
it follows that these individuals also constitute a single man, but
it most certainly does not follow that their bodies constitute a
single body.
Locke now tries a second reductio. He cites the opinion of phi-
losophers who have believed in transmigration "that the souls of men
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may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts."
If the soul is identical with the man, and if the soul of Heliogabalus
were detruded into the body of one of his hogs, then the man,
Heliogabalus, would be the hog. And this, Locke says, is something
that no one would say. The second argument suffers from the same defect
as the first. If the man is identical with the soul and not with the
body
s
then the detruding of Heliogabalus* soul into a hog no more makes
the man, Heliogabalus, identical with the hog than it makes his soul the
same thing as the hog.
Perhaps sensing the weakness of these arguments, Locke begins to
shift to a linguistic consideration. It would be "a very strange use of
the word man," he says, if it were "applied to an idea out of which body
and shape are excluded." A little later on we find him making a much
stronger assertion. "... the idea in our minds, of which the sound man
in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a
2
certain form." This statement sets the stage for the long anecdote
about the talking parrot which is intended to show that the mere posses-
sion of rationality is not sufficient to make an animal lacking a
human shape a man. We may well grant that we would not classify an
intelligent parrot as a man, but this serves to show only that posses-
sion of a human shape is necessary to qualify a being as a man. It does
not show that having a human form is sufficient to make the thing which
has it a man, and it most certainly does not establish Locke's strong
claim that the word "man" means "animal having a human form." Locke
may have realized this, for the conclusion that he draws from the
narrative is much weaker than the one he had origi nally sought to esvab-
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lioh.
For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational
being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people's
sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and
if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not
shifted all at once, must, as v/ell as the same immaterial,
spirit, go to the making of the same man.
3
It is clear that Locke is now using "man" to designate the compound
composed out of animal body and immaterial soul. The term is unequiv-
ocally employed in this second sense at least once again in the later
discussion. "... there can, from the nature of things, be no absurdity




and with them make up for that time one man ..."
There is no passage, so far as I am aware, occurring after the talking
parrot story in which Locke clearly identifies a man with a human
body. So there may be grounds for thinking that in the course of
writing the chapter Locke came to abandon that original, identification.
As the chapter wears on, Locke becomes ever more liberal about
the permissible uses of the word, "man." Both in Section 21 and in
Section 29, the latter being the final paragraph of the chapter, he tells
us that "man" may be used in one cf three ways. It may designate either
a soul, an animal body or a compound of the foregoing two. Locke has
apparently forgotten or abandoned his earlier arguments against iden-
tifying the man with his soul. He even briefly considers the possi-
bility of "making human identity to consist in the same thing as per-
sonal identity" but finds a difficulty. Anyone who takes this view
will be unable to "make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates
after the resurrection." But Locke concedes that few are agreed as
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to tvhat "makes a man and consequently the same individual man."'’ In
these passages he indicates that virtually any usage is acceptable if
it is employed consistently. After all, everyone does and must con-
struct his own abstract general idea or his own nominal essence of
"man." The important point is the following:
... whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is
made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under
any denomination, the same existence continued preserves it
the same individual under the same denomination.
^
This is the last sentence in the chapter of the Essay which is devoted to
the topic of identity. It certainly is a baffling one. But I believe
that the key to understanding it is provided by Locke's earlier,
simpler statement, that those properties which make a man, by virtue of
so doing, also make the sane individual man. I interpret both state-
ments as confused attempts to say that the specification of the proper-
ties which determines the kind to which a thing essentially belongs
also determines or shapes the persistence criterion which is applicable
to it.
Accordingly, when "man" is taken as designating a human body, the
persistence criterion for a man will be the same as for any organism:
But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union
of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union
and shape remain in a concrete, no otherwise the same but
by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be
the sane man. ''
Naturally this criterion will be subject to the same difficulties ana
will require the same supplementation as did the persistence princi-
ples for organisms that we discussed in the last chapter.
If, on the other band, every man is compounded out of a particular
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body and a particular soul, then the continued existence of a man will
be subject to a general rule governing the persistence of compound sub-
stances, of which the criterion for masses of matter was a special case
v/hatever compositions of substances begin to exist, during the
union of those substances, the concrete must be the same ...»® It will
be necessary and sufficient for the continued existence of a man that
his body continue to exist, that his soul continue to exist and that
they remain united to each other. The test of their remaining united
to each other might be their continued occupation of exactly the same
places.
2. The Soul
The soul, Locke has told us, is "a substance that thinks, and has
a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. n° Thinking
and having the power to excite motion in the body are the properties
making up its Aristotelian essence. The question we now must try to
resolve concerns the properties which must be retained by any soul if
it is to continue to exist. What is the persistence criterion for
souls? The only textual passage I am aware of in which Locke even
alludes to this question occurs at II, 27, 10b. The chief difficulty
with his discussion here is that he is not primarily concerned to
specify the properties essential to the continued existence of a
spiritual substance. Instead, his focus is upon the causes operating
to prevent a person from knowing whether the soul with which it is
presently associated is the same soul as that to which it was annexed
at some point in the past. We have to figure out the nature of the
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persistence criterion from the reasons Locke gives for our inability
to apply it. Another difficulty results from Locke's insistence upon
stating the problem as though it were one of a soul's assuring itself
concerning its own self-identity. But no being of any kind ever has
to worry about that. The soul may wonder what its past life was really
like* but that is not the same as wondering if its past really was its
past. In attempting to interpret this passage, we shall make the
necessary reconstructions.
But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical
substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of,
if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained
present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be
always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently
the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty
is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by
forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we
have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes
in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of
one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes,
and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on
our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and
in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none
with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts,
I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being inter-
rupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts
are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e, the
same substance or not . 1
Locke suggests that if the person had a perfect memory record of
every instant in the life history of his soul, he would have no reason
to doubt that the soul to which he found himself attached today was the
same as the soul with which he had been associated in the past. But he
has no such perfect memory record. The reason for this is twofold. In
the first place, there are intervals of time, periods of dreamless
sleep, for example, in vrhich the soul simply has no thoughts or experi-
ences. Then there is nothing for the memory to record. Secondly, our
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memories are imperfect; many of our soul's past experiences are
swallowed up by a forgetfulness which puts them beyond our powers of
recall. But how would possession of a perfect recollection of all his
soul's past experiences enable a person to recognize his soul of today
as his soul of yesterday? How could he conceivably assure himself that
the memories he possessed were memories of experiences actually had in
past times by his present soul? Locke says that if past perceptions
always remained present in the mind, then the soul would be always
consciously present to itself and would be "evidently the same to itself."
But a few pages later Locke recognizes that "consciousness of past ac~
tions" is not the same thing as the actions or experiences themselves.
It is a representation of past actions, and as such it may always be
delusive. "... that may be represented to the mind to have been which
really never was ..." and "the consciousness of past actions can be
transferred from one thinking substance to another.""^ If the soul can-
not tell whether its memories truthfully reflect its own past experi-
ences, then the person surely cannot know whether his memories reflect
the actual past of his present soul.
It seems clear that possession of an "uninterrupted consciousness"
of a chain of past experiences would not in itself enable a person to
know that these experiences were all those cx a single immaterial sub-
stance, that is, the substance with which he presently finds himself
associated. What sort of memory, what sort of consciousness of things
past would be helpful? Sydney Shoemaker attempts to elucidate the
Lockian text we are considering by means of the metaphor of a string oi
beads
.
Imagine that we have before us a number of glass beads strung
on cords, and that we wish to determine whether two of the
beads are strung on one and the same cord. Since both the
beads and the cords are visible, we can start with one of our
beads, follow along the ccrd on which it is strung, and see
if we come eventually to the other bead. But what if' our
vision is obstructed and part of a strand of beads is hidden
from us? Then we may see bead A, and the section of cord on
which it is strung, and bead B, and the section of cord on
which it is strung, and yet be unable to see whether A & B
are strung on one and the same cord. Now let us compare
seeing a bead and the section of cord on which it is strung
with remembering a mental object, say an image, and the sub-
ject to which it belonged. To say that two different beads
are on one and the same cord will correspond to saying that
two different objects (say an image and a pain) , occurring
at different times, belong to one and the same subject.
What will then correspond to having an unobstructed view of
the strand of beads, presumably, will be having an uninter-
rupted memory, i.e», being able to remember every moment of
a certain interval of time. . .. And then, it appears, there
would be no difficulty about his knowing of two remembered
mental objects that they belonged to one and the same subject;
it would be like the case where one has an unobstructed view
of a strand of beads, and can thus see that two different
beads are on one and the same cord.-*-2
The beads correspond to the remembered experiences; the cord on which
they are strung is analogous to the soul which is the subject of the
experiences. The assumption on which Shoemaker's metaphor is based is
that the cord itself, i.e., the soul, is visible. For if it were not,
our perception of a row of beads in which there was no break or gap
would not suffice to tell us that the beads were strung on a single
cord.* They might be strung on two or more cords that were in some in-
visible fashion joined together. Just so the chain of remembered ex-
periences might be supported by a plurality of souls which haa insen-
sibly succeeded each other.
In the passage we have been discussing Locke does seem to make
the
assumption that the soul is directly accessible to observation or m-
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spection. Because of his tendency to view the problem as one of the
soul's assuring itself concerning its own self-identity, this assump-
tion is expressed in terms of the visibility or presence of the soul to
itself
,
rather than to the person with which it is associated. Thus
Locke speaks of the "thinking thing" (the soul) being consciously
present to itself, and, most revealingly, of our "losing the sight of
our past selves" due to forgetfulness, etc. (In this passage, although
not usually elsewhere, "self" is a synonym for "soul..-" ) Vie cannot lose
sight of our souls, unless at one time v/e had such sight of them. Now
this teaching concerning the "visibility" of the soul, either to itself
or to the person associated with it, seems to contradict the familiar
Lockian doctrine that substances, or at least the real essences of sub-
stances, are unobservable. Locke has been at great pains to inform us
that this doctrine applies equally to mental and material substances.
V/e observe, not our own mental substance but, at most, certain of its
operations, namely, thinking, willing, etc. We form our complex idea of
an immaterial spirit
,
not on the basis of any observation of such an
entity, but by putting together the simple ideas taken from the opera-
tions of the mind and joining them to substance, "of which we have no
distir.at idea „
"
For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own opera-
tions, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits,
it hath, or can have no other notion of spirit but by
attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a
sort of beings
The existence of the soul is inferred. The soul is not a datum oi
perception, either visual or intellectual.
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... it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we
receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries
of cur thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts
it would make, is not able to advance one jot
Only the beads are visible. "... the idea we have of spirit ... stands
1 5thuss the substance of spirit is unknown to us ..." The cord is
totally invisible.
There appears to be no way to 1'econcile the assumption in II, 27, 10b
concerning the "visibility" of the soul with the main line of Locke's
teaching about the unobservability and unknovability of substance. It
is not the first time we have been obliged to notice that Locke’s state-
ments about spiritual substance are loaded with inconsistencies. This is
a particularly blatant one.
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that Locke could
consistently maintain that a person is able to observe, not only his
soul, but the causal, connection between the state of his soul at any
given time and the thoughts and perceptions which he experiences at that
time. Let us further assume that he forms a complete and uninterrupted
memory of the activities of his soul in this respect. Would even this be
enough, to assure him that the soul whose activities ha had continuously
observed was one soul and not a plurality of souls? If by constantly
keeping his soul "in sight," he is able to be certain that it is always
the same soul, he must possess a way of detecting whether- there has been
any substitution of a new soul for the original one. He must possess a
criterion that enables him to recognise that the soul he perceives at any
given time is the same as the soul that he perceived in the past, and
also, if occasion, arise., to recognise that it is not the same. He needs
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to know what sort of changes or discontinuities would be a sign that the
old soul had vanished and been replaced by an interloper. Such a cri-
terion would be a persistence criterion for souls. But Locke gives us
absolutely no hint as to what such a criterion would consist of. This
omission contrasts strikingly with his serious effort to provide such a
test for other entities, such as masses of matter, organisms, men and
persons. The only other case of a neglected stepchild is that of simple
material substance, although some commentators believe that he does give
a persistence criterion for atoms, namely, spatiotemporal continuity.
Perhaps there is a special difficulty in providing a persistence criteri-
on for simple substances. Or perhaps Locke was not very interested in
the concept of the soxil.
3 . The Person
a. Nature of a person . Locke offers the following definition of a
person.
... a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and re-
flection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places; which it
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from
thinking, and, as it seerns to me, essential to it: it
being impossible for any one to perceive ’without •per-
ceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell,
taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we
do so. Thus it is always as to our present s€-nsations
and perceptions; and by this every one is to himself that
which he calls self : —• it not being considered, in this
case, whether the same self be continued in the same or
divers substances. For, since consciousness always
accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone
to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes him-
self from all other thinking things, in this alone con-
sists personal identity, i»e„, the sameness of a rational
being: and as for as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches
the identity of that person: it is the same sell: now as
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it was then; and it is by the same self with this present
one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. 10
It is clear that Locke wishes to reject the identification of self with
substance, and instead to define a person in terms of consciousness.
However, some of the language he employs may well be a source of confu-
sion. He successively refers to a person as a thinking being, a think-
ing thing and a rational, being. It may be asked what meaning can be
assigned to those terms if they do not refer to a substance. In fact,
Locke himself, in the paragraph immediately succeeding this one equates
a thinking thing with a substance. Superficially, he is contradicting
himself. Nevertheless, the subsequent paragraphs make it so plain that
Locke wishes, above all else, to avoid the identification of a person
with a substance that we must, I think, regard this as a case of verbal
confusion and imprecise use of language.'" Whether the verbal incon-
sistency may not reflect a genuine philosophical!, difficulty is a more
interesting question.
I think we may render Locke's account of the Aristotelian essence of
a person as follows;
(1) A is a person
if and. only if
(a) A thinks (is intelligent, has reason, has reflection)
and
(b) A is conscious of its thinking.
In view of the fact that Locke asserts it is impossible to think without
being conscious of one's thinking, the second clause may be redundant.
If wo wish to take cognizance of Locke's remarks in the first sentence of
the quoted paragraph, we should, perhaps, add as further clauses:
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(c) A is conscious of itself
and
(d) (3t) (3 1
' ) (3p) (iJp 1 ) (i) t' is later than t
(ii) p / p’
(iii) A exists in p at t
(iv) A exists in p* at t'
(v) At t' in p' A is able
to recognize that he
himself was in p at t.
It may be that (d) should not properly be considered as stipulating
a part of the Aristotelian essence of a person. Because it deals with
identity over time, it may be more appropriate to regard it as part of
the persistence criterion for persons. Whether (c) asserts anything
different from that which is asserted by (b) is one of the chief un-
settled problems in Locke's philosophy of the self. It is hard to tell
whether "A" in (a) refers to a subject which has the property of thinking
or whether (a) and (b) should be rewritten to read:
(s ' ) A is a thought
and
(b') ( x) (x is a thought of A).
The reader may think this issue was settled by Locke’s remarks in
the opening chapters of Book II concerning the inferribility of a
thinker from, the fact of a thought. It must be remembered, however, that
the thinker there referred to was a thinking substance, a soul. But the
person, according to the teaching Locke will now put forward, is not to
he identified with the soul or the thinking substance. So even if we
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assume that such a substantial thinker does indeed exist as the neces-
sary substratum of every thought, "A" in (a) cannot have that thinker
as its referent. Indeed, if "A" in (1) is taken to refer to a subject
which is a thinker, a puzzling situation is bound to result. For then
there will be two thinkers, one substantial and one non-substantial,
and presumably they will be the subjects of exactly the same thoughts
and experiences. Locke has told us nothing that would enable us to
l8
conclude that they have these experiences in different ways."' Hugh S.
Chandler has attempted to rescue Locke from this unpromising psycho-
logical theory in the following way.
Consider this triad; (l) When anything rings, a bell
rings; (2) Telephones are not bells; (3) Telephones ring.
Does it follow that when a telephone rings, two things ring?
Obviously not. When a telephone rings, only one thing rings.
It is the telephone, or more specifically, the telephoned
bell.
Locke need not, and should not, suppose that each of
our thoughts is thought by two subjects. A person thinking
by virtue of a component in him which, is doing the thinking,
but which is not that person, does not add. up to two
thinkers. -*-9
The solution which Chandler suggests depends upon the assumption
that the soul is a component of the person, in the way that the bell is
a component of the telephone. It is difficult, however, to see how the
soul, which is a substance, can be a part of an entity which is not a
substance. Furthermore, ringing is merely one of the things that a
telephone does; ringing does not exhaust the "essence" of a telephone.
But according to Locke thinking and consciousness of thinking (itself a
species of thought) do exhaust the whole essence of a person and com-
prise its entire activity. If the soul is the thing that does the
thinking, it would seem more reasonable to identify the soul with the
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person than to conceive oi it as a component of the person.
It seems to me that there are only two methods by which we can
extricate Locke from the infelicitous consequences of the double sub-
ject theory,, One is to say that, explicit avowals notwithstanding,
Locke never believed in the existence of an immaterial soul. The other
is to hold that Locke's person is not a subject of experiences, but
rather is identical with the experiences themselves. Ultimately, per-
haps, it will turn out that both of these claims are correct. First
appearances notwithstanding, it may be that Locke i3 more accurately
characterized as a no-subject theorist of the person than as a subscriber
to the doctrine of a dual self. The chapter on identity and diversity
teems with statements in which Locke comes very close to identifying the
person with states of consciousness. Thus we frequently find him saying
that consciousness is that "whereby X am now myself" and "whereby I am
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myself to myself." "Nothing but consciousness can unite remote
2*1
existences into the same person ..." x "In all which account of self,
the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self;
22
but the same continued consciousness ..." "... it is the conscious-
ness that goes along \;ith the substance ... which makes the same person,
and constitutes this inseparable self ..." He explicates the rela-
tion between the person and the soul by saying: "I agree, the more
probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to and the
2k
affection of, one individual immaterial substance."
But the no-subject theory, that is, the view that a person is
identical with states of consciousness, is also beset by problems to
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which Locke was not insensitive. The chief difficulty may be summed up
as follows. At any given moment of time, I have, or I am aware of a
set of sensations. To refer to Locke's earlier example, I see white
and black colors, I hear singing, I feel warmth and I taste something
tart. If we eliminate the expression, "I," we are left with the state-
ment that there is a color, a sound, a warm feeling and a taste. But
Locke displays at least an initial awareness that it will not do simply
to equate the person with the total ity of these sensations. If we say
that the self is no more than a bundle of perceptions, there may not be
any way to "bundle" them. We may not be able to explain how it is that
they are orgsnized into some kind of a unity and distinguished from the
set of sensations belonging to another person. Anticipating many of
the problems besetting the so-called "bundle" theory of selfhood, Locke
apparently saw the need for some kind of cognitive subject to unify the
experiences of a given person. And so the statements in Chapter 27
which seemingly identify the self with consciousness are interspersed
with others in which the self is said to be a subject of consciousness,
a being which has the property of thinking, feeling and being conscious
"Self is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of,
... which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of
, . . „25happiness or misery ..."
Locke did not wish to abolish the self as a subject of experiences
bxit he did desire to disengage it from logical dependence upon what he
must have believod to be the discredited notions of soul and substance.
Consequently he did not want to postulate as a subject of consciousness
something different in kind from the perceptions themselves. For to
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take that course, he must have felt, would inevitably lead to identify-
ing the person either with an immaterial soul or with a material body.
Now Locke believed that in the concept of consciousness he had dis-
covered a surrogate for the substantial ego, which would yet perform
the necessary synthesizing function. "... consciousness always accom-
panies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls
self ..." The crucial importance to Locke of the doctrine that to think
means to be conscious of thinking is now apparent. It is the second-
order consciousness of thinking that is intended to play the role of the
subject of experiences. Thus the subject of experience will itself be
constituted out of experience.
However, - Locke gives no adequate analysis of the nature of this
second-order consciousness. Does "perceiving that one perceives" mean
merely that each particular sensation is accompanied by a sort of mirror
image, a double, so that the sensation of warmth has annexed to it the
sensation of the sensation of warmth? In that case, how would the latter
differ from the former? And why should there not be still another sensa-
tion, attached to the second one, and to that still another, and so on
indefinitely? If consciousness consists merely in this curious double or
multiple nature of each perception, it is clear that it cannot play tbo
role of organizing the totality of sensations into a whole, nor can it
give rise to the idea of self or personal identity. For the sensation
of the sensation, of warmth will no more be connected with the sensation
of the sensation of color than were the original first-order perceptions
connected with each other. The doctrine that each perception is accom-
panied by a second-order perception of the original perception converts
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the atomic sensations (of warmth, color, etc,) into strings of percep-
tions, but does nothing to provide a bond between these strings, nor to
explain how the person having such perceptions is able to compare them
and relate them to each other.
If consciousness is to be "that which makes everyone to be what he
calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking
things," it must rather be understood as a comprehensive awareness of
the individual perceptions. Plato makes this point in the Theaetetus .
Yes, it would surely be strange that there should be
a number of senses ensconced inside us, like the
warriors in the Trojan horse, and all these things
should not converge and meet in some single nature —
a soul., or whatever it is to be called — with which
we perceive all the objects of perception through the
senses as instruments. °
Would the Platonic account of perception be acceptable to Locke? Does
he mean to put forward an account of consciousness similar to Plato's?
It is difficult to know. Certainly he would refuse Plato's suggestion
that we identify the being which is the meeting point of the senses with
the soul, the mind or any kind of substantial entity. He would insist
that the agency which unifies a person's sensations is itself an item of
consciousness. Is this possible? Can the "common power" by which,
according to Plato, individual perceptions are organized and united, be
understood as being itself no more than a perception, a single compre-
hensive perception of the individual sensations and thoughts occurring at
any particular moment cf time? The tenability of Locke's solution to
the problem of personal identity requires an affirmative answer to this
question.
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Let u3 say that a state of consciousness is a set of contemporane-
ous experiences such that all the members and only the members of that
set belong to a given person at a given time. How, at any particular
moment, does one distinguish the set of experiences belonging to one
person from the set of experiences belonging to another? Locke at first
suggests that a set of contemporaneous experiences belongs to a person,
A, if and only if A is conscious of every member of the set. That is to
say, a set of contemporaneous experiences qualifies as a state of con-
sciousness if and only if there is a person who is conscious of all and
only the members of that set. However, this reply presupposes that we
already have a definition of a person, while in fact it seems impossible
that such a definition could be provided withoxit making use of the con-
cept of a state of consciousness. Following some of Locke’s sugges-
tions, let us transa.ate his proposal as follows; A set of experiences,
S, is assignable to a single person just in case there exists a compre-
hensive perception of every member of S. That perception will be
another set of experiences, S’, such that, for every E which is a member
of S, there is a member of S’ which is a consciousness of E. The diffi-
culty is that Locke has taught us that consciousness is inseparable from
thinking. It is impossible that there should be any thought or experi-
ence which is unaccompanied by a reflexive awareness of that thought.
So every set of experiences will meet this criterion and will qualify
as a state of consciousness. To prevent this consequence it would be
necessary to specify that S* itself is a set of experiences belonging
to a single person. In order to do this, we should need to postulate
another set ox experiences, S", such that for every E* which is a mem-
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ber of S', there is a member of S" which is a consciousness of E'«
Obviously this would lead to an infinite regress. The only hope of
stopping that regress would be to claim that the comprehensive percep-
tion of every member of the original set of experiences, S, is not a
set of distinct experiences, but a single, unitary experience. But
how could such a claim be justified? Let us say that a sensation is
atomic just in case there is no part of it which is capable of being
experienced in isolation from any other part. Hearing a musical tone
would be an example of an atomic experience. Now it is plain that the
comprehensive perception, which includes within itself consciousness of
the many atomic experiences which make up the first-order state of con-
sciousness, cannot itself be an atomic experience. If it is possible to
experience a feeling of warmth without experiencing a tart taste, then
it is presumably possible to be conscious of the first-order experience
of warmth without being conscious of the first-order experience of a tart
taste. But if the second-order comprehensive perception is molecular in
nature, then we face the same problem that we faced in connection with
the original first-order state of consciousness. What is it that makes
the atomic experiences which compose it the experiences of one person?
Is it possible, within the framework of Locke's theory, to discover
a workable criterion for determining the experiential boundaries of a
given person at a given time? Let us experiment with a solution that
27
has been proposed by H„ P. Grice.
1
" That experiences E and E 5 belong to
the same state of consciousness means, according to Grice , that "E and
E' would, given certain conditions, be known, by memory or introspec-
pO
tion, to be simultaneous." We have already had occasion to remark
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that if a definiens contains a stipulation that a state of affairs
occurs or will occur given certain conditions
,
the definition utilizing
that definiens will suffer from vagueness and emptiness. Experiences
which do not belong to a single person would be known, by memory or
introspection, to be simultaneous, given certain conditions which do




given the condition that they are experi-
ences of one person. But let us see if Grice's suggestion can be
adapted in a way that suits our purposes. Perhaps we could say that E
and E 8 belong to the same state of consciousness if and only if there
is an E" such that E" is an experience of the relation of simulta-
neity which holds between E and E'. If we think that there are any ex^*
periences such as we have described E" to be, this approach might hold
out some hope. However
,
the workability of the solution is dependent
upon the assumption that no experience may belong to more than one
person. For if the assumption does not hold good, then the existence
of E" will guarantee only that there is some person who experiences E
and E* as parts of a single state of consciousness. It will not
exclude the possibility that E may also belong to another person who
fails to experience either E' or E". And hence it will not insure
that E and E* are invariably co-personal experiences. Now it is a
feature of Locke's theory of the person, as we shall reconstruct it,
that distinct persons may have temporal parts in common and hence that
a given experience may be an experience belonging to more than one
person. Consequently a Grice-type solution is not feasible for Locke.
Given Locke's assumptions, I must confess myself unable to dis-
cover any way of determining which, experiences may properly be said co
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belong toa particular state of consciousness. This failure may be due
merely to my shortcomings. But unless it can be made good by some more
ingenious commentator, it is apparent that Locke's theory suffers from a
fatal weakness. We shall be forced to understand a state of consciousness
as being simply a non-empty set of experiences.
What, then, is the property or properties making up the Aristotelian,
essence of a person? Locke began by defining a person as a thinking being,
thereby failing to make the distinction, later so important to him, between
a soul and a person. But the doctrine that "it is that consciousness which
always accompanies thinking, which makes everyone to be what he calls self"
teaches us that it is Locke's real intention to define a person as a thought,
or set of thoughts, attended by a consciousness of those thoughts. V/e may
say that a temporal slice of a person is a state of consciousness charac-
terized by first-order thoughts together v/ith a second-order awareness of
them.
b. The persistence criterion for persons . No one in his senses would
want to say that the lifetime of a person was no longer than the duration of
a particular thought or a state of consciousness. Locke was no exception to
the rule. A person, conceived of as a temporally extended entity, is not a
single state of consciousness but is, rather, composed of a series of such
states, each of them characterized in the way just mentioned. By what
principle is a series of states of consciousness bundled into a personal
whole? What sort of relation do the later states in such a series need to
bear to the earlier ones if they are to be parts of a single person? The
key to the unity of a person at any given time, according to Locke, is his
consciousness of his present thoughts. The unity of a person across time
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is constituted by his continuing consciousness of his past thoughts.
Foz' it is by the consciousness it has of its present
thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now,
and so will be the same self, as far as the same
consciousness can extend to actions past or to come ... ^
Locke’s most succinct statement of his persistence criterion for persons
is as follows:
... as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea
of any past paction with the same consciousness it had
of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has
of any present action: so far it is the same personal
self
Locke, of course, conceives of this persistence criterion as a crite-
rion of identity for persons picked out as existing at different times. In
this he has been followed by all of his commentators and critics. So the
standard way of rendering his criterion is as follows:
(2) B at tp is the same person as A at t^
if and only if
(a) A and B are persons
(b) It is possible for B to remember at t^
having performed some act or having had
some experience which A performed or
experienced at t^.31
It is this formulation of Locke’s persistence principle, certainly a
natural one in view of the language he employed, that has been the source
of most of the paradoxes associated with his theory. Ultimately we shall
reconstruct it as a criterion stating the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the co-membership of temporal segments in a series of states of
consciousness composing a person. But for the time being and for purposes
of exposition we shall employ the "personal identity" terminology. Locke
uses the terras "memory,.?! "consciousness of past actions," and "ideas of
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past actions," interchangeably. To repeat the idea of a past action with
the same consciousness one had of it at first is to remember oneself per-
forming the action in question. When Locke says that B at t is the same
self as A at t^ if B can repeat an idea of A's action at t^
,
by "can" he
clearly has in mind something stronger than mere logical possibility. The
test of whether I can remember a past experience is whether
,
under appro-
priate circumstances and with appropriate stimulation, I do remember it.
If I am in fact unable to recall events in which my childhood body partici-
pated, or the recent actions committed by my adult body while drunk or
drugged, I am not the same person as the one who participated in those
events or committed those actions, although, because of the continuity be-
tween my body as it existed at those times and as it exists now, I am the
same man. This is a consequence of which Locke was fully aware and which
he vras prepared to accept.
Locke next raises the question as to whether personal identity is de-
pendent upon or entails identity of substance. It is clearly immaterial
substance, the soul, that he is referring to here, although it is equally
true that he would refuse to base personal identity on sameness of body or
material substance. His answer is; "... whether we are the same thinking
thing, i.e.the same substance or no »<><, concerns not personal identity at
all."'''
2
Locke's reason for refusing to equate the person with his soul is
based upon his contention, which we have already discussed at length, that
no one can know with certainty whether his soul of the present moment is
the same as the soul which was the subject of the past experiences he now
remembers. But everyone can know that he is the same person as the person
who had the experiences he now remembers.
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For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man
be himself • to himself
,
personal identity depends on
that only ...5-5
The conclusion, not drawn explicitly by Locke, is that the soul and the
person are not the same thing. In an alternative version of the argument,
Locke says that it is always possible that an intellectual substance have
represented to it "as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps
done by some other agent But such false representations cannot be
made to the person. "For the same consciousness being preserved ... the
34personal identity is preserved."''
c „ Person and soul
. For Locke the relationship between the self and
the soul, is exactly parallel to that which is ordinarily conceived of as
prevailing between soul and body. Hence it makes sense for him to ask
whether the self (the person) can retain its identity even although the
soul does not. This is a question which he answers affirmatively. Inso-
far- as I retain my memories, my consciousness of my own past experience, I
remain myself and am the same person I was before, even although these
memories have been grafted upon a different soul. Conversely, if the
memories properly belonging to another soul, let us say the soul of
Lucretia Borgia, are grafted upon my soul and conjoined with my memories,
then that lady and I become the same person. Insofar as I remember her
misdeeds as though they were my own, 1 am punishable for them, even al-
though my soul was in no way responsible for their commission. It is
logically possible that transferal of this sort might come to pass, Locke
thinks, because of the fact that memories are not self-certifying in the
way present sensations are.. Because of their representativ e nature, they
may always be delusive. Consequently my soul may be decieved into be-
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lieving that it committed the poisonings, etc. that were actually not its
actions, but the actions of Lucretia's soul, and it may even be deluded
into believing that it remembers those actions as its own. For assurance
that such terrible events will not occur, we must trust to the goodness of
God, Locke says, "who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his
sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of
theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward
35
or punishment with it." ^ If, then, divine intervention does not prohibit
it, there is no logical, reason why one person may not be constituted out of
the experiences of several souls.
Having attempted to show that the person-soul association may instan-
tiate a one-many relation, Locke next seeks to demonstrate that there is no
logical absurdity in assuming that several distinct persons may be associ-
ated with a single soul. If a soul should be stripped of all its memories
and its consciousness of its past existence, and in this state should then
commence a new life, it would "make" a new person. If my soul is numeri-
cally identical with that once possessed by Lucretia Borgia, but I have no
recollection whatsoever of her acts and experiences, then I am not the
same person as Lucretia, nor am I punishable for her wrongdoings. Moral
responsibility is a function of personality and is determined by memory.
If an individual commits a crime which later he is wholly incapable of
recollecting, he is the same man as the wrongdoer; his soul is identical
with that of the wrongdoer; but he is not the same person as the wrong-
doer. Hence divine justice will not punish him. Human laws hold such an
individual responsible, because they have no way of determining whether
His plea of forgetfulness is genuine or spurious.
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But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts
shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no ,
one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of „.. >0
If a limb is amputated from the body, says Locke, the original owner
no longer regards it as a part of himself and is indifferent as to what be-
comes of it. But if it should be the case that when a finger is cut off,
consciousness goes along with the finger and leaves the rest of the body,
then one would be concerned only for the finger and not for the remainder
of the body.
This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or
misery, must grant — that there is something that is
himself
,
that he is concerned for, and would have happy ...
In all which account of self, the same numerical substance
is not considered as making the same self; but the same
continued consciousness ... Person , as I take it, is the
name for this self.37
... happiness and misery being that for which every one
is concerned for himself
,
and not mattering what becomes
of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that
consciousness.kS
The soul has exactly the same instrumental status as does the body. Should
consciousness be severed from its original spiritual substance, then the
fate of that substance would be of no interest to the self. We see now
that Locke was inconsistent in speaking of the transfer of guilt and lia-
bility to punishment from soul to soul as a tragedy which God would surely
wish to prevent. Locke's position should be that it is a matter of indif-
ference as to which soul is punished for any particular misdeed. The only
thing that matters is that a person be held responsible exclusively for
his own actions. Is it any wonder that this doctrine was responsible for
much anger in theological circles?
Does the concept of a soul or an immaterial mental substance serve
for Locke any philosophical purpose whatever? I think it is evident that
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the answer must be in the negative. This conclusion is by no means orig-
inal with me. Laird points out that "his account of the soul shows how
39
useless that conception may be, if understood as Locke understands it."
Gibson appears to be one of the few commentators actually to subscribe to
Locke’s doctrine of personal identity. Hence his view on the status of
mental substance is of interest, since presumably he views the problem in
an authentically Lockian way. He says:
Here, moreover, in the identity of self-consciousness,
Locke has found a concrete unifying conception, in
place of the empty thing-in-itself into which the idea
of substance had finally resolved itself .... But a
mental substance which is not only unknown, but has
been shown to stand in no essential relation to the
self of consciousness, can only be retained so long as
it is not challenged. Nothing could show more con-
clusively than the mere statement of such a position,
the entire uiselessness of the traditional conception
of substance for the interpretation of our self-conscious
life."10
I am inclined to think that this was exactly what Locke intended to show.
215


















the Intellectual Powers of Man
,
III, 3, 3) and Sydney Shoemaker, (o£. cit .
,
p. 46). An elaborate and rather strained defense of Locke against these
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Shoemaker (op . cit . , p. 47f) attributes to Locke the view that
persons are entities which persist for "relatively long periods of time"
but that the immediate subjects of particular experiences which think
and feel and to which mental states are ascribable are immaterial sub-
stances. The word "I" occurring in psychological statements refers to
a being of the latter sort, and not to a person. Persons are not sub-
jects of experiences. Shoemaker then concludes that, since Locke also
says persons think, he is contradicting himself. But there seems no
reason whatsoever to think that Locke conceived of the person-soul re-
lationship in the way Shoemaker describes it. The chapter on identity
contains many passages providing abundant evidence to the contrary. Con-
sider, for example, the following test:
"For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot
recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it
will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than
if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere
existing." (II, 27, 24). Locke is typically inconsistent in referring
to the soul as "a part of me" and in then proceeding to deny that what
"a part of me" does necessarily "belongs to me." But the main purpose
of this passage is clear. "I" does not refer to a substance, but to the
person. What the substance joined to "me" has thought or done is not
necessarily what "I" have thought or done. It is true that Locke thinks
many souls may be associated with a single person. It is equally true
that he believes many persons may be annexed to a single soul. So there
is just as much ground for believing that immaterial substances are the
entities that persist for "relatively long periods of time" and that
persons are the immediate subjects of experience as the other way about.
If we take Locke's statements about the soul and the person literally,
it follows rather that there are always two subjects of every experience.
19 Hugh. S. Chandler, o£., c it
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20 II, 27, 11a
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le Difficulties with the Standard Interpretation
of Locke's Criterion of Personal Identity
Locke's principle that B at t
2
is the same person as A at t if and
only if B at t^ can remember some experiences of A at t, is open to grave
logical objections when it is construed as asserting necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the identity of persons.. It appears to generate- at
least three paradoxes.
a.- A may be identi cal, with B without possessing all of the properties
of B g Locke apparently believes that becoming identical with a person does
not entail the acquisition of all of his properties. His utterances on
this subject are not always free from ambiguity, but in general he seems to
think that while B's recollection of any action or experience of A is
sufficient to insure the identity of B with A, it is not sufficient tc
guarantee that all of A* s experiences are B's experiences.
That with which the consciousness of this present thinking
thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one
self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to
itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own,
as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as
every one who reflects will perceive. --
It is not altogether easy to knew what Locke intends to say in this pas-
sage,, Does he wish to adopt the position that if A joins himself to B
end becomes one self with B, then A owns all the actions of B as his own?
Or does he wish to say that if A is the same person as B, A owns those
actions of 3, and only those actions, to which. A's consciousness reaches?
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Presumably the latter; otherwise the phrase "as far as that consciousness
reaches, and no further" would be otiose. This interpretation is borne
out by the following passage.
For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I
cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own
thought and action, it will no more belong to me ... than
if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being
anywhere existing.^
It is central to Locke's thinking that at any given time a person
bears moral responsibility exclusively for those actions which he is able
to recollect at that time.
... whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or appropri-
ate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no
more concerned in than if they had never been done; -and
to receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on
the account of any such action, is all one as to be made
happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit
at all„^
"Person," Locke says, "... is a forensic term, appropriating actions and
4
their merit ..." Actions are appropriated or assigned to a person, B,
at t just in case B is morally responsible for them at t. But B is
morally responsible for an action at t if and only if at t he can remember
having performed it. It follows that at any given time the only actions
of B are actions which he can recollect at that time. At the same time it
suffices to make 3 identical with A if B becomes conscious of airf action
of A. Thus B may be the sane person as A and yet there may be actions of
A which are not actions of B. Locke appears to be claiming that B may bo
identical with A and yet fail to possess some property that A possesses.
b» A and B may become identical and cease to be ident ical.) It seems
that individual may become identical, v/ith some person from whom he has
previously been distinct, and he may become distinct from someone wicn
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whom he previously has been identical. Locke tells us that someone might
possess the same soul as that possessed by Nestor, but if he had no con-
sciousness of any of Nestor's actions this would not suffice to make him
the same person as Nestor. But should such a being, possessing Nestor's
soul but non-identical with Nestor "... once find himself conscious of
any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with
5Nestor." Conversely, as long as he retains the memory of Nestor's
thoughts and actions, he is Nestor. But if he should lose this memory
beyond the possibility of retrieving it, he would cease to be identical
with Nestor said would no longer be responsible for his deeds. He is the
same person as Nestor as long as he can reproduce some of his experiences
g
in memory; let him lose this capacity and he loses his Nestor-identity.
This view appears to entail the consequence that an individual at one time
has, and at another time has not, all of the properties of Nestor. But
this is impossible. Let us assume that Nestor and I are identical. Then
the dated property of participating in the siege of Troy circa 2000 B.C.
which Nestor possesses is a property which I have always possessed, and
the dated property which I possess of recalling circa 2000 A.D. the events
of that siege is a property which Nestor has always possessed. Dated
properties can be neither acquired nor lost. Thus if we are identical, we
have always been identical. It is impossible, not having been the same
,
that we should become the same. The same argument establishes that, once
having been identical, we cannot cease to be so. If it has ever been the
case that Nestor and I have possessed all of our dated properties in
common, we shall always do so.
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£« Denial of the transitivity of identity . That Locke’s theory of
personal identity apparently committed him to a denial of the principle
of the transitivity of identity was a consequence first pointed out by
Thomas Reid, There are three kinds of cases which seem to involve a
failure of the transitivity of identity. Reid’s example is as follows;
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy
at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard
from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been
made a general in advanced life? suppose, also, which must
be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard,
he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and
that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking
the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of
his fi.ogging. These things being supposed, it follows,
from Mr. Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school
is the same person ’who took the standard, and that he who
took the standard is the same person who was made a general.
Y/hence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the
general is the same person with him who was flogged at
school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so
far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke's
doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore
the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person
with him who was flogged at school.
In order- to make the example intelligible we should assume that the term "a
brave officer" which is applied to the individual who is successively a
schoolboy, a junior officer and a general designates a man (a body or
body-soul compound) rather than a person. Then the schoolboy, the young
officer and the old general will all be "the same man." But Locke




If this is so it will make sense to inquire if the
general and the schoolboy are, under these circumstances, the same per-
son* More nrecisely, we want to know if the person associated with the
general's body is identical with the person associated with the school-
boy's body. Even although the general's body is identical with the
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schoolboy's body, it is possible that distinct persons are associated
with different temporal phases of it. If "a brave officer" had designated
s. single person
s
however, it would not have been intelligible to raise this
question. In order to make certain that this example tells against Locke
we should further assume that the general is not able to recollect any
experiences contemporaneous with the flogging.
Another version of the puzzle is provided by the case of an individual
(a body-soul compound) who retains his memories of the earlier part of his
life but loses his ability to recollect a subsequent segment. Let us alter
keid's example so that the general recalls the flogging but, perhaps owing
to the receipt of a head wound, is unable to remember the capture of the
standard, or any of the events surrounding this episode. Then the person
associated with the general's body is identical with the person whose body
was flogged, but not with the person whose body was wounded, although the
latter two persons are identical with each other. In the first case, A at
t
n
= B at tp, B at t ? - C at tj but C at / A at t^ , In this case, C at
t_, = A at t^ and B at t_, - A at t.,
,
but C and B, both identical with A,
are not identical with each other. The same situation might be brought
about if the memories properly attaching to a given soul, let us say the
souk of Lucretia Borgia, were inherited by a plurality of distinct persons.
There seems to be no reason why, on the basis of Locke's principles such
a state ex affairs could not come about. If the persons, Golda Heir and
Indira Gnandi, each acquire Lucretia' s memories, then each of them be-
comes the same person as Lucretia. But since Golda ' s Lucretia-memories
would be accompanied by experiences different fx*orn those accompanying
Indira's Lucretia-memories, this circumstance, it seems, would hardly
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suffice to make Golda and Indira identical with each other. So once again
the transitivity of identity would be violated.
An example of the third kind of case in which transitivity fails is
afforded by the man (body-soul compound) who suffers a temporary loss of
his ability to recall an earlier part of his life, but subsequently re-
gains that power. Giving to the head injuries, he does not recall the
events of his school days during his young officer phase, but he subse-
quently recovers, so as an elderly general he is able to recollect the
events of both his schoolboy period and his young officer period. Under
these circumstances, the person associated with the elderly body is iden-
tical \vith the person associated with the boy's body and also with the
person associated with the young officer's body, but the latter two per-
sons are distinct. C at t. = A at t
n
and also C at t, = B at tp, but B
at tp / A at
Let us return to the first case. If we interpret the key singular
terms, such as "the schoolboy of t^," "the general, of etc. as ex-
pressions of the form, "the A which has P^," and consequently as referring
to temporally persistent entities of whose existence t is merely a segment,
then we must describe the situation the counter-example depicts in the
following way.
(1) There exists a person, A, who all through his life has the dated prop-
erty of being a schoolboy during t^.
(2) There exists a person, B, who all through his life has the dated prop-
erties of (a) being a junior officer during tp and (b) remembering during
ip the experiences which were had by A during t 1 .
(3) There exists a person, C, who all through his life has the dated prop-
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erties of (a 1 ) being a general during and (b') remembering during
the experiences had by B during and (o') failing to remember (i.e.,
lacking the ability to remember) during t^ any experiences had by A during
V
Now it is clear that when we interpret Locke's theory as making the
strong claim that B's ability to recall some of A's experiences is the
necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of B with A, we
saddle him with the admission that C, through possession of the dated prop-
erty (b 5 ), is identical with B and that B, through possession of the dated
property (b). is identical with A. It is a logical consequence of this
admission that C is identical with A. Reid assumes that Locke's theory
compels him to deny the logical consequence of his own admission. But is
this really true? If C is unable to recollect any of the experiences of
A, then indeed it follows from Locke's theory that C is not identical with
A. But is it so clear that C is unable to recollect any experiences of
A? On the contrary, on the basis of assumptions (1), (2) and (3), it
follows that C does remember A's experiences, for C is the same person as
B, and B remembers A's experiences. The fact that C dees not remember the
events of at t.. does not prove that he fails to remember them at ail.
He does remember them; he remembers them at It appears, then, that
when we interpret expressions such as "A at t" as names for temporally
persistent entities, Reid's counter-example fails. Locke is committed to
saying that "A," "B," and "C" name a single person, but it is not imme-
diately obvious that he is committed to denying that proposition.
However, Locke would regard than refutation of Reid's criticism as
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a Pyrrhic victory. Let us consider why. According to Reid's original
example, A robs an orchard at some point during t and at a subsequent
point in t^ he is flogged for that offense. Let us alter the example
slightly by making the assumption that A does rob the orchard during t^
but that he is not punished for it during t nor is B punished for it
during t^. The question that now arises is whether or not C is punish-
able at for the offense that was committed by A during t
1
but which C
no longer is able to recollect at t^. We have already noted that Locke
believes no one should be punished for offenses that he is unable to re-
call at the time of the punishment . Therefore it is clear that Locke would
not agree that C is punishable at t_ for the offense committed by A at t.
2 1
of which C has no recollection at _t ,.
Locke could have reconciled this denial of C's liability to punish-
ment at with the admission that A, B and C constitute a single person
simply by adopting the moral principle that no person has the dated prop-
erty of being punishable at t for an offense committed by him at t - n,
unless he has the dated property of remembering at t the offense commit-
ted by him at t - n. 3ut this is to say that Locke need not have held
the conception of a person which in fact he did hold; he need not have
founded personality on consciousness and memory. Locke chose instead to
say that a person is responsible for all of his earlier actions, and
hence that actions he cannot remember are not his.
... personality extends itself beyond present existence
to what is past, only by consciousness, — whereby it
becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to
itself past actions ...9
Consequently he would not have been able to grant that A, B and C of
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Reid’s example constitute a single person without admitting that C is
punishable at t^ for the offense committed by a at t.,
.
But it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine that a person is
responsible for all of his earlier actions with the teaching that no one
is punishable for actions which he is unable to recall at the time of
the punishment. Let us consider a person (a state of consciousness)
existing at t. What earlier states of consciousness may be assigned to
that person at t? Part of the time Locke's answer seems to be, all those
and only those which the person is capable of remembering at t. A person
must be such that at any given time his state of consciousness is potenti-
ally a memory cf all his earlier states. So if B at t^ cannot remember
any experiences of A at t
1 ,
then A and B cannot be states of the same per-
son. Yet if at t^ C remembers experiences of both A and 3, A, B and C
will make up a single person. This is a contradiction which no recon-
struction of Locke's theory can resolve.
Perhaps feeling the tension between his incompatible principles,
Locke may have been seeking a way out by relativizing the relation of
identity to a particular time. Accordingly, his full criterion of the
identity of persons does not stipulate that B is identical with A if and
only if B at some point during his life can recall any of A's experiences.
Instead that criterion specifies that 3 is identical with A at a certain
time
,
namely, that time and only that time, at which he is able to
recollect A's experiences. 3 at t^ is the same person as A at t^ if
and only if B possesses the ability at t_ to remember an experience had
by A at t^ . The theory that A and B are identical relative to a particu-
lar time is merely an alternative formulation of the contradictory pnn-
227
ciple, which Locke did accept, that a person may become identical with
someone from whom he had previously been distinct and vice versa. When
its singular terms are interpreted as names for temporally persistent
entities, Reid's counter-example has the effect of forcing Locke to accept
this consequence and its attendant absurdities. If "A," "B," and "C" are
thought of as naming a single person, Locke is obliged to say that at t^
that person is identical with the schoolboy, but that at t^ he has become
distinct from the schoolboy. Reid's argument merely shows that a theory
which is enmeshed in that contradiction will also be compelled to deny
the necessary truth that identity is a transitive relation.
d c Veridical and non-veridical memory . Now let us consider another
cluster of difficulties attending Locke’s attempt to define the identity
of persons by means of the criterion of memory. Depending on the sense
given to "remember," this attempt appears to lead either to circularity or
to paradox. When we say, "B at t^ is the same person as A at t^ if and
only if B can remember at some experiences had by A at t^," vre may be
using the word "remember" in one of two ways. We may be defining it in
such a manner that it is logically impossible for anyone to remember any
experiences other than those he himself actually had. This we may call
the veridical sense of "memory." It is certainly the primary sense cf the
word. When we are using "remember" in this ’way, it is logically correct
to refer to certain memory-like experiences as merely spurious memories,
if in fact v/e liave grounds for believing they do not mirror past events in
the life of the individual. Let us assume that through hypnosis or other
means
,
I am put into a delusional state in which it seems to use that I
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remember the experience of standing at a storehouse window in Dallas and
gunning down President Kennedy. Given the sense of "remember" which we
are new employing, it would be logically, as well as psychiatrically,
proper for someone acquainted with my actual whereabouts on the day of
Kennedy’s assassination to inform me that I do not remember any such ex-
perience? I merely think I remember it. If we define "memory" in this
narrow sense, however, its usefulness as a criterion for establishing
personal identity becomes questionable. The definition of personal iden-
tity holds that B at t„ = A at if and only if B at t_ can remember
some of A's experiences at t., „ The deflation of memory stipulates:
-L
(1) B at t 0 remembers some of A's experiences at tn
if and only if
(a) B at t has ideas of some experiences had by A at t.
with the additional idea annexed to them that these
-
experiences have been had by B at t^
and
(b) the experiences of which B has ideas at t 0 were actually
had by B at
Clauses (a) and (b) imply that the experiences had by B at t.. , of which
he has ideas at t^, are identical with some experiences had by A at t^.
According to our ordinary ways of thinking, A and B cannot have identical
experiences unless they are identical persons. If this is so, then (a.)
and (b) imply:
(c) B at t. = A at t 1 .
The definition of personal identity is thus rendered circular, for whe
defi-niendum
,
"E at t„ = A at t^" is in fact contained in the aefiniens.
Let us now consider the attempt to define personal identity through
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a memory criterion when the word "remember" is allowed to include in its
meaning what we would ordinarily call non-veridical memory experiences,
that is to say, when clause (b) of the definition of veridical memory is
simply dropped. When the word is used in this sense it is no longer
logically proper to inform a person that he merely thinks he remembers
an experience. The status of memory becomes exactly like that of a
feeling of pain. If I seem to feel a pain, I do feel a pain. Similarly,
if I think I remember an experience, I do remember that experience. Thus
v/e make it possible for a person to remember experiences he never had.
It is possible, for example, for me to remember the experience of assas-
sinating President Kennedy, even although such an action was never commit-
ted by me.
However, if we combine a memory criterion of identity with this sense
of the word "remember," we shall be faced with the paradoxes we have just
been discussing. V/e shall be compelled to admit that persons, previously
distinct, may become identical (and vice versa) and we shall be obliged to
deny the transitivity of identity.
V/e have noted that if one assumes it is impossible for distinct per-
sons to share the same experience, the definition of personal identity in
terms of veridical memory is circular. If one does not make that assump-
tion, the definition is freed from circularity but leads to the same
bizarre consequences that flow from combining it with a non-veridical con-
ception of memory. If B forgets the experiences he shared with A, then
he ceases to be identical with A. If he remembers them again, he is once
more identical, with A.
V/e are now in a position to appreciate the ingenuity of Locke’s aevic
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of a double subject, constituted out of the distinct entities, the self
and the soul. This machinery enables him to employ the veridical and the
non-veridical senses of memory simultaneously. When he discusses the rela-
tion of the soul to its memories, he is clearly using the word "remember"
in what we have been calling the non-veridical sense, namely, to denote
the present consciousness of an. event that represents itself as having
occurred in the individual's past, but which in fact may not have done so.
... why one intellectual substance may not have represented
to it, as dene by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps
done by some other agent — why, I say, such a representation
may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well
as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst
dreaming we take for true — will be difficult to conclude from
the nature of things. _LlJ
Thus Locke is enabled to discuss the possibility of memories being trans-
ferred from one soul to another, and of a mind remembering experiences it
never had. He does not fall into the contradictions we have just described,
however, precisely because he does not employ a memory criterion to estab-
lish the identity of a soul. The soul is a substance, and the criteria
for determining the identity or persistence of a substance, whatever they
may be, have nothing to do with memory. It is entirely possible for a soul
tc be "wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence" and
yet remain the same soul. Conversely, if two souls each acquire all of the
memories of the other, they yet remain numerically distinct as souls.
A man is related to his memories in precisely the same way as is the
soul to its memories, but once again contradictory consequences do not
follow, because the identity of a man is not determined on the basis of
memory, but rather by the criterion used to establish the sameness oi
physical organisms. So even if Locke were to eliminate the soul from his
231
conceptual scheme, he would be able to employ the concept of non-veridical
memory without falling into paradoxes.
When Locke turns to the identity of persons, where he does employ the
criterion of memory, he shifts without warning to the veridical sense of
"remember."
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of
any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at
first ... so far is it the same personal self .-Li
Let us assume that an intelligent being has an idea of a past action which
in fact it did not perform, although it thinks of this action as being its
own. Under these circumstances it cannot have a consciousness of the
action which is the same as the consciousness it had of it at first, since
there was no such prior consciousness. It seems, then, that where persons
are concerned, only veridical remembering qualifies as remembering. To re-
member an experience means to remember one's own experience. The idea of
a past action which one has not performed is not a memory. On the assump-
tion that a given experience can be had by only one person, the paradoxi-
cal consequences which ensue from the combination of a non-veridical sense
of memory with a memory criterion of identity are thus avoided, but at the
cost of rendering circular' the definition of a person. This circularity,
however, is masked in Locke's presentation by the role he accords to the
notions of the soul and the man, which function cLS alternate subjects. By
focusing on the dramatic possibilities of non-veridical memory where the
soul is concerned, he obscures the fact that he is not using a similar
non-veridical sense of the word "remember" in his definition of a person.
Thus many readers have believed that they were in receipt , not only of a
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genuine piece cf information, but even a shocking piece of information,
when told that person B's ability to remember some of person A's experi-
ences is a sufficient condition of the identity of B at t 0 with A at t,.
2. The Reconstruction of Locke's Theory
a. Another conception of memory
.
The preceding account of Locke's
theory of personal identity is somehow too simplistic. Is the Lockian
definition condemned either to circularity or to paradoxical consequences
of the sort we have been portraying? I shall argue that the theory is not
to be so readily dismissed.
No difficulty exists in making a distinction between veridical and
non-veridical memory so long as we are talking about a substance, whether
spiritual or material in character. A veridical memory is a representation
of an experience which the being in question has actually had, or of an
action which it has actually performed. A non-veridical memory represents
to a subject as though it were its own an experience which that subject has
not actually had. But in the case of a person, as conceived of by Locke,
how does one determine what is and what is not a veridical memory? Is the
notion of a non-veridical memory even intelligible in this context? A sub-
stance is capable of performing actions and of having experiences. A sub-
stance can have experiences because it is possible to distinguish the- haver
of the experiences from the experiences themselves. It makes sense to ask
whether certain memory-like experiences had by a substance at are genu-
ine reflections of experiences that substance had at precisely because
there is in principle a way of deterrn: ning whether the substance at t^ rs
the 6ame as the substance at t^, and the method of determining the ident^i-y
2J4
How are later states assigned to earlier states? Let us assume that at
t^ we have a certain state of consciousness, C^, characterized by ideas
of swimming, perhaps with the additional idea of "presentness" annexed to
them. At t^ we have another state of consciousness, characterized by
ideas of drying off on a beach, with the additional idea of presentness
annexed. is also characterized by ideas of swimming to which there is
annexed the idea of pastness, that is to say, the idea that the swimming
ideas, or ideas very much like them, have been previously experienced.
How do we know whether belongs to the same series as C^? How do we
determine whether the C2 ideas of swimming, to which there is annexed the
additional idea of pastness, genuinely reflect the ideas of swimming,
which are accompanied by an aura of presentness? Clearly the answer must
be that if the memories are appropriately similar to the C
^
ideas, then
CL and C~ form parts of the same series of states of consciousness, and
thus "belong to" the sarnie person. Perhaps we should also require that the
degree of pastness attached to the memories accord at least roughly
with the Hength of the interval, between t^ and It seems clear that,
given this conception of a person, the distinction between genuine and
spurious memory has been robbed of its significance. Let us assume that
in the past there existed a state of consciousness which included ideas
of administering noison to an enemy. Let us further assume that this
state of consciousness inhered in the particular spiritual substance to
which we refer by the name of Lucretia Borgia. Suppose that in the
present there exists a state of consciousness which includes, with the
appropriate degree of pastness annexed, exactly similar ideas of adminis-
tering poison to an enemy. It follows from Locke's theory that the
233
of the substance is independent of the question of the similarity between
the memory experiences at and the experiences at t^ If a memory at
t
2
precisely matches an experience had at t^ one can still sensibly in-
quire whether these conscious states belong to the same substance. Only
if the answer is in the affirmative does the memory count as veridical.
But if a person is no more than consciousness, or consciousness of con-
sciousness, as most of the time Locke would have us believe, then in-
quiries of this sort are no longer intelligible. We cannot then ask if
the states of consciousness existing at t
1
and are states that both
belong to an entity for which there is an independent criterion of iden-
tity, and hence we cannot inquire if that entity actually had at t^ ex-
periences which the memory experiences of t
?
may be said truthfully to
resemble. Locke might wish to reply that he has, indeed, provided for a
subject of conscious experience, a subject which has experiences, but that
this subject is itself a conscious experience. A set of conscious experi-
ences existing at is a genuine memory of a set of conscious experiences
existing at t just in case both sets are perceived by the same overarch-
ing consciousness, the same consciousness of consciousness. The diffi-
culty which any such answer would have to confront is that there is no
criterion of identity for consciousness, even for consciousness of con-
sciousness, apart from the existence of similarities between the sets of
conscious experiences which are alleged to be perceived by the same super-
consciousn-353 .
On Locke's account, a person is simply a finite temporal series of
states of consciousness. By what principle is this series constituted ?
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earlier and later states of consciousness constitute a single person.
One can ask whether the soul-substance in which the later state of con-
sciousness inheres actually performed the act which was performed by the
soul-substance we call Lucretia; but from the standpoint of Locke's con-
ception of personal identity, it makes no sense to inquire whether the
later state of consciousness is a genuine reflection of the earlier one.
The definition of "remember" so far as persons are concerned must
be recast as follows. "B at t., remembers some of A's experiences at t^"
means "B at tp includes memories of some experiences included in A at
V
(2) B at t? includes memories of some experiences included in
A at
^
if and only if
(a) A and B are both states of consciousness
and
(b) B at tp contains ideas of experiences, with an idea of
pastness annexed to them, that are relevantly similar to
some of the experiences, with an i.dea of presentness
annexed to them, that are contained in A at t^.
b. Potential memory «, Unfortunately, we are in need, nor merely of
a definition of "remember," but also of a definition oi
"can remember.
Locke has specified that the ability on the part of B to include in its
consciousness ideas of A's experiences or actions is a sufficient condi-
tion for the identity of B with A; it is not necessary that B actually
include memories of experiences included in A. It is wholly understand-
able that Locke should frame his definition of personal identity in this
way. He naturally wants to say that a person inherits responsibility
,
moment he is conscious of
not merely for those actions which at any given
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having performed, but for all those acts and experiences which, with
appropriate stimulation, he is capable of recollecting. However, it is a
grave question as to whether the notion of ability to remember can be
made intelligible in the context of Locke's phenomenalist conception of a
person. It seems that the ability to remember, or to produce conscious
states of a certain kind, is a property that can belong only to an agent
capable of performing causally efficacious actions. Is a state of con-
sciousness such an agent? Perhaps, taking a clue from Berkeley, we can
say that there are lav/s determining that certain states of consciousness
will be followed by certain other states and, moi-eover, that some states
are such that they will follow others if and only if those others have
been preceded by still earlier states of a certain definite kind. In
other vjoras there may be a state of consciousness, C, such that if it has
been preceded by a state of consciousness, B, then it v/ill be succeeded by
a state of consciousness, D. That is to say, B is such that if it is
followed by C, then C will be succeeded by D, Let us assume that A is a
mental state occurring at t^
,
and A consists of the experience of having
a conversation with Professor Feldman. At there occurs another mental
state, B, which consists of the experience of reading the New York Times .
B contains no memories of A. V/e want to know if B can remember A, or, as
I shall put it, if B is potentially a memory of A. Let us further assume
that some states of consciousness, while not themselves including memo-
ries of earlier states, have under certain circumstances the tendency to
produce, or be followed by, states which do include memories of those
earlier states. We may think of these states as being appropriate stim-
uli to the recollection of the earlier states. Thus a state of conscious'
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ness which includes the experience of hearing the question, "Do you remem-
ber the conversation you recently had with Professor Feldman?" might be
considered to be a stimulus to the recollection of the earlier state which
consisted of the experience of having that conversation. When we ask
whether the mental state, B, consisting of the experience of reading the
New York Times
,
is potentially a memory of the mental state, A, which was
an experience of a conversation with Professor Feldman, we are asking
whether there is any state, C, containing an appropriate stimulus to the
memory of A, such that if B is followed by C, C will in turn be followed
by a state, D, which includes a memory of A. It is obvious that a state
such as C which is a stimulus to the memory of A need not always be
followed by a 1> which is a memory of A» If B is such that there is no
state, C, such that if C immediately succeeded B it would produce a state,
D, which includes a memory of A, then we may say that the state, B, is
not a potential memory of A, Abandoning the stilted language which phe-»
nomenalism forces upon us, we may say, if my mental state when reading the
New York Times is such that no stimulus whatsoever is capable of awaken-
ing in me the memory of the conversation with Professor Feldman, then I
cannot remember that conversation.
Let ns attempt to define "can remember." "B can remember at t
^
some
of A s s experiences at t, " we paraphrase as "B at potentially includes
memories of some experiences included in A at t^." The main structure oi
the definiens is that of a conjunction, having (I) and (II) as its mem-
bers,, (II) is a disjunction which has as its disjuncts (1) ar.d (2). (l)
provides that if B actually contains memories of A, then B shall count as
a potential memory of A, that is to say, E has the ability to remember A.
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The situation where B does not actually include any memories of experi-
ences included in A, but nevertheless potentially includes them, is dealt
with in (2)„ C is the state containing the stimulus to recollection of
the experiences included in A. It may be identical with B or it may in-
stead be an immediate successor to 3. Those two possibilities are dealt
with in (a) and (b) which lay down the conditions which the stimulus
state, C 5 must meet. Clause (ii) is included in the antecedent of both
(a) and (b) since it is possible that B or C might be the terminal state
in the life of the person and hence not be succeeded by any state at all.
Yet we should wish to say, and indeed, given Locke's conception of a per-
son, we need to say, that this terminal state potentially includes memo-
ries of earlier states in the person's existence.
(3) B at t? potentially includes memories of some experiences included in
^ A at t
if and only if
(I) A and B are states of consciousness
and





(2) There is a state of consciousness, C, such that
(a) J.f (i) C is identical with B
and
(ii) C is succeeded by .any state at all
then C is immediately succeeded by a state
of consciousness, D, which includes memories
of some experiences included in A
and
(b) If (i) C immediately succeeds B
and
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(ii) C is succeeded by any state at all
then C is immediately succeeded by a state
ox consciousness, D, which includes memories
of some experiences included in A.
One great advantage to these phenomenalist definitions of "remember"
and "can remember" is the fact that they no longer contain the stipula-
tion that A at t^ be identical with B at t£» Hence the definition of per-
sonal identity in terms of memory is freed from the circularity by which
it was crippled when "remember" was taken in its ordinary veridical sense
and we assumed that an experience could be had by only one person. In
order to make this new definition of memox-y viable, however, we have to
regard "A" and "B" as replaceable by names of states of consciousness, or
temporal slices of experience. Now it is plain that B's remembering the
experiences of A (B's being a memory of A) is not the necessary and suffi-
cient condition of B's identity with A. Indeed, since (2) in the defini-
tion of "remember" requires B to differ from A in attaching the idea of
pastness to experiences which in A were accompanied by a sense of being
present, it is obviously impossible for A and B to be one and the same
state of consciousness. What is to be defined in terms of the memory
criterion is not a x-elation of identity, but the relation of genidentity
which holds between distinct temporal parts belonging to a single whole.
c. Resolving the -paradoxes . The fact that Locke is apparently
committed to the theses that (1) A may be identical with B while failing
to possess all ox B's properties and (2) A and B may be identical at one
time and non-identical at another constitutes strong evidence that he is
using the wox'ds "same" and "identical" in a sense which is different from
that of the contemporary logician. It indicates that he does not always
regard statements of the form "B at t
2 =
A at t^' as genuine assertions of
identity, and hence that he does not always interpret "A at t" as "the A
which has P
t
." If this is not the case, his theory is simply incoherent.
But if the assertion that B at t
?
is identical with A at t
1
is understood
as a. statement that B at t^ and A at t are parts of a single temporally
persistent whole, the door is opened for a reconstruction of his teachings
on a more sensible basis. So it may be that, after all, he is not vulner-
able to the charges, which have hitherto seemed most potent, that his
theory entails a violation of the laws of logic.
We are now in a position to give at least an initial answer to the
criticism that Locke allows B to be identical with A, and yet to lack some
property belonging to A. When he maintains that, merely through remember-
ing some action of A, B becomes identical with A, Locke is in reality
claiming only that this act of recollection on the part of B is a suffi-
cient condition for the inclusion of B in a personal whole having A as an
earlier temporal part. There is no apparent contradiction in asserting
that B may be joined to A in this way while at the same time recognizing
that there are many properties belonging to A which B fails to possess.
The charge that Locke allows distinct persons to become identical (and
vice versa) may be met in a similar way. When Locke says that I become
the same person as Nestor upon acquiring consciousness of some of
Nestor’s actions, all he is maintaining is that my recollection of a
Nestor-action suffices to include me in a personal whole which has Nestor
as an earlier part. But although joined together in this very special way,
Nestor and I would remain non-identical. Should 1 subsequently lose my
memory of Nestor's actions, the result is not to make previously identical
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persons non-identical, but to terminate the existence of the person having
us both as parts and to initiate, instead, a nev; person whose earlier seg-
ments, at least, consist of my states of consciousness, shorn of any capac-
ity to recollect Nestor-experiences. It may indeed conflict with our
ordinary ways of thinking to maintain that there are persons with tempo-
ral parts like this, or that they can be created and annihilated in such
a fashion. But so far as I can see, the view entails no logical absurd-
ity.
Let us turn now to Reid's transitivity paradox. On the basis of the
reconstruction of Locke's theory which I have been proposing, the singu-
lar terms, such as "the schoolboy at t^ must bo interpreted as names,
not for temporally whole persons, but for temporal segments of persons.
So Locke is no longer committed, by the transitivity of identity, to
maintaining that the general at t^ is the same person as the schoolboy at
t
1 .
Indeed, when "A at t^" "B at t
2
," and "C at ty are regarded as re-
placeable exclusively by names of temporal segments of persons, each of
them existing at different times, such an assertion would be unintelli-
gible. Therefore, Locke is not obliged to hold that C is identical with
A. Instead he is left with the assertion that A and B belong to a single
temporal series constituting a person, that B and C are members of another
such series, but that A and C are not co-members of any one such series,
and that consequently there is no person having A, B and C as its tempo-
ral segments. In the second of the three cases that we previously dis-
cussed, B at t^ recalls the experiences of A at t^ and C at t^ likewise
remembers A's experiences, but is unable to recollect any oj. B s experi-
ences. Under these circumstances there will be a person composed of A
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and B, and another person composed of A and C, but B and C will not make
up a person, and once again there will be no person having as its seg-
ments, A, B and C. For reasons that will subsequently become apparent,
we shall postpone consideration of the third case until Locke's defini-
tion of a person has been reconstructed.
The situations we have been describing may well present themselves as
strange in the extreme, but are they contradictory? To raise this ques-
tion is to ask if the relation of co-membership in a single temporal
series of mental states constituting a person is necessarily a transitive
relation. If A and B are co-members of such a series, and B and C are sim-
ilarly related to each other as co-members, does it follow that A and C
are so related? If one ans\\rers this question affirmatively it is because
one believes that under the specified conditions it is necessary that A, B
and C constitute a single series. We may pose the problem in another
way. Let the series composed of A and B be called "<*" and the series
composed of B and C be called
"ft." Then the question becomes one of
whether a single temporal slice of consciousness, B, may be a member of
two distinct temporal series, ck anaf?
,
each making up a person, and yet
that it not be the case that there is any more comprehensive series, b ,
such that constitutes a person and d" and P are both parts of & . Some
philosophers might wish to deny that the situation just described is a
possible one on the grounds that experiences and states of consciousness
are necessarily private, i.e., that they cannot be shared by more than
one person. But this claim is debatable. Some philosophers have held it
possible that a person might undergo fission and divide into two per-
sons. This statement, if not contradictory, must be understood as
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asserting that two persons, always distinct, have for a period of time a
part in common, and subsequently proceed to go their separate ways* Such
a state of affairs would not seem to be logicalD.y impossible. So given
this view of what it is to be a person, there does not appear to be any
compelling logical reason for regarding the relation of co-membership in
a single personal series as a transitive one.
It may be objected that if we allow a temporal segment of conscious-
ness to figure as a component in distinct personal series, we shall vio-
late Locke's dictum that there cannot be more than one thing of a given
kind in the same place at the same time.
For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that
two things of the same kind should exist in the same
place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that,
whatever exists anywhere at any time, excludes all of
the same kind, and is there itself alone. 3-2
To return to Reid's example, there is a person composed of the schoolboy
of and the junior officer of t^, there is a second person, distinct
from the first, having as his temporal parts the junior officer of and
the genera.! of t„, and these two persons are not co-members of a more com-
prehensive personal series. Thus it may be argued that, the reconstructed
version of Locke's theory demands that the space occupied by the body and
the soul of the junior officer be occupied by two things of the same kind,
namely by two distinct persons. The objection, however, depends on the
premise that persons are entities that occupy space, and it seems likely
that this is a premise Locke would reject. Locke divides everything that
13
exists into two fundamental categories; substances and modes. " All
substances occupy space. According to Locke, all modes or relations are
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"ultimately terminated in substances,"” but it seems that termination
in a substance. is not the same thing as occupation of the place which the
substance occupies. Locke allows, for example, that an indefinite number
of ideas, or modes of thought, may terminate in a given finite spiritual
substance at any one time. These ideas are, all of them, inodes of
thought, that is, modes of the same kind, but this circumstance is pre-
sumably no bar to their being terminated in the same substance at the
same time. It is one of Locke's cardinal teachings that a person is not
a substance. Since everything which is not a substance is a mode, it
follows that persons must be regarded as modes. And hence there seems to
be no reason why an indefinite number of them should not be connected with,
or tei’minate in, the same bodily or spiritual substance.
3. The Definition of a Person as a Temporal Whole
a. Persons as relativized to time . We have seen that Locke shows some
inclination to conceive of the relation of identity as relativised to a
particular time. This suggests that we might most effectively capture his
intent by defining a person as relativized to a time. We may sketch such a
definition along the following lines.
(4) P is a person at t
if and only if
P is composed of a series, S, of states of consciousness such uhat the
state coinciding with t potentially includes memories of some lor
all) experiences included in each state.
But this definition is fundamentally unintelligible. It sufiers from the
same incoherence as did the notion of identity relativized to a time. Jr
and P' cannot be identical at one time and distinct at another. A series
of states of consciousness cannot constitute a. temporally whole person at
one time and fail to constitute such a person at another. Either the
series makes up a person or it does not. Constituting a personal whole
is a property that belongs to the series, and not to any of its temporal
parts. It is not a dated property of the series. So the effort to con-
ceive of a person in this way is best abandoned as fundamentally contra-
dictory in nature.
b. New attempts at a definition
.
(5) P is a person which is a temporal whole
if and only if
P is composed of a series, S, of
states of consciousness such that
(a) the last state potentially includes
memories of some experience
included in some earlier state
and
(b) S is not itself a proper
part of any series meeting
requirement (a).
This rendition accords with Locke's intentions insofar as it makes it
possible to say that B at t 0 and A at t 1 are later and earlier segments of
rhe same person provided that B can remember some experience of A. But in
other respects it is a glaring failure. It makes any state of consciousness
whatsoever assignable to a person simply on condition that he has had
assigned to him some state of which his final state potentially includes a
memory* Thus a person would be obliged to claim as his own an indefinite
number of experiences which he was totally unable to recall.
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Let us make another attempt. For clause (a) in (5) let us substi-
tute (a 1 ).
(a 1 ) the last state potentially includes memories of some experiences in-
cluded in each earlier state.
This definition also fails to carry out Locke's intentions, for it,
too, has as a consequence that an action or experience may be attributed
to a person as his own even although he lacks the capacity to remember it.
All that is required for an experience to be an experience of person A is
that it be a part, possibly an unremembered part, of a state of conscious-
ness, some fragment of which is included as a potential memory in his last
state. Thus it would be possible for a person to be held culpable for an
action of which he has totally lost consciousness. This strikes at the
center of Locke's intentions.
Earlier we pointed out that if "identity" is to be understood in its
ordinary sense, then Locke is surely contradicting himself in claiming
(a) that B becomes the same person as A merely by remembering some exper-
ience of A and (b) that at any given time an experience is an experience
of B only if B remembers, or can remember, that experience as his own at
that time. For if B is truly identical with A by virtue of recollecting
some one of his experiences, then, necessarily, all of A's experiences
belong to B
,
including those that B at any given time is unable to remem-
ber. We suggested that this contradiction could be avoided by reinter-
preting "identity" as ".joint membership in a. single temporal series. 1-
Now we see that a parallel problem continues to plague the reconstructed
theory. It is surc-ly intelligible to say that A and B are earlier and
later parts of the same person even although the xater part cannot recalx
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all of the experiences had by the earlier part. But what of the person
constituted out of A and B? If he is to be such that an experience is his
experience only if he is capable of recollecting it, then we cannot allow
a later state of consciousness to be joined in a personal whole with an
earlier state merely on the ground that the later state is potentially a
memory of some experience included in the earlier state. For if that
later state is the final state in a temporal series constituting a person,
the consequence may be that there are experiences belonging to a person
which he cannot remember. The inconsistency between (a) and (b) cannot,
after all, be disposed of merely by substituting the concept of co-member-
ship in a temporal, series for that of identity.
(b) represents the very core of Locke's position regarding person-
ality and moral responsibility; we can be certain that he would be un-
willing to give up this thesis. So it seems fairly clear that it is
(a) that must be surrendered. V/e may wonder, in any case, why Locke was
willing to allow B's remembering some action of A to be a sufficient con-
dition of the identity of B with A. Doubtless he was concerned that a
recmirement that the last segment of a person remember all the experiences
of the earlier segments would result in the life span of a person being
short indeed. A consideration of this sort would be of tne utmost
importance if Locke's person could be identified with the being which
the name "nerson 1 ’ denotes in our ordinary discourse and thinking.
But by now it is apparent that a person, according to Locke's conception,
bears little similarity to the persons with which v/e are acquainted
in our every day lives. It follows from Locke's theory that a
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person is annihilated at the moment that there ceases to exist a state of
consciousness which potentially contains memories of experiences in each
of his temporal states. We shall see, however, that it is possible that
he may be reborn at a later time if such a state of consciousness should
subsequently come into being. All that is achieved by the retention of
(a) is that this annihilation will not occur as long as there exists a
state of consciousness potentially including memories of some experiences
included in each of A's earlier temporal states. But if even a single
temporal slice of A's experience becomes totally unrecollectable, then A
disappears from existence. No limit has been set to the size or width of
temporal slices; presumably a temporal slice of consciousness may be of
extremely short duration. Even when (a) is retained the life span of a
person is extremely precarious, to say the least. Human beings, as we
understand them, are inevitably composed of a great multitude of Lockian
persons. This being so, Locke loses little in surrendering the contradic-
tion-making thesis that B is joined in a personal, union with A merely by
the ability to recall some of A's experiences. The heart of his concep-
tual scheme is the thesis that an experience, E, is assignable to a per-
son, A, if and only if the last state of consciousness in the series which
constitutes A either includes a present awareness of E or potentially in-
cludes a memory of E. The preservation of that conception requires the
following substitution for clause (a) of (5).
(a 11 ) the last state potentially includes memories of each experience
included in each earlier state.
It may seem that this definition permits a person to escape respon-
sibility for actions or experiences which he does have the capacity to
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remember, if those experiences belong to a state of which there is a part
that he cannot recollect. It will be recalled, however, that we were
obliged to say that any non-empty set of contemporaneous experiences is
a state of consciousness. Hence any experience qualifies as such a state
and is assignable to each temporal series, constituting a person, whose
final member contains a potential memory of it.
No series of states of consciousness which constitutes a segment of
a person itself qualifies as a person. Furthermore there is no require-
ment that each state of consciousness which is a member of a personal
series potentially include memories of every earlier state. This makes
it possible for a person to include among his past experiences amnesic
states in the course of which he was oblivious of all or part of his past.
For these states of consciousness to count as his it is necessary only that
they should be reflected in the memories of his final state. This seems
to accord with Locke’s intentions, for Locke clearly believes that any
experiences which a person remembers as though they were his own are his
15
own. On the other hand, it compels him to sacrifice the inconsistent
claim that if B at t
p
does not remember the actions of A at t^, it is not
possible that those actions were performed by the same person as B, or by
a part of a person belonging to the same personal whole to which B
belongs.
4. Persistence and Identity Criteria for Persons
a. The persistence criterion . Given the definition of a person
which we have accepted, it is now impossible for us to continue to says
(6) B at tp and A at t. are states of consciousness belonging to the same
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person if and only if B potentially includes memories of all the experi-
ences included in A.
The problem comes to view when we consider the third type of case
which, under the original formulation of Locke's theory, constituted a
violation of the transitivity of identity. This is the case where C at
tj recollects all the experiences of A at t, and also of B at t^, but B
lacks the power to remember all of A's experiences. According to the
definition of a person, A and B are both segments of a single person con-
stituted by A, B, and C. This is because the final state in the temporal
series, namely C, includes memories of all experiences in both A and B„
But (6) makes it impossible for A and B to be regarded as segments of
one person, since the later state, B, does not potentially include memo-
ries of all the experiences included in the earlier state, A. In order
to avoid the inconsistency we must further amend Locke's persistence cri-
terion to read:
(?) B at t 0 and A at t^ are states of consciousness belonging to the same
person if and only if there is a C at t, or at a t later than t^ such that
C potentially includes memories of every experience included in A and
every experience included in B.
0. of course, may or may not be identical with B.
b„ The identity criterion. Following the pattern that was estab-
lished for masses of matter and organisms, we can transform the persistence
criterion for persons into a test of identity for temporally extended
wholes.
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if and only if
(3a) (3E) \ {k is part of and
B is part of P ) and /T3C) i (C is a
state of consciousness and C potentially
includes memories of every experience
included in A and every experience
included in B
_)7] .
c. Can the self divide ? Given the definition of a person that we
have constructed for Locke, is it possible that a person might divide? It
is, of course, impossible that a person, P^, existing from t until t^,





tp until tj, and each identical with (Figure 1). To affirm the possi-
bility of such a state of affairs would be to deny that identity is a
transitive relation. But might it be the case that a temporal part of a
person, A, exists from t^ until t p , and is succeeded by two distinct per-
son-parts, B and C, existing from until t^, and that A is an earlier part
of a person, P, ’which has both B and C as its later parts? (Figure 2).
Then there would be just one person, P, but from t^ until t^ P would
possess two distinct branches. For this situation ter exist, it would be
necessary either that the last state of B or the last state of C include a
potential memory of every experience in every state that belongs to A , B
and C. Under these circumstances, however, contemporaneous states of B
and C would simply be simultaneous states of a single person. B and C
would not constitute distinct person-parts or distinct branches. There
would be one undivided person, who had ail the experiences of A between t
and tp
,




Something resembling the division of A could take place if the last
stage of B did not include potential memories of all experiences in C
and the last stage of C did not include potential memories of all experi-
ences in B. Then B and C would not only be distinct person-parts; they
would not even be parts of the same person. But suppose the last stages
of both B and C include potential memories of all experiences in A. Then
there is a person, P1? such that A and B are its earlier and later tempo-
ral parts, and there is a person, P
2 ,
such that A and C are its earlier
and later temporal states (Figure 5). and P
2
have a temporal part, A,
in common, but they are distinct persons. A, B and C are all of them
proper temporal parts of persons, and so do not count as persons in their
own right. But strictly speaking, A has not divided, for at all times it
has belonged to two distinct temporal wholes.
However, there is another way in which a more authentic form of divi-
sion might occur. The last stage of B might have the ability to recall
_gart of each state of consciousness included in A. B might be able to
recollect, for example, all of the visual experiences of A. The last
state of C, on the other hand, might include potential memories of all the
auditory experiences of A, but not any visual ones. Then the visual
experiences of A would constitute an earlier temporal part of a person,
Pn , having B an its later temporal stage and the auditory experiences of
A would constitute an earlier temporal part of another person, P~, having
C as its later part. Since the last stage of A is assumed to include
potential memories of all experiences had by A, and since A, taken as a
whole, is not a proper part of any one series constituting a person, it
seems reasonable to say that A counts as a person in its own right
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(Figure 4). Yet there is a part of A (= P^) which belongs to and
another part that belongs to P^, and P^ and are distinct from each
other. Thei e is no point in time at which A( =Pp) , divides. That is truly
an impossibility. A person-part can no more become identical with
another person-part than a person can become identical with another per-
son from whom he has been distinct. But P
,
in addition to being a tem-
porally whole person, is genuinely divided between two persons, each
distinct from and each distinct from the other.
Can Lockian persons fuse? Is it possible that there are two distinct
temporal person-parts, A and B, existing between t and t n and that from
t^ until t
j




such that A and C make up one
person and B and C make up another? (Figure 5). For this state of
affairs to come about it would be necessary for the last state of C to
contain potential memories of all experiences had by A and B. But if that
were the case, A and B would simply constitute simultaneous states of a
single person and would not be distinguishable as temporal parts. So





. I believe that Locke's theory of a person, when re-
constructed in the way attempted here, is free from contradictions.
Since, however, we have found no principle by which we can determine
what experiences belong to a given person at a given time, it remains a
conceptually inadequate account. If we do not know what experiences make
up a person at any one time, it is obvious that one cannot know what con-
stitutes a person considered as a temporally extended whole.
Furthermore, the very process of reconstructing the theory in a way
that renders it logically coherent has made manifest the fact that there
is little resemblance between a person, as Locke has conceived of him,
and what we take to be a person in ordinary life and discourse. V/e con-
ceive of a person as a subject of experiences, and not as the experiences
themselves. Consequently most of us find unacceptable the view that re-
membering his past experiences is essential to the continued existence of
a person. In addition, we think that the life of a person is roughly co-
extensive with the life of his body. If we believe in personal survival
after the death of the body, we consider that the lifetime of the person
includes as a part of itself the lifetime of the body. But Locke is
committed to the view that a person can endure only so long as there is a
state of consciousness that is potentially a memory of every item of ex-
perience in each of his earlier states. It is clear that, under this
conception, persons would be extremely short-lived, and that every human
body would have associated with it a host of distinct persons. Finally,
Locke's view permits persons to share numerically the same experiences,
while we tend to believe that an experience is something that can be had
by one person only. Locke is therefore obliged to accept the result that
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persons may overlap or have temporal parts in common. While not consti-
tuting a logical absurdity, this consequence is one that, from the stand-
point of our ordinary outlook, is very strange indeed.
Locke's version of a phenomenalist theory of personality can be
rendered logically consistent. But it cannot be denied that his concep-
tion of a person is a highly novel one. Does that mean that it is simply
false? The important issue, it seems to me, is not whether Locke is
using the term "person" in a way that conforms to our ordinary usage.
Clearly, he is not. What we need to know is whether there really are any
entities such as the ones that his definition of a person picks out.
Whether we, in the course of our daily discourse, call these things
"persons" is not of primary importance. The critical question is, rather,
do the series of states of consciousness that Locke's principles serve to
unify into wholes constitute real individuals? I think we would normally
regard organic bodies, whether vegetable or animal, as real entities that
exist by nature, so to speak., and not by mere convention or fiat.
Following a suggestion of Plato's in the Statesman, we may say that there
are natural lines or "cuts" which mark the temporal beginning and end of
individuals of this sort. A definition ox an organic body that serves to
demarcate its temporal boundaries may properly be expected to conform to
these natural "cuts." To find a case where it does not so conform is to
produce a counter-example to the definition. Does Locke's definition of
a person conform to natural, cuts delimiting real, beings or are the cuts
which it makes merely invented by Locke? I suggest that our ultimate
assessment of the value of Locke's theory will depend on an answer to
this question,
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5 II, 27, 26
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II, 27, 20-; Locke sometimes says that the same man can "at
different times make different persons" and that we "must allow it pos-
sible for the same man to be two distinct persons." This suggests that
he intended to legitimatize statements of the form "A is the same man
(human organism) as B, but A is not the same person as B," where the im-
plicit assumption is that A and B are both bodily organisms and both
persons. If such is the case, Locke was truly confused. The claim that
A and B, both of them F and both of them G, are the same F, but not the
same G, cannot be made intelligible when "F" and "G" are replaced by
expressions designating the kinds, body (man), soul and person. This is
because nothing which is a temporal slice of an individual belonging to
one of these kinds can be a temporal slice of an individual belonging to
smother of these kinds. If "F" is replaced by an expression designating
the kind, man (organism), said "G" by an expression designating the kind,
person, then any A and B which are both F (i.e., segments of a man) can-




II, 2 < , 26.
II, 27, 13.
II, 27, 10.
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